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The debate between Bernard Matolino and Wenceslaus Kwindingwi’s ‘The end of ubuntu’ and 
Thaddeus Metz’s ‘Just the beginning for ubuntu [..]’ has been a major force to be reckoned 
with and a serious bone of contention at least for thinkers such as Matolino; Jonathan 
Chimakonam; Mojalefa Koenane and Cyril-Mary Olatunji; and Leonhard Praeg. Matolino and 
Kwindingwi argue that ubuntu as an ethical theory and a recommended way of life has reached 
its end. They insist on its relevance as served only by small-scale and tight-knit communities. 
Not only is this so but they also argue that ubuntu is not relevant for modern African realities. 
On the contrary, Metz thinks that ubuntu is still relevant as an ethical theory and a way of life. 
He argues that its relevance is not limited to traditional and pre-industrial set ups. He thinks 
that ubuntu is open to the dictates and dynamics of modernity since those who reside in large-
scale communities live up to its values. He suggests that scholarly inquiry into and political 
application of ubuntu must be construed as projects that are only now properly getting started. 
However, this dissertation seeks to subject this on-going debate and its two contributors 
(Chimakonam and Koenane and Olatunji) to philosophical scrutiny. Its original contribution to 
literature is two-fold. Firstly, it argues that Metz’s; Chimakonam’s; and Koenane and 
Olatunji’s arguments are neither compelling nor should they be adumbrated as standard replies 
to Matolino and Kwindingwi. Secondly, it contends that ubuntu is not relevant for modern 
African societies. 
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Introduction and Background to the Study. 
Preliminary Remarks. 
The question for the relevance of ubuntu in modern southern Africa is the main concern for 
this research project.1 This project seeks to subject the Matolino-Kwindingwi-Metz debate and 
its two earlier commentaries [Jonathan Chimakonam (2016) and Mojalefa Koenane and Cyril-
Mary Olatunji (2017)] to philosophical scrutiny. Its original contribution to knowledge seeks 
to subject this debate and its two contributors to critical scrutiny by using the question of 
ubuntu’s relevance as its recurring motif. The sole business for my subjecting these to 
philosophical scrutiny is motivated by my questioning the relevance of ubuntu with specific 
reference to the debate. The debate rests upon two disparate postulations: “The end of ubuntu” 
– as initiated by Bernard Matolino and Wenceslaus Kwindingwi (2013); and just the beginning 
for it by Thaddeus Metz (2014). Central to the disparities between these debaters are certain 
adumbrations that illustrate the possibilities for the relevance and irrelevance of ubuntu in 
modern Africa. At the heart of these adumbrations lie certain contributions that are aimed either 
at continuing or revisiting the debate. 
Outline. 
This chapter is comprised of nine sections. Sections one outline the Matolino-Kwindingwi-
Metz debate. Sections two provide a preview of contributions to the debate. Sections three 
outline this project’s original contribution to the debate. Sections four discuss the question of 
the relevance of ubuntu critically; ubuntu and its relevance. Sections five provide a brief 
overview of ubuntu and its problems of interpretation. Sections six introduce the main research 
question for this project, sub-questions, and objectives. Sections seven discuss the research 
methodology. The last section provides an outline of chapters. 
 
1 Before anything else, a declaimer should be made here, that ubuntu has been a subject of intense debates. The 
sole business for making such a disclaimer is a double-edged sword. Firstly, I do this to ease the text flow so as 
to avoid making the text harder to read or easy to undermine. Secondly, I understand that some of the views I will 
be criticising were important ones to have been voiced even though this project may, on some occasions, be 




The Matolino-Kwindingwi-Metz Debate. 
The debate attempts to question the relevance of ubuntu (Matolino and Kwindingwi) and affirm 
its relevance (Metz) for modern Africa. It rests on two disparate postulations: “The end of 
ubuntu” (Matolino and Kwindingwi, 2013) and “Just the beginning for ubuntu [..]” (Metz, 
2014). The former demonstrates that ubuntu ought to reach its end as an ethical theory and way 
of life. It argues that ubuntu is an outdated notion and does not have the capacity to shape ethics 
in the current South African context (Matolino and Kwindingwi, 2013). The latter affirms the 
beginning and relevance for ubuntu as an ethical theory and way of life. It seeks to argue that 
scholarly inquiry into and the political application of ubuntu should be viewed as projects that 
are only now properly getting started (Metz, 2014). 
A Preview of Contributions to The Debate. 
The Matolino-Kwindingwi-Metz debate has received a great deal of notice from thinkers such 
as Matolino (2015); Chimakonam (2016); Koenane and Olatunji (2017); and Praeg (2017). For 
this reason, there are some perennial issues that are intrinsic to their contributions to the debate. 
Firstly, Matolino (2015) responds to Metz by arguing that his response poses no threat to their 
original position. He shows that his assessment of Metz’s position puts Metz in an unenviable 
position of defending the indefensible. He proves Metz’s position to be dogmatic and un-
philosophical. Secondly, despite some agreements here and there in the process of endorsing 
Metz’s account, Chimakonam (2016) finds Matolino (2015); and Matolino and Kwindingwi 
(2013) more wanting. He thinks that proclaiming the demise of ubuntu or its end is not just a 
mere declaration, but it is a problem. The significance of this problem will re-define not only 
the sphere of ubuntu philosophy but also the history of African philosophy. He agrees with 
Metz that the arguments marshalled in support of it are indecisive. On the other side, he agrees 
with Matolino (2015) that Metz’s systematization of ubuntu may not be as impregnable as Metz 
envisages. He then argues for the re-invention of ubuntu using the tool of conversational 
thinking. Thirdly, in their attempt to uphold Metz’s account as more plausible, Koenane and 
Olatunji (2017), also find Matolino and Kwindingwi’s (2013) account more wanting. They 
argue that ubuntu, insofar as it is a moral theory, is competitive and will ultimately prove to be 
a desirable ethic which could contribute positively towards developing moral character in the 
contemporary socio-political environment in parts of Africa. Finally, of equal significance is 
Praeg’s (2017) account, which proves both sides of the debate [Matolino and Kwindingwi 
(2013); and Metz (2014)] to be unfounded though he does subscribe to the angle from which 




outline of the basic minimum of conceptual moves any Ubuntu theorists has to make in order 
for their text to avoid the twin seductions of being either a contemporary variant for an outdated 
ethnophilosophy, or an ahistorical analysis of Ubuntu that remains oblivious to the historicity 
of the concept”.  
This Project’s Original Contribution to The Debate. 
This project seeks to wade into the debate, and its two contributors in a manner that subjects 
them to critical scrutiny. As a result, I take this debate seriously not only because my calling 
into question the relevance of ubuntu is framed within its ambits but because I recognize it as 
one of the most outstanding debates in philosophical discourses. For this reason, this project is 
a starting point for what may be conceived of as giving this debate and its contributors serious 
philosophical attention. This philosophical attention is served by the question of ubuntu’s 
relevance as its recurring motif. It is this project’s contribution which demonstrates that to deal 
with this specific debate, especially for the purposes of addressing the question of ubuntu’s 
relevance for our own times, one has to start grappling with two crucial issues amongst others. 
The First Issue: An Interrogation of Metz; Chimakonam; & Koenane and Olatunji.  
I wish to suggest that one has to think carefully about Metz; Chimakonam; and Koenane and 
Olatunji not only by becoming aware of their arguments but in a manner that interrogates them 
philosophically. For this reason, I know none of the contributors (e.g., Matolino (2015); 
Chimakonam (2016); Koenane and Olatunji (2017); and Praeg (2017)) whose works have 
received considerable attention in philosophical circles.2 Or at least this is one of the gaps to 
be identified and filled up in this project.3 Thus, it does seem clear that contributors of the 
debate could only be counted on the fingers of one hand. But I hardly think that appealing to 
numbers as a means of brushing aside philosophical insights - of the said contributors - and 
citing this debate in passing will prove to be justifiable to everyone’s satisfaction. Reflecting 
on philosophical insights as opposed to appealing to numbers and years the debate and its 
contributions have survived is exactly what this current project seeks to contribute to 
knowledge. This is the kind of reflection that seeks to fill some of the gaps or underexplored 
areas from the debate: dealing with the question of ubuntu’s relevance and providing critical 
comments on some of its contributors. In doing so, this project seeks to unveil new grounds by 
interrogating Metz, Chimakonam, and Koenane and Olatunji thoroughly. It serves as a prime 
 
2 Jonathan Chimakonam does engage with Matolino (2015) but that on its own does not mean that he (Matolino 
(2015)) has received considerable attention from other philosophers 




candidate for arguing that their arguments are neither compelling nor should they be 
adumbrated as standard replies to Matolino and Kwindingwi.  
In other words, even if readers were to endorse Metz’s; Chimakonam’s and Koenane and 
Olatunji’s views as I do not, but I will point them to the following outcomes. Firstly, I shall 
present a close examination of how ubuntu has been grounded in contemporary Africa. This 
examination is directed at scholarly inquiry into ubuntu. It relies on different scholars who 
interpret/ground the possibilities for ubuntu’s relevance in the light of Western philosophical 
approaches. Moreover, I will then contest Chimakonam’s (2016) approval of Metz’s 
systematisation of ubuntu. No doubt, Chimakonam has credited Metz with the status of 
developing a philosophical system which represents a new version of ubuntu with theoretical 
sophistication (Ibid.). I will argue that Chimakonam’s (2016) approval will not go very far if 
we consider thinkers such as Ramose (2007). On this way of thinking, I urge readers to doubt 
Chimakonam’s approval of Metz’s system as demonstrating ubuntu’s ‘proper mode of 
philosophising’ for our own times (Ibid.). Secondly, I will argue that there is a logical 
inconsistency that haunts Metz’s rejoinder. This inconsistency bifurcates between his 
justifications for: (a) The beginning for ubuntu; and (b) The beginning for its projects that he 
deems as properly getting started. Thirdly, I will then provide a response to Chimakonam’s 
stand with Metz and Matolino on Metz’s systematization of ubuntu. I will show that it is not 
clear where he stands in his: (a) Approval of Matolino’s impatience with Metz’s 
systematization; and (b) His rejection of Metz’s systematisation. No doubt, Chimakonam seeks 
to provide a credible assessment of (or the “one way of credibly assessing”) the debate. And 
he writes as if this were necessarily the case. On the contrary, I will seek to pursue a specific 
line of critique which shows that this ‘one way of credibly assessing’ the debate is not as 
credible as Chimakonam would have us believe. Fourthly, I will show that Koenane and 
Olatunji’s contribution is vulnerable to significant flaws. Namely, I will provide an analysis 
which shows that the perspective they have adopted - in their reaction to Matolino and 
Kwindingwi - is not as different as they make it sound. Not only is this so but their perspective 
serves as a resuscitation of Metz’s perspective with different justifications. I will also provide 
another analysis which shows that they have failed to provide a summary and an examination 
of Metz’s rejoinder. Finally, I will then point readers to: their misreading of Matolino and 
Kwindingwi’s anecdote; as well as their misinterpretation of Matolino and Kwindingwi’s 




These outcomes purport to demonstrate the kind of suspicion that a careful reader would have 
to foster towards understanding Metz; Chimakonam; and Koenane and Olatunji. For this 
reason, and in the process of engaging with these thinkers, I will show how my position fits in 
with the positions of philosophers with whom I aim to agree or disagree. I will show why my 
view is preferable to the ones I will be criticising especially on the issue(s) where I differ. I 
will also acknowledge why the views I will be criticising were important ones to have been 
voiced, even if I think they are up to scrutiny. I will also show what impact my original 
contribution has, if it is relevant, to the current debate to which this project contributes.4 
The Second Issue: Exploring the Relevance of Ubuntu For Our Own Times. 
This project also serves as a prime candidate for delving into Matolino and Kwindingwi and 
Metz so as to search for ubuntu’s relevance and its relationships with the facets of modernity. 
This second issue is informed by my own interrogation of Metz’s (2014) rejoinder using 
Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013). This is precisely because I read these scholars [Matolino 
and Kwindingwi and Metz] as sparking a certain kind of investigation about ubuntu and its 
relationships with the facets of modernity, especially in its attempt to deal with the question of 
ubuntu’s relevance for contemporary Africa. Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013) argue that 
ubuntu is not in tandem with the facets of modernity. I read them as attempting to spark a 
certain kind of investigation about the non-suitability or irrelevance of ubuntu for modern 
African societies. As for these thinkers, ubuntu ought to reach its end because it clashes with 
the dynamics of modernity. On the contrary, Metz (2014: 71) thinks that this is not necessarily 
the case. He contends that ubuntu is open for modern demands or “the desirable facets of 
modernity”. I read Metz as insisting that ubuntu has some values that demonstrate its relevance 
for a place like Johannesburg in South Africa. On this view, he suggests that the question of 
ubuntu and its conflicts with the dictates and dynamics of modernity could be resolved by 
appealing to its (ubuntu’s) values (Ibid.). No doubt, Africa must resolve its telling problems 
that are imposed by aspects of its traditions that are in conflict with the dynamics of modernity. 
And this is exactly what I urge readers to take notice of whenever they read the Matolino-
Kwindingwi-Metz debate. This debate seeks to take modern realities very seriously: either by 
arguing that ubuntu is not in concord with the desirable facets of modernity, or by insisting that 
ubuntu is not vulnerable to the changes that unfold in modern African societies. However, for 
various reasons which I shall come to later in this project, I will argue that Metz’s account fails 
 
4 I drew this checklist from Brian Mogck’s book (2008: 14 – 15) entitled “Writing to Reason: A companion for 




to account for ubuntu’s relevance for our own times. And if this specific line of critique 
succeeds, readers would notice that ubuntu is clattered with realities that makes it fail to account 
for changes faced by modern southern African societies. 
On the Question for the Relevance of Ubuntu. 
From the foregoing, one may wonder why the question for the relevance of ubuntu is raised in 
this project. She/he may be convinced that there are reasons that could lead some readers to: 
reject my reading of the debate; or commit themselves to another reading they deem suitable. 
The point here is to anticipate the kinds of objections that can be raised against reasons which 
could reject my reading of the debate. Some may even doubt the significance of this question, 
despite that it is used with specific reference to the debate. This is because such attempts are 
certainly not new on the literature of ubuntu. Others may even insist that questions of this sort 
have been answered and affirmed by the sheer number of scholars. Or one may drag and 
dismiss this question as trivial or reject it in an outright manner. However, this section seeks to 
shed some light on why the question for the relevance of ubuntu with specific reference to the 
debate is central and worth discussing. This is not to suggest that questions such as this are 
neither open to rational, informed, and honest disagreements since they are more of an on-
going pursuit rather than a dogmatic inquiry.  
As a result, I think it is crucial to set things straight here so as to avoid constant questions as to 
why one should accept my calling into question the relevance of ubuntu. These questions may 
come from different thinkers who hold dissenting views about the role and relevance of ubuntu 
for contemporary Africa. I aim to justify the claim that the question for the relevance of ubuntu 
in modern southern Africa is gleaned from my reading of the debate. This debate involves 
“anti- and pro-ubuntu” thinkers who frame their discussions with reference to the end of ubuntu 
and just the beginning for it. This is not to suggest that only after this debate did I [or should 
others] begin to seriously wonder about the question for its relevance. My reliance on its 
question does not mean that there is no heritage of thinkers outside the debate who have dealt 
with this matter in their discussions about affirming or questioning its relevance and the kinds 
of justifications they sought to rely on. Hence, I aim to exemplify this in two respects.  
Firstly, Metz (2011) affirms its relevance by constructing an ethical principle that not only 
grows out of the indigenous understandings of ubuntu but also clearly amounts for the 
importance of individual liberty and is readily applicable to addressing present-day South 




the relevance of ubuntu for the new South Africa (Ibid.). Secondly, others defend its relevance 
by showing a coincidence in its values and some of the values enshrined in the constitution of 
South Africa. For instance, Moeketsi Letseka (2012: 47) defends ubuntu against Penny Enslin 
and Kai Horsthemke’s (2004) take on ubuntu in a manner that seeks to reveal its potential as a 
moral theory and public policy. 
What is clear from the foregoing is that it was not until Metz’s (2014) response to Matolino 
and Kwindingwi (2013) that the relevance of ubuntu for contemporary Africa was affirmed. A 
typical example of a prior affirmation is made manifest in Metz’s (2011) submission and 
Letseka’s (2012) defence of ubuntu against Enslin and Horsthemke (2004) who did register 
some grounds of scepticism. There are some thinkers (e.g., Mdluli, 1987; Marx, 2002) who 
even sound a sceptical note against ubuntu even before Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013). Wim 
van Binsbergen (2001) provides the most trenchant critique of the way in which ubuntu has 
been constructed and used in post-apartheid South Africa (McAllister, 2009). His was a 
recognition of the utopian and prophetic nature of ubuntu. He posits ubuntu as a creation of 
some African elites [academics] similar to other utopian ideals such as African communalism, 
Nkrumah’s (1965) Consciencism and African socialism (van Binsbergen, 2001).  
Another crucial point registered by Matolino (2019: 1) takes Emmanuel Eze (2008; 2008a) as 
providing an insightful critique of ubuntu that is targeted at its shortcomings as a philosophical 
tool that may inform how philosophy reflects on the political. This [Eze’s] critique predates 
“The end of ubuntu” as advocated by Matolino and Kwindingwi. Here Matolino (2019: 1) reads 
Eze as demonstrating that “ubuntu as an extraordinary moral framework may be ill-suited to 
capture ordinary experiences and subsequently pass appropriate judgment”.5 It is precisely 
because of Matolino’s (2019) own reaffirmations of Eze’s critique that makes him to be critical 
of ubuntu as Eze is. Matolino (2015; 2019) is not a defender of ubuntu nor is Eze (2008; 2008a); 
and van Binsbergen (2001) etc. What this shows is that it was not after Matolino and 
Kwindingwi have critiqued ubuntu that other scholars began to subject it to scrutiny.  But even 
a host of other scholars have made this state of affairs quite evident even after Matolino and 
Kwindingwi. Key amongst scholars who contest its relevance [especially outside this debate] 
we can identify Clive Zimunya, Joyline Gwara and Bernard Mlambo (2015) who question the 
feasibility of ubuntu in a modernized world. 
 
5 I urge readers to notice that Eze’s critique (especially his suggestion that ubuntu is ‘too much’ or relies on ‘luck 




There is also a cloud of witnesses who attest to its defence prior to/and after Matolino and 
Kwindingwi. For instance, it has been argued that the majority of South African population 
continues to be nurtured and educated according to the tenets of ubuntu (Ramose, 2001). Some 
insist that ubuntu should be considered foundational to the constitution of South Africa. Others 
also acknowledge its widespread use today, since it occurs in everyday speech and in most 
sophisticated contexts, and as a concept in management ideologies in the transitional stages of 
post-apartheid South Africa (van Binsbergen, 2001). The concept of ubuntu has also been 
construed as capable of playing a significant role in the process of reconciliation after the end 
of apartheid (Weidtmann, 2019). Its relevance is also demonstrated as the underlying moral 
framework of reconciliatory politics of South African rainbow nation (Mwipikeni, 2018). 
My justification from the debate rests upon two considerations. Firstly, I consider the debate 
itself to be based on questioning ubuntu, its relevance and how ubuntu ought to reach its end 
in modern southern Africa. Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013); Matolino (2015) – [about its end 
and irrelevance]; and Praeg (2017) – [not about its end but its irrelevance] - are actually a good 
case in point here. Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013) sought to argue that the project of ubuntu 
ought to reach its end as an ethical theory and way of life. For this reason, they think that the 
concerted effort of reviving ubuntu in South Africa has occupied the centre stage since the 
dawn of democracy. The widespread, public, and concerted “ubuntuisation” of the intellectual, 
business, public and private lives are all there is to their arguments aimed at questioning 
ubuntu’s public display in South Africa. They posit that contemporary conditions in [Southern] 
Africa are such that there is no justification for appealing to an ethic associated with ubuntu 
(Ibid.) 
They argue that there is a big disjuncture between the natural environs in which we can 
conceive ubuntu to have been a success and the current state of affairs in modern day Africa. 
Not only did they posit that ubuntu has largely disappeared because of irreversible effects of 
modernity and industrialization but insist that the disappearance of its favourable and natural 
conditions render it obsolete (Matolino and Kwindingwi, 2013: 203). They endorse its howling 
success as intrinsic to undifferentiated, small, and tight knit communities that are relatively 
underdeveloped (2013: 202). Matolino’s (2015) response to Metz (2014) is a demonstration of 
their surety and consistency to their “original position”: a position, which sought to question 




Their project flows from two main lines of reasoning. On the one hand, they seek to argue that 
the aggressive promotion of ubuntu in post-apartheid South Africa is an elitist project so 
conceived by the new black elites. They insist that black elites conceive of ubuntu as a 
restorative move as well as an attempt at securing the dignity of black masses as well as an 
attempt at forging a so-called black identity. This first line of reasoning draws on historical 
cases that sought to aggressively promote an African mode of being which coincided with both 
the end of colonialism and the rise of black elitism. These scholars note that such attempts 
ended in very public and political failures. On this view, there is a sense in which ubuntu is 
construed as the “aggressive promotion” or a revival project by black elites aimed at restoring 
and securing the dignity of black masses. The African mode of being is consumed by this 
aggression of ubuntu which ended in public and political failures on the continent. In their 
second line of reasoning, they question the desirability of ubuntu as a mark/guide of the spirit 
of the nation. Their critique of ubuntu concentrates on the disjunct that exists between the 
metaphysical conditions necessary for the attainment of ubuntu and the stark ontological and 
ethical crisis facing the new elites and “our people” (Matolino and Kwindingwi, 2013).  
Secondly, I read Metz’s (2014) reply to Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013) as affirming – [Just 
like Chimakonam (2016) and Koenane and Olatunji (2017)], - instead of questioning, the 
beginning, and the relevance for ubuntu in his “reply” to these thinkers. In fact, just like 
Matolino (2015: 214), I read Metz as offering “a defence of the relevance of ubuntu theorists”. 
No doubt, only after Matolino and Kwindingwi had criticized ubuntu did Metz thought about 
its beginning. Central to Metz’s response to these thinkers is his argumentation that not only 
should scholarly inquiry into ubuntu be viewed as the projects that is only now properly getting 
started but even ubuntu’s political application. From this, I read Metz’s argumentation as 
imbedded in two-pronged strategies: (a) That of scholarly inquiry; and (b) Political application.  
Metz’s reading of these thinkers depicts them as portraying dyadic equivalences. The first 
equivalence is sociological whereas the second one is philosophical. The former adumbrates 
them as insisting that political elites who have most influentially invoked ubuntu have done so 
in ways that serve nefarious social functions. Narrowing down the discourse about how to live 
is reminiscent of these nefarious functions. The latter adumbrates these thinkers as insisting 
that the moral ideals of ubuntu are appropriate only for a bygone era or pre-modern age.  
Metz’s account proceeds from both the position of negativity and positivity. At the negative 




(2013) are insufficient to draw their conclusion. The said insufficiency inaugurates Metz’s 
negativity towards them. On the positive side of the spectrum, Metz provides reason to think 
that ubuntu as an ethical theory has a lot going for it as an account of how individuals and 
institutions should be moral in the twenty first century. Not only does Metz’s “body of work” 
serve as his defence of ubuntu but he was generous enough to grant other “interpreters of 
ubuntu” the opportunity to air their views against Matolino and Kwindingwi (Metz, 2014). This 
can also be extended to contributors to the debate who take an affirmative stance as Metz does. 
For instance, Koenane and Olatunji (2017) contend that ubuntu as far as it is a moral theory is 
competitive and will ultimately prove to be a desirable ethic which could contribute positively 
towards developing moral character in parts of contemporary Africa. Therefore, this debate 
gives credence to my calling into question the relevance for ubuntu in modern southern Africa. 
Ubuntu And Its Relevance. 
Things are not really that straightforward when it comes to ubuntu and its relevance. In this 
section, I proceed by way of asking a single question that gives birth to its sub-questions. The 
section strikes a note of caution by showing that readers must be alert to certain things when 
attempting to answer the question of ubuntu and its relevance. That is, up to a certain time the 
question of what ubuntu, and its relevance really is, was never of further reflection and serious 
speculative activity until it was laid open to a contested terrain or until its textual history was 
made manifest. Not only does a particular way of clarifying what ubuntu and its relevance are, 
emanate from the likes of different thinkers but it springs from the sheer number of 
interpretations, which are sometimes irreconcilable. In other words, I do recognise that ubuntu 
and its relevance has been and continues to be a major force to be reckoned with and a serious 
borne of contention at least for thinkers whose scholarship is based on Southern Africa. This 
is particularly because it has attracted their attention from a variety of disciplines such as law, 
politics, sociology, and philosophy, etc (Weidtmann, 2019: 98). The place where ubuntu seems 
to be very particular and construed as the root of African philosophy is Southern Africa 
(Ramose, 2003: 23). In addition, it is recognised as endogenous to sub-Saharan African 
indigenes (Matolino, 2015: 215). Even though it originated from Southern Africa, but its Pan-
African and African nationalists give credence to its application as not limited to Southern 
Africa, let alone South Africa, write Koenane and Olatunji (2017: 267). 
This section does not insist that proponents and opponents of ubuntu must not be listened to. It 




depend in the contemporary Southern African context (Gordon, 2014). The idea that ubuntu 
has much to offer to the wider world; particularly in southern Africa is taken seriously by some 
scholars (Magadla and Chitando, 2014). Advocates of an ethic of ubuntu insist that ubuntu has 
a tremendous contribution to make to a new understanding of a human being as originally a 
being in relations (Murove, 2014). The reality of the matter is that ubuntu is deemed relevant 
by a number of scholars (Munyaka and Motlhabi, 2009). But the opposite is also true and ought 
to be taken seriously since there exists some doubts about the efficacy of ubuntu in 
contemporary Africa. Some thinkers may insist that discussions on ubuntu will do us no good 
since it is fraught with many problems. The end results may prove such discussions as fruitless 
endeavours which manifest the politicisation of ubuntu in general. There are high chances that 
discussions such as these may be undermined right from the outset. 
This section does not seek to answer the question of ubuntu and its relevance, but it may attempt 
brief answers to its sub-questions. The main question is: what is ubuntu and its relevance in 
modern Southern Africa? Its sub-questions go something like this: has ubuntu enjoyed its 
relevance in the past? Was the question of its relevance pondered in the past? Did scholars of 
ubuntu wondered about the question of its affirmation for modern Africa? How was the logic 
of its affirmation made possible? Can one affirm ubuntu as an ethic or way of life if it has never 
been of any relevance in the past? Why should one be concerned with the question of its 
relevance nowadays? Are these set of sub-questions worth asking in African philosophy? Or 
has this set of questions been of further reflection and serious speculation among many a 
philosopher in Africa?  
Sub-Questions. 
I wish to focus on the said set of questions before dealing with the first or main question asked 
in this section. In attempting to answer this set of questions tentatively, I think ubuntu has 
enjoyed its relevance in the past since it is shown that no one was truly human except when 
they were in full relationship with others. Everyone depended on the community to attest to 
his/her humanity. The true human potential was realised in partnership with others since one’s 
humanity was bound up with the humanity of others (Ngcoya, 2015: 1). For this reason, ubuntu 
was based upon an ethic which recognises the community as primary. The individual in this 
community was completely constituted by their relationship with others (Bilchitz, Metz, and 
Oyowe, 2017: 157). The idea of brotherhood, welfarism, family atmosphere was all there was 
to indigenous African societies. What seems to be misleading for some thinkers is that Africans 




existent in traditional Africa. The collective purpose as opposed to individual purpose was 
cherished to show that the true and only African philosophy in traditional Africa was the 
philosophy of brotherhood, welfarism which is said to have prevented anyone from becoming 
more prosperous than anyone else (Anoba, 2018). It must be clear that these assertions aimed 
to demonstrate that communalism was the standard of ethical behaviour. It was based on these 
assertions that communalism was posited as the blueprint for restoring Africans to wholeness; 
organizing our social life; as well as a template for political re-organization across the continent 
(Taiwo, 2016 in Mosima, 2018: 48). This status of African communalism was popularized in 
the writings of the first wave of post-independence leaders: Julius Nyerere; Kenneth Kaunda; 
Kwame Nkrumah; Ahmed Sekou Toure; and Leopold Sedar Senghor. These nationalist-
ideological politicians and “philosopher kings” were also doubled as Africa’s pioneer 
intelligentsia (Wiredu, 2004: 18; and Masolo, 2004: 488 in Mosima, 2018: 53). They were 
writing in response to the challenges of nation construction in the 1960’s. Not only did they 
produce political philosophies embedded in Marxist-Leninist thoughts, but they also appealed 
to their indigenous cultural heritage (Mosima, 2018). They were of the view that this new 
orientation of communalism could most authentically suit Africa’s moral merits and cultural 
specificities (Ibid.).  
However, even before its articulation by these philosopher kings or political thinkers, African 
communalism was earlier articulated in Placide Tempels’ Bantu Philosophy (1959). Tempels 
was of the view that the human being or person in Bantu thought was defined through the 
community. And this collective ontology is also said to have been broadened by [John Mbiti; 
Ifeanyi Menkiti]; Mogobe Ramose who attest to the African notion of community (Mosima, 
2018: 55). Kwame Gyekye rejects this collective ontology as radical communitarianism and 
advances his moderate account which recognises the community and the individual. Polycarp 
Ikuenobe (2006) also identified - beyond radical and moderate standpoints – multiple senses 
of communalism (Taiwo, 2016: 84). However, it is not my aim in this project to discuss other 
philosophers who have reacted to the debate between the community and the individual (Eze, 
2008; 2018, Matolino, 2009; 2011a; 2011b; 2014; 2018a, Famakinwa, 2010; Oyowe, 2013; 
2015, Molefe, 2016; 2017; 2019, Chemhuru, 2018; Ikuenobe, 2006; 2017 etc). What this shows 
– especially when one reads works by African nationalists and some thinkers - is that communal 
thoughts were all there was to traditional societies. Surely, there may be some traditional 




must be rare since many of them were grounded on kinship relations, which began from the 
household and expand to lineage and clan proportions. 
The question of its relevance was dealt with by appealing to what ubuntu was in indigenous 
African societies. It has been argued that some southern African scholars think of ubuntu as a 
key concept to evoke unadulterated forms of African social life before the advent of 
colonialism (Mosima, 2018: 52). It is this concept which is said to have survived even today 
especially in remote villages and intimate kin relationships (Ibid., 52). In other words, what 
ubuntu was in these societies was a product of the unanimity of thoughts. What it was, was its 
usefulness as an ethic, moral or unifying worldview. Equally significant is the logic or 
assurance of its affirmation as an ethical/moral theory: (e.g. Metz and Gaie, 2011; Metz, 2007; 
2009a; 2010; 2011; 2013; 2014; Blessler, 2008; Broodryk, 2002, 2005, 2006; Ramose, 1999, 
2002; Shutte, 1993; Mokgoro, 1998; Sindane and Lienberg, 2000; Letseka, 2000, 2013a, 
2013b, 2014; Tutu, 1999; Teffo, 1994); a public policy (Nkondo, 2007); (Letseka, 2013); a 
basis for African ethics (e.g. Murove, 2009; 2013, Mkhize, 2008); a way of life (e.g. Munyaka 
and Motlhabi, 2009; Metz, 2014, Koenane and Olatunji); a narrative of return (e.g. Gade, 2011, 
Matolino and Kwindingwi, 2013); an educational value (e.g. Letseka, 2000; 2013, Nkondo, 
2007 and others); “an underlying motif of the bill of rights”6 etc, in modern Africa by a number 
of scholars. It seems clear that ubuntu has received considerable attention in post-
colonial/apartheid Southern Africa. Other thinkers like Mkhwanazi (2016) may even insist that 
its relevance should not be confined to traditional societies but acknowledgements to its 
dynamism ought to be taken seriously. In their acknowledgements of this dynamism, they may 
not read ubuntu as a concept that is fixed or monolithic but a practice of re-making, re-
imagining things as people’s experiences change or as new challenges arise (Mkhwanazi, 
2016). Hence, ubuntu has clearly taken on new meanings in contemporary African societies 
(Ibid.).  
These sub-questions can be read as attempts by Africans at finding something better, relevant, 
and uniquely African, about ubuntu and how it must be seen in post-colonial/apartheid 
Southern Africa. The “need for ubuntu” as opposed to “victimization”7 was demonstrated to 
restore the dignity and self-respect of the African person denied of his or her humanity by 
exploitation, and annihilation through slavery, colonisation, and apartheid (Mkhwanazi, 2016). 
 
6 This assertion was made by the South African constitutional court. 




The employment of ubuntu in the interim constitution of South Africa and the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission exemplifies this call for a return to ubuntu. These attempts 
subjected ubuntu as something that ought to be used spatially to affirm, if not proving the point 
or trying by all means to establish a metaphysical grounding for the relevance of ubuntu in 
post-colonial/apartheid Southern Africa. The point I am labouring to achieve here is that the 
above set of questions is certainly worth asking and reflecting not only in philosophy but very 
much so even amongst thinkers of different persuasions who are keen about ubuntu and its 
relevance.  
The Question of What Ubuntu Is. 
I wish to separate the main question for this section in two parts. This separation is necessary 
for analytical purposes. The first part: What is ubuntu? The second part: what is its relevance? 
The former captures ubuntu. The latter its relevance. The set of proceeding questions that 
followed were a direct result of the former and the letter. This is primarily because the above 
set of questions either stem from the question of ‘ubuntu’ or its ‘relevance’. The most pertinent 
fact is that the latter is in tandem with the research question for this project. But, before 
considering the latter as constitutive of this project’s examination, it is crucial that one 
understands what it is that makes the former worth discussing here. Namely, what is ubuntu? 
 
There are different answers that could results from the “what is ubuntu or its relevance” 
questions. For this reason, an attempt for a justifiable answer to the first part of the question 
depends entirely on what one makes of what ubuntu means/might be. Christian Gade (2012) 
describes and systematises different answers to “What is ubuntu?” question. The conclusion he 
arrives at distinguishes between two clusters of answers to this “what is” question. He argues 
that answers that are loyal to the first cluster of “what is” question posit ubuntu as a moral 
quality of a person whilst answers to the second cluster depict ubuntu as a phenomenon (e.g., 
philosophy, ethic, worldview, and African humanism etc) according to which persons are 
interconnected (Gade, 2012: 484 – 501). What seems to be the problem, for some scholars, is 
that we are left with competing interpretations of “what ubuntu is” (Matolino, 2015). This is 
precisely because never before its written literature has one accounted for a clear and consistent 
expository explanation and description of what ubuntu was prior to what it is now. However, 
as Ramose (2005: 83) points out, this does not mean that “any supposed lack of writings on 
ubuntu is tantamount to lack of thought”. Unlike Europe or the Americas where sufficient texts 




society, it rarely does in Africa (Anoba, 2017).8 Surely, faint traces remained an obstacle for 
traditional African societies. Traditional Africans inoculated repetitions of the folk thoughts of 
their peoples. The results were such that some folk ideas tended to be swapped in the pool of 
communal thought since they were neither preserved in print (Wiredu, 1980: 37). The same 
problem applies to “what is ubuntu” question because - ubuntu has many meanings that are 
inexhaustible because it cannot be pinned down to have originated at a particular point in time 
in history (Murove, 2014). 
The Question of Its Relevance. 
I am apt to think that the question of ubuntu’s relevance requires a close examination and 
attention to detail since some philosophers are sceptical about it in modern Africa. For instance, 
van Binsbergen (2001); Marx (2002); Enslin and Horsthemke (2004); Eze (2008; and 2008a); 
Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013) Matolino (2015); Zimunya, Gwara and Mlambo (2015); 
Matolino (2019) etc. However, this does not mean that it is only through this form of scepticism 
that one should frame, re-think, re-appropriate, or begin to seriously wonder about, the question 
of its relevance for our own times. For this reason, the question for ubuntu’s relevance rests 
upon two basic tenets in this project. Firstly, there is going to be a chapter that deals with 
ubuntu’s metaphysical grounding or the manner in which the possibilities of ubuntu have been 
grounded in post-colonial/apartheid (southern) Africa: Chapter two. Secondly, and as outlined 
above, I shall delve into the Matolino-Kwindingwi-Metz debate in order to address the question 
of ubuntu’s relevance and its relationships with the dictates and dynamics of modernity: 
Chapter five.  
Ubuntu and the Problem of Interpretation. 
Anyone who is said to be very keen and curious about this place’s9 philosophy, would have 
noticed that ubuntu is understood in different ways. Not only would this be the case, but she/he 
has to understand that ubuntu is contested in as far as its interpretations, and descriptions are 
concerned. At the heart of these deliberations lie certain disparities whose sole aims are to 
affirm or not to affirm its place in modern African experiences. The sole aim of affirming or 
not affirming its place is occasioned by how different thinkers, academics, legal practitioners, 
politicians, ordinary people, and others grapple with its relevance to modern Africa. For this 
reason, the term is said to have circulated through orality and tradition associated with no 
 
8 This point is further clarified by Anoba Abrahim (2017: 38). He argues that most knowledge on the evolution of 
African philosophy was preserved in arts, tales and other literatures passed from one generation to another. 




particular authoritative text. So, it automatically becomes open to interpretation especially in 
view of its application to contemporary southern Africa (Blaukenberg, 1999: 43). 
 It should come as no surprise that ubuntu is riddled with problems. The crux of the matter it 
that it is often used - in a mechanical way - to solve current problems (Venter, 2004). What 
appears to be forgotten, or not given the attention it deserves is that ubuntu comes from a feudal 
socio-economic system where Chiefs, clans, and extended families were providers of wealth 
and values (Ibid.). What Elza Venter (2004) points out is that African cultures and historic 
contexts should be taken cognisant of when using ubuntu [to re-appropriate it for modern or 
large-scale societies]. On this occasion, one should not uncritically accept everything that is 
said about African cultures. What one should refrain from is romanticising everything about 
what it is/means to be African. This is particularly linked to ideas expressed in the works of 
Placide Tempels, Alexis Kagame, and John Mbiti who, according to Bruce Janz (2008: 29), 
“anachronistically invented an idyllic pre-colonial past that allegedly and urgently needed to 
be resuscitated”. It is clear that there are problems of interpretation attributed to ubuntu in 
modern Africa. And even the previous section was somehow leading to this problem. No doubt, 
ubuntu has become so topical yet more elusive and tantalizing concept. I assume it is clear from 
the foregoing that designating the meaning of ubuntu with all the expected precision is a 
tantalizing and problematic activity (Mawere and van Stam, 2016). 
The Research Question, Sub-Questions and Objectives. 
The main research question that governs this project is stated as follows: What is the relevance 
of ubuntu in modern Southern African societies? I wish to substitute it with four sub-questions 
which will enable and steers this research to provide answers to it. The project is concerned 
with sub-questions of the following sort: Firstly, what is ubuntu? Secondly, what are the 
challenges faced by scholarly inquiry into ubuntu in its (ubuntu’s) attempts to deal with the 
question of its relevance? Thirdly, what is the relationship between ubuntu and the dictates of 
modernity? Finally, is ubuntu still relevant for modern Africa? These sub-questions are 
legitimate forms of inquiry that will be in concord with this project’s examination. This 
project’s examination seeks to spark a certain kind of investigation about the relevance of 
ubuntu in modern Africa. These sub-questions are also aligned with this project’s objectives. 
This project’s objectives are fourfold and framed as a theoretical approach to: give a critical 
exposition of ubuntu in African philosophy; explore some of the challenges faced by scholarly 




relevance for contemporary Africa; give a critical explication of ubuntu and its relationships 
with the facets of modernity in Africa; and present a close examination of ubuntu’s relevance 
for our own times. 
Research Methodology. 
The research methodology for this project is desk-based. Various databases will be used to 
comprehensively research the topic. Through a review of the available literature or existing 
resources, this project will draw on articles, journals, textbooks etc. I will critically and 
carefully read, explicate, or analyse, examine, and evaluate and reflect on journals, articles 
about the debate in both primary and secondary texts. This project will be done and conducted 
through reviewing the philosophical literature from which modern debates on ubuntu are 
viewed, critiqued, and discussed. Specific texts and key concepts which are sensitive to this 
debate will be analysed textually, philosophically and contrasted critically from literature. 
Outline of Chapters. 
In chapters one, I give a critical exposition of ubuntu. Chapters two set out to present a general 
critique of scholarly inquiry into ubuntu. It does this by (a) Foregrounding some of the 
dominant views/assertions that ground the possibilities of ubuntu’s relevance/talk for 
contemporary (southern) Africa; and (b) Presenting a close examination for the logic behind a 
metaphysical grounding for some of the affirmative postures attributed to ubuntu’s 
relevance/talk for contemporary (southern) Africa. Chapters three outline the nature of the 
Matolino-Kwindingwi-Metz debate. It provides a critical examination of Metz’s intervention 
and Chimakonam’s contribution to this specific debate. It argues that their arguments are 
neither compelling nor should they be adumbrated as standard replies to Matolino and 
Kwindingwi. Chapters four target Koenane and Olatunji’s contribution for a philosophical 
interrogation. This chapter argues that their arguments are neither compelling nor should they 
be adumbrated as standard reply to Matolino and Kwindingwi. The final chapter gives a critical 
explication of ubuntu and its relationship with the facets of modernity with reference to the 
debate. It presents a close examination of ubuntu and its challenges in modern African 
realities/societies. It argues that Metz’s current defence fails to account for ubuntu’s relevance 
for contemporary Africa.  
Concluding Remarks. 
This chapter sought to show that the question of the relevance of ubuntu in modern southern 




for the entire study. It has demonstrated what is to be achieved with this question. Thinkers 
who are engaged in discussions about affirming and questioning the relevance of ubuntu will 
be taken seriously. This project subjects the debate to philosophical scrutiny. The sole business 
for subjecting it to philosophical scrutiny is motivated by questioning ubuntu’s relevance with 
specific reference to this debate. The question for the relevance of ubuntu is gleaned from my 
reading of the debate. This chapter has outlined the debate; a preview of contributions to the 
debate; the project’s original contribution to the debate. It has critically discussed the question 
of the relevance of ubuntu; ubuntu and its relevance. It has expounded on ubuntu and its 
problems of interpretation. And introduced the research question, sub-questions, and 


















A Critical Expositive Discourse of Ubuntu. 
1.1 Preliminary Remarks. 
In this chapter, I set out to provide a critical exposition of ubuntu. In other words, the present 
chapter considers views and postulations that expound or advocate for ubuntu by setting out its 
meaning in illuminating ways. However, I strongly suggest that if one fails to grasp whatever 
significance this exposition intends to unveil, one must read it as built upon two basic tenets at 
least. Firstly, she/he must read it as a steppingstone towards a critical examination of ubuntu 
and its challenges in modern philosophical discourses. Secondly, she/he must read it as a means 
of demonstrating the broadness of ubuntu’s pertinent views that I discuss before I penetrate the 
vast recesses of the Matolino-Kwindingwi-Metz debate and how it addresses the question of 
ubuntu’s relevance in modern African societies. In what follows, I aim to show forth critical 
analyses and interpretations born out of different perspectives on the subject of ubuntu. And I 
treat the subject matter in hand (ubuntu) with absolute impartiality. 
1.1.1 Outline. 
The map for this chapter is three-fold and structured in the following fashion. Firstly, I provide 
a brief description of ubuntu. In this section, I shall appeal to ubuntu’s linguistical and 
philosophical analyses. Secondly, I provide a brief construal of what ubuntu is as articulated 
by different thinkers. And I shall not give an exhaustive construal of what ubuntu is. Finally, I 
give an account for the African community in understanding ubuntu. This account springs from 
one crucial point: the role of the community in understanding ubuntu. But I will not consider 
standard views against the construal of this community in Africa since doing so is beyond the 
length parameters of this project. 
1.2 A Brief Description of Ubuntu. 
In this section, I wish to give a brief but analytic description of what ubuntu is before I set out 
its meaning in a novel manner. What I attempt to do with this analytic description is at two 
levels. I consider ubuntu’s (a) Linguistical and (b) Philosophical analyses. This two-fold 
description seeks to break down the term “ubuntu” into its bare essentials. It analyses the term 
in its various parts, attributes, or properties separately [ubu- and -ntu] without reference to each 
other and dovetail its various parts together - ubuntu. I provide the linguistical and 
philosophical analyses of the term to make its descriptions “less disputatious and to escape 




captured by a wider linguistic rendering in the Bantu languages of Southern Africa, but it has 
gained considerable attention in Zimbabwe and South Africa since these countries needed 
home-grown philosophies to move forward after they were plagued by Apartheid and liberation 
war (Mangena, 2016). 
1.2.1 Ubuntu’s Linguistical Analysis. 
Ubuntu is derived from proverbial expressions [aphorisms] found in several languages in 
Southern Africa (Le Grange, 2013: 331). Its linguistic and descriptive analysis heralds that the 
origins of “ubuntu” requires one to separate it so as to understand the term accurately. This 
separation proves that it must be understood as prefixes; and suffixes that surround the roots “-
ntu” (Nguni languages), “-tho” (SeSotho language) or “-nhu” (ChiShona language). It is this 
root which not only refers to “being or thing” but does not change in singular and plural. It is 
said that “ntu” is reserved to a human being or person (Ntibagirirwa, 2018: 115 – 119). I think 
we can also analyse both prefixes ubu- and umu- using for instance, noun class categorizations 
found in one of the Nguni languages. In linguistics the term “ubuntu” grammatically combines 
-ntu “person” or “human being” with the class 14 ubu- prefix used to form abstract nouns so 
that the term is parallel in semantic content to the abstract noun “humanity” (Oduor, 2014: 76). 
The IsiZulu noun classes is exemplary here.10 Both prefixes ubu- and umu- may be conjoined 
with -ntu.  The word ubu- originates from what is known as isigaba 14 or the 14th Class of 
IsiZulu nouns. This class is constitutive of abstract concepts. Nouns in this class are always in 
a singular form and I am not aware of any attempt aimed at pluralizing them. This is similar to 
other African languages: “u-” [Chi-Shona]; “u-bu-” [Kinyarwanda]; “o-bu-” [Luganda] 
(Byamugisha, Keet, and DeRenzi, 2018). When they are conjoined with -ntu/nhu or tho they 
become ubuntu/unhu/obuntu or botho and automatically belongs to the ‘essential noun class’11 
which is a class of abstract concepts. The prefix umu- originates from what is known as 
“isigaba-(1)” or the 1st class of Zulu nouns which contains people and kinships. Similarly, in 
other African languages one gets the following prefixes “mu-” [Chi-Shona]; “mu-” [Kikuyu], 
“u-mu-” [Kinyarwanda]; and “o-mu-” [Luganda].  When it is conjoined with -ntu;-nhu; or -tho 
it becomes umuntu/omuntu/munhu or motho and automatically belongs to the ‘human noun 
class’.12 On the other side, it is said that the prefix ubu- refers to the abstract whilst the suffix 
 
10 I use IsiZulu because it is one of the languages, I am most familiar with: 
http//: www.whitezulu.wordpress.com/izigaba-zamabizo/. 
11 Here are examples of nouns that belong to this class: ubusika (winter); ubuthi (poison or venom); ububi (evil) 
and ubuhlungu (pain). 




-ntu is an ancestor who got human society going. This ancestor is depicted as the one who gave 
us a way of life as human beings (Munyaka and Motlhabi, 2009). This way of life is depicted 
as the communal way of life which recommends that society must be run for the sake of all. It 
is this “communal” way of life that requires cooperation, sharing and charity. As a result, not 
only is ubuntu seen as the quality of being human but it is the behaviour or quality of the “-
ntu” society (Mfenyana, 1986: 18 – 19).  
1.2.2 Ubuntu’s Philosophical Analysis.  
Mogobe Ramose (1999; 2002; 2005) recommends that the best way to do this analysis is to 
approach the term “ubuntu” from the angle of philosophical discourse. He approaches “ubuntu” 
as a hyphenated term: ubu-ntu. His analysis depicts ubu-ntu as a compound word that emerges 
from the prefix ubu- and the stem -ntu. He suggests that the former is a denotation of the idea 
of being in general. To be more precise, the ‘ubu-’ prefix denotes the highest level of generality 
in its ontological standing. He insists that this prefix stands freely and ontologically to be 
conjoined with a number of suffixes (Ramose, 2005). This prefix is understood as enfolded 
being before it manifests itself in the concreate form or mode of existence of a particular entity 
since it is always oriented towards unfoldment: -ntu (Ibid.) On the other side, Ramose (2005: 
34 – 35) notes that umu- shares an identical ontological feature with the prefix: ubu-. When it 
comes to these ontological features, he argues that the “Ubu-” denotes the widest generality 
and the idea of motion whilst umu- tends to be more specific. In addition, ubu- implies the idea 
of perpetual motion which cannot be halted unless motion ceases to exist, writes Ramose 
(2005). Not only does Ramose construe this motion as verbal but it is always moving towards 
-ntu, which depicts the temporary place where one has become (Ramose, 2002; Robinson-
Morris, 2018). Moreover, it is common knowledge that whenever umu- is intermingled with -
ntu something else comes up: umuntu.13 Umuntu shares the same -ntu-suffix with ubuntu 
(Ramose, 2005). Accordingly, ubuntu is conceived of as a derivative of the word umuntu: 
meaning a person, or a human being (Munyaka and Motlhabi, 2009: 64). Both ubu- and umu- 
can be coupled with many suffixes.14  
The suffix ‘-ntu’ is distinctly epistemological. It is posited as the nodal point at which being 
(ubu-) assumes a concreate form or mode of being in the process of continual unfoldment 
(Ramose, 2005). For this reason, -ntu stands not only for the epistemological be-ing but it also 
 
13 A human be-ing. 
14 As for ubu-, we can couple it with -vila, and this literally means laziness in IsiZulu. And as for umu-, we can 




means the process of life as the unfolding of the universe by manifestation in different forms 
and modes of being (Ramose, 1999). Of central importance here is also the inseparability of 
ubu- and -ntu (Ramose, 2002: 231; and Robinson-Morris, 2018). This inseparability all comes 
down to ubuntu as an African onto-epistemology. On this view ubuntu becomes the indivisible 
one-ness and whole-ness of an African ontology and epistemology (Ramose, 2002: 230). The 
indivisibility of being-becoming (ubu-) towards the very temporary location where one has 
become (-ntu) situates ubuntu as a gerund, a “-ness” and not an “-ism”. An “-ism” according 
to Ramose (2002; 2004: 150) falsely gives the impression of entities as existing, as fixed, 
independent, and separate. The view that Ramose is concerned with rests on a distinction 
between humanism and humanness. Humanism places humans at the centre of everything 
whilst humanness does not prioritise the human self but recognises the human being as 
connected to other human beings and features of the natural world (Bilchitz, Metz, and Oyowe, 
2017: 215 – 216). It has been argued that whether one associates him/herself with humanism 
or humanness, there is a bottom-line that he must take into consideration. It is in recognition 
of both humanness and humanism as definitive aspects of the African philosophy of ubuntu 
that one may have truly seen this bottom-line (Mangena, 2016). Therefore, when one dovetails 
ubu- and -ntu what she/he gets is ubuntu. And it is this kind of philosophical yet descriptive 
analysis for ubuntu couched in Afro-ontological (ubu-) – and epistemological (-ntu) terms 
which Ramose saw fit to qualify as the root of African philosophy (Ramose, 2002; 2005). 
1.3 A Brief Construal of What Ubuntu Is. 
This section endeavours to give a broad but not exhaustive construal of what ubuntu is as 
articulated by many an African thinker residing in sub-Saharan Africa. It does this since ubuntu 
harbours an array of logical, ethical, epistemological, and metaphysical value-laden 
manifestations (Mangena, 2016). It is said that it provides a well-established and highly 
advanced moral compass for the embodiment of human character with direct application in 
business; religion; politics; law; education; and management among other spheres of life 
(Mawere, and van Stam, 2016). It is posited as an old philosophy and way of life that has 
sustained African and particularly southern African communities for centuries. It represents 
the kind of behaviour that is inculcated in the individual by society through established 
traditional institutions over a period of time. It is attained through socialisation. It is also 
construed as a spiritual foundation, an inner state, an orientation, disposition towards good 
motives. It challenges and makes individuals perceive, feel and act in a human way towards 




Ubuntu is a traditional value that has attained a universal status not only in southern Africa but 
also in Africa (Ntlama, 2014). Not only is it a lived but is also a living philosophy of the “Bantu-
speaking peoples”15 of Africa (Bhengu, 2015: 17). It is a philosophy with a past, a present, and 
a project in the future. That ubuntu is the lived and living experience of human beings denotes 
that the human dignity of the Bantu-speaking peoples demands recognition, protection, 
promotion, and respect on the basis of equality with all other human beings, wherever they may 
be on planet earth (Ramose, 2014: 121). It refers to the moral attributes, or human quality, 
character or conduct, and the essence of being a person who is known as umuntu/munhu/muthu 
or omundu in the Bantu languages (Mangena, 2016). Umuntu is known as the agent or doer of 
ubuntu. Not only is he/she a spacio-temporal being, but he/she participates in the perennial 
“doing” of ubuntu (Ramose, 2005). Without abantu there can be no ubuntu. Thus, ubuntu is a 
denotation of a “-ness” not an “-ism” (Ramose, 2004: 150), It points one to a “family 
atmosphere” or environment which points one to a kind of affinity and kinship among the 
indigenous people of Africa. This kind of affinity is expressed in the following aphorisms: 
motho ke motho ka batho [Sotho] and umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu [Zulu, Xhosa, and Ndebele]. 
Both aphorisms mean one and the same thing. They reveal that to be human is to affirm one’s 
humanity by recognising the humanity of others, and on that basis establish humane relations 
with them. What these aphorisms have in common is that they price communal relations with 
others in virtue of the values that are placed on humanity/personhood. They are best known as 
the basic tenets of an ethic of ubuntu (Munyaka and Motlhabi, 2009: 65). What this shows is 
not only that ubuntu underlies the significance of related-ness, but it suggests that to be human 
is to be in relationships with others (Ramose, 2005: 40 – 42, and Mkhwanazi, 2016). The 
concept of “humanity” “humanness” or “personhood” is at the core of ubuntu. It is about human 
kindness and what it is that makes a person, a person. It is the interdependence of persons for 
existence, development, and fulfilment of their potentialities to be both individuals and the 
community (Mangena, 2016). On this view, it advocates a profound sense of interdependence 
and emphasizes that our true human potential can only be realized in partnership with others. 
It is about the group or community more than it is about the self (Ibid.). 
Ubuntu has a communal character instead of an individual character. Further, it does not 
succumb to any individualistic or egocentric outlook since its emphasis is the significance of a 
 
15 According to Mfuniselwa, J. Bhengu, the ‘Bantu-speaking people” of Africa consists of more than 100 Negroe 
people who live in Southern and Central Africa, ranging from Nigeria and Uganda to South Africa and who speak 




group or community.  It is associated with a whole range of positive values and attitudes such 
as respect for human life and elders; passion for community; helpfulness; conviviality, sharing, 
caring, trust and unselfishness. It seeks to harmonise the past with the present and the future 
(Mawere and Mubaya, 2016). It describes a particular way of life: a life that is central to 
communal relationships, a life that promotes and manifests itself and is best made evident in 
harmonious relations within society (Munyaka and Motlhabi, 2009: 65). In other words, ubuntu 
is known to be associated with the following expressions: humanity towards others; a universal 
bond of sharing that connects all humanity; one’s humanity only comes through the humanity 
of others; and everyone’s humanity is tied to everyone’s humanity (Etieyibo, 2017). On this 
occasion, this depicts that a human being is the telos or ought to be the telos of human activities 
and all ethical or normative considerations. This rightly conjures up a good image of a human 
being that is at the end, centre, and beginning of all ethical considerations (Etieyibo, 2017: 140 
– 143). On this view, ubuntu is deemed as averse to anything that is harmful to a human being. 
It flourishes in respect and honour for others and without it there is no peace. Hence, it refers 
to certain values [generosity; respectfulness; understanding; kindness etc.] expected of a person 
since one is human and not anything else just as we expect the heat to express heat-ness or a 
dog its dog-ness (Ntibagirirwa, 2018: 121). 
1.4 An Account of The African Community in Understanding Ubuntu. 
What I wish to achieve in this section is structured in the following fashion. I expound more 
on the idea of the community simply because it is said to have inoculated, prolonged, and 
sustained how and what we understand ubuntu to be. The community is at the nerve of things 
that constitute the individual and ubuntu. This individual person is portrayed as an agent of 
ubuntu (Ramose, 2005: 36). Hence, the manner in which ubuntu has been understood or 
articulated cuts across the community and the individual in Africa.  
1.4.1 The Role of the Community in Understanding Ubuntu. 
It is common knowledge that the community is a constitutive element of understanding ubuntu 
(Munyaka and Motlabi, 2009, Ramose, 2005) Not only is the community the context for the 
manifestation of ubuntu, but the umuntu also. It is this human community that is used by an 
individual to realise himself/herself as a person (Munyaka and Motlhabi, 2009: 68 – 72). She/he 
is expected to validate her/his humanness in terms of life in accordance with certain values that 
the community cherishes (Ntibagirirwa, 2018). Before venturing into the details of the role of 
the community in our understanding of what ubuntu is, it is necessary for one to understand its 




On this occasion, in Africa man is defined with reference to the community (Menkiti, 1984). 
In fact, the community always comes first. The individual is born out of and into this 
community, and she/he will always be part of the community (Venter, 2004). It is the reality 
of the communal world that takes precedence over the reality of individual life histories. It is 
in rootedness in an ongoing human community that this individual comes to see himself as a 
man. It is also by knowing this community that the individual also comes to know himself as a 
durable, more, or less permanent, fact of this world (Menkiti, 1984). On this view, it is the 
community that defines the person as person, not some isolated static quality of rationality, will 
or memory. In this sense, not only is personhood conceived of as something which has to be 
achieved but at the same time it is not given because one is born of the human seed (Ibid.). 
What this shows is that the idea of personhood proceeds from the belief that a network of social 
relations defines the social nature of a human being. Ontologically speaking, a person neither 
proceeds nor is he/she posterior to the community (Ajei, 2016: 231). Moreover, a community 
is viewed as the oneness of a living triad that is constitutive of the living, the living-dead 
[ancestors] and the yet-to-be-born. The living had an obligation to the yet-to-be-born by 
participating in sex with the intention to have children. This is primarily because having 
children is considered as a very important responsibility in marriage (Ramose, 2016: 202 – 
204). Not only does sex in this community serve to procreate so that the family will be 
expanded but the individual duty has to contribute to the growth of the family and the 
community. Failure to procreate and enhance the growth of the community is perceived as a 
very bad light. Hence, sexual intercourse is limited to married heterosexuals, and can never be 
entertained if it is done with the intention to give oneself or someone possible pleasures since 
it is done for a specific purpose (Matolino, 2011: 76). 
Another crucial point is that traditional African social organisations or communitarian thinking 
project individuals as inherently relational in the sense of their being natural members of 
community. They have an inherent need to be dependent since human life is social by nature 
as it commences and progresses within a web of well-defined social affiliations (Ajei, 2016: 
230 – 231). Indeed, in this sense, the community takes priority over the individual (Menkiti, 
1984). This community or belonging to a community is part of the essence of traditional 
African life which renders man as inseparable from it (Venter, 2004: 151 – 153). It is this 
community that is always in a state of flux. That is, the community gains its strength if mutual 
obligations are fulfilled (Mkhize, 2008). What weakens the community is moral transgressions 




rectified if this community works interactively to re-establish social connection, 
interdependence which results to communal unity (Mkhize, 2008: 41). Elders are projected as 
contributors to the community’s stability and cohesion. The status of these elders is an “earned- 
status”. This status is usually earned, as Polycarp Ikuenobe (1998: 37) writes, through a 
“number of practical life experience”. And when these elders display their wealth of knowledge 
in moral judgments, children get the opportunity to learn the proper behaviour expected of 
them (Ikuenobe, 1998). 
Therefore, I think I have attempted to paint a picture that conjures up a relationship between 
the community and individual. This relationship between the community and the individual 
shows that the self is rooted in the community. In other words, one attains selfhood through 
others since it is with reference to the community that a person is defined (Mkhize, 2008: 21; 
and Ntibagirirwa, 2018: 123). It is this picture which projects an individual as only a person 
when she acts and presents herself as part of the group. And at the point where she sees herself 
as an individual that is independent of the group and whose being is understandable outside the 
group, she automatically becomes a non-person (Taiwo, 2016: 94). So conceived, ubuntu offers 
a language through which once’s “individual rights” derives from group membership 
(Oyewumin, 1997: 45 in Chitando and Magadla, 2014: 185). 
I now endeavour to expound more on how the community’s role is understood in as far as its 
usefulness and depictions of what ubuntu is are concerned. In the African tradition the word 
“community” signifies some existing society or group and is used to refer to an ideal regarding 
the way the members of a group ought to relate to each other (Metz, 2013: 81). It turns out to 
be the case that many communities that are still living in accordance with traditional values 
and principles adhere to the dictates of ubuntu. Some may even argue that one cannot speak of 
ubuntu outside of community. Be it at birth/conception and death Africans are always in 
community (Dolamo, 2013). What this shows is that the significance of the community is at 
the heart of understanding the usefulness of ubuntu. It is in this community of similarly 
constituted selves that a human being defines herself/himself with respect to the quality of 
his/her participation. Even personhood is defined with reference and in relation to the 
community. For this reason, ubuntu speaks into the interrelationship that exists between the 
individual and the community in which she/ lives or vice-versa (Ntlama, 2014). The community 
breeds a strong and binding network of relationships. For instance, not only do children belong 




in the community. It is for this reason that even kinship terms attest to the nature of the 
relationships that bind members of a community together (Kamwangamalu, 1999). 
On this view, the member of a community constitutive of ubuntu uses words such as “sister, 
brother, father, mother, or uncle etc” to any member even if they are not siblings or members 
of the same clan (Kamwangamalu, 1999: 28). The sense of community exists if and only if 
people are mutually responsive to one another’s needs (Mkhize, 2008: 39). Within this 
community, an individual is natured into becoming a mature and responsible human being that 
would embrace values, norms, principles or dictates of ubuntu. One becomes fully human if 
she/he goes through a progressive process of integration into society (Dolamo, 2013). What 
this claim essentially amounts to is that interdependence in a community affirms the very 
essence and existence of ubuntu. This is chiefly because an individual in this community owes 
her/his existence to the existence of others. This gives credence to the cardinal belief of ubuntu 
as asserting that a man can only be a man through others (Kamwangamalu, 1999: 29). The 
aphorism “umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu” unveils the significance of group solidarity on issues 
so central to the survival of communities. It is said that this aphorism envelops values which 
are key to group solidarity: compassion, kindness, patience, respect, human dignity, 
humanness, caring, sharing, harmony, balance, reciprocity, truth, justice, order, and conformity 
to basic norms, collective unity, and being sensitive to the needs of others (Ntlama, 2014).  
Ubuntu is not a “throat clearing exercise” but it signifies human interdependence and group 
solidarity which are central to the survival of communities, writes Ntlama (2014: 83). The best 
model for these community is the family. It is said that the family has no function outside the 
community. Not only does the family serve as a means of personal growth for its members but 
interactions, conversations and companionship between the growing and full-grown members 
are also an end in themselves. The extended family, for Shutte (2008), is deemed as capable of 
extensions to include anyone. This is partly because ubuntu is infused within the concept of 
inclusivity. So, the extended family does not only include those related by blood, kinship, or 
marriage but even strangers. On this view, humanity itself is construed as a family that one 
joins at birth and does not leave by dying (Shutte, 2008: 28). This may be linked to the sense 
of relationality since ubuntu is itself a relational matter that involves living a life comprised of 
morally praiseworthy behaviour. And it is this moral praiseworthy behaviour that is at the 




1.5 Closing Remarks.  
This chapter has sought to give a critical exposition of ubuntu. In doing so, it has managed to 
achieve three things. Firstly, it has provided a brief description of ubuntu. This section appealed 
to ubuntu’s linguistical and philosophical analyses. Secondly, the chapter has provided a brief 
construal of what ubuntu is as articulated by different thinkers. It did not aim to provide an 
exhaustive construal of what ubuntu is. Finally, it sought to give an account for the African 
community in understanding ubuntu. This account emanated from one crucial point: the role 




























The Logic for And Behind the Possibilities of Ubuntu’s Relevance: A Critique 
of Scholarly Inquiry into Ubuntu. 
2.1 Preliminary Remarks. 
The preceding chapter gave a critical exposition of ubuntu. Not only did it aim to demonstrate 
the broadness of ubuntu’s pertinent views, but it served as a steppingstone towards a critical 
examination of ubuntu and its challenges in modern philosophical discourses. However, this 
chapter challenges the logic behind affirming the possibilities of ubuntu’s relevance in modern 
Africa. No doubt, most pro-ubuntu scholars did foreground its assertions that brought to the 
surface ubuntu’s affirmative postures for its place in modern Africa: scholarly inquiry into 
ubuntu. These affirmations for ubuntu’s relevance shall be used as a foil for a critique I wish 
to make. They span from different interpretations. This critique does not cast the entirety of 
ubuntu’s assertions into doubt. Instead, it shall be at the level of detail that draws from a 
metaphysical grounding for the following postures which manifest reactionary frameworks and 
an affirmative zeal for ubuntu’s relevance/talk: ubuntu and metaphysics; ubuntu as African 
education; ubuntu as African law/jurisprudence; ubuntu as humanism; ubuntu as 
cosmopolitanism; ubuntu as African ethics; and ubuntu as environmental ethics. This critique 
seeks to penetrate the recesses of ubuntu’s affirmations, a little bit. It shall be at the level of 
detail that suffices to build a foundation for thinking harder about ubuntu and its relevance in 
the subsequent chapters. And I shall not make a case for it being the best critique that one could 
offer in reaction to the logic for ubuntu’s affirmative postures.  
2.1.1 Outline. 
The aim of this chapter is two-folded. Firstly, it foregrounds some of the dominant 
views/assertions that affirm the possibilities of ubuntu’s relevance in contemporary southern 
Africa. This is done with the intention to foreground different ways in which the possibilities 
of ubuntu’s relevance/talk have been grounded in Southern Africa: scholarly inquiry into 
ubuntu. It will not be concerned with which of them will best account for plausible answers to 
the question of ubuntu and its relevance. Hence, it foregrounds some but not all thinkers who 
[or views that] did establish a metaphysical grounding for the relevance of ubuntu. Secondly, 
it presents a close examination for the logic behind a metaphysical grounding for some of the  




2.2 The Logic for the Possibilities of Ubuntu’s Affirmations. 
This section aims to provide a brief discussion of the manner in which the possibilities of 
ubuntu’s relevance have been grounded by individual scholars. No doubt, ubuntu has become 
a powerful draw for many intellectuals within and beyond (Southern) Africa (Eze, 2008: 230). 
However, this section is limited to a number of scholars who have grounded the possibilities 
of ubuntu’s relevance in the light of Western or other philosophical approaches of the world. 
In other words, it falls within the ambits of those who attribute an identical meaning to ubuntu 
using other Western philosophical approaches: ubuntu as something(x) or ubuntu and 
something(x). This is linked to scholarly inquiry into ubuntu. For instance, there is a growing 
tendency from the existing literature that understands ubuntu from the prisms of metaphysics; 
humanism; cosmopolitanism; formal education; law/jurisprudence; environmental ethics etc. 
For this reason, some scholars embark on this enterprise so as to devise other modes of 
reflecting on ubuntu in ways that might suit their proclivities. It is this enterprise which some 
scholars invoke in order to ground other affluences of understanding ubuntu using their own 
interpretations informed by their training and proclivities (Matolino, 2015: 215 – 216). And I 
aim to exemplify different interpretations as they appear in the literature in the following table.  











Possibilities of Ubuntu’s 
Relevance or Ubuntu 
Talk for contemporary 
southern Africa 
Some Candidates for Scholarly Inquiry into 
Ubuntu 
1. Ubuntu Metaphysics  Ubuntu and metaphysics  Ramose (2002; 2003: 236 – 237; 2005); 
Nabudere (2005: 3 – 5); Mangena (2016); and 
Ntibagirirwa (2018) etc 
 
2. Ubuntu Humanism Ubuntu as/and (African) 
Humanism  
Samkange and Samkange (1980); Letseka 
(2000: 188); Eze (2011); Gade (2011, 2012); 
Mangena (2016); and Praeg (2017: 295) etc. 
 
3. Ubuntu Cosmopolitanism Ubuntu as/ and 
Cosmopolitanism 
Ramose (2014); Ngcoya (2015); Eze (2017); 
Etieyibo (2017); Graness (2018); and 
Umezurike (2020) etc. 
 
4. Ubuntu Formal education  Ubuntu as/and (African) 
Education  
Letseka (2000; 2012; 2016); Higgs (2004; 
2012); Venter (2004); Waghid (2004; 2014; 
2020); Piper (2016); Bondai and Kaputa (2016); 
Shanyanana and Waghid (2016); Oviawe (2016); 
Etieyibo (2017); Viriri and Viriri (2018: 104 – 
107) Walton (2018) and Waghid, Waghid and 





5. Ubuntu  Ethics  Ubuntu as/and (African) 
Ethics 
Ramose (2002; 2004); Metz (2007; 2010; 2014); 
Shutte (2008); Mkhize (2008); Murove (2009: 
xvi; 2009a: 14 – 15); Metz and Gaie (2010); 
Dolamo (2013); and Mangena (2016 and 2016a) 
etc. 
 
6. Ubuntu  Law/or 
Jurisprudence 
Ubuntu as/and (African) 
Law/Jurisprudence 
Mokgoro (1998); Ramose (2005); Cornell and 
Muvangua (2012); Keevy (2014: 56 - 57); 
Furman (2014: 150 – 166); Cornell (2004; 2014: 
167 - 175); Ndima (2015); Bennett (2018); and 
Kamga (2018) etc. 
 
7. Ubuntu  Environmental 
ethics 
Ubuntu as/and (African) 
Environmental Ethics 
Murove (2009: 315 – 330); Ramose (2009); and 
Chibvongodze (2016) etc. 
 
 
As a matter of fact, I conceive of all the propositions (ubuntu as something(x) or ubuntu and 
something(x)) enshrined in the above table as grounding the possibilities for ubuntu’s talk/ 
relevance for our own times. This manner of grounding ubuntu emanates from individual 
scholars who are keen about ubuntu and its relevance for post-colonial/apartheid (southern) 
Africa. No doubt, this is linked to what Metz (2014: 64) construes as ‘scholarly inquiry into 
ubuntu’. Metz’s views scholarly inquiry into ubuntu as the project that is only now properly 
getting started. He suggests that we have come to an era where thinkers and writers must 
reclaim ‘talk of ubuntu’ to contest its misuse since he thinks that scholars must not stop 
expounding ubuntu (Metz, 2014: 64 – 67). In fact, scholars must ‘keep spreading the word’, 
writes Metz (2014: 67). Koenane and Olatunji (2017: 273) find this stimulating. They suggest 
that from whichever angle ‘talk of ubuntu’ or ‘ubuntu talk’ is likely to continue as suggested 
by Metz. Matolino (2015: 215) on the other side, thinks that “this could be viewed as an 
innocuous scholarly activity, one that has to be encouraged even, for competing interpretations 
of ubuntu may be seen as a mark of sensible scholarship”. Surely, this is a positive direction 
especially when one understands ubuntu as flexible to ‘future constructive thinking’ (Agada, 
2013: 244). These propositions (ubuntu as something(x) or ubuntu and something(x)) take a 
rather specific posture since they form an intermingle that grounds the possibilities of talking 
about ubuntu’s relevance for post-colonial/apartheid (southern) Africa. They demonstrate 
different layers of creativity and originality that necessitates how ubuntu must be understood 
and interpreted. I think, Western philosophical approaches that are enshrined in the above table, 
aim to build some relations/ similarities or differences; distinctions or comparisons with 




its relations, similarities or differences, distinctions, or comparisons with Western 
philosophical approaches of the world.    
2.3 The Logic Behind the Foregoing Affirmative Stances: A Critique. 
I wish to present a close examination of a ‘metaphysical grounding’16 for the possibilities of 
ubuntu’s relevance linked with the foregoing affirmative stances attributed to ubuntu’s 
scholarly inquiry for post-colonial/apartheid southern Africa. It is my view that not even a 
single instance of this examination could be found in the existing literature of ubuntu since at 
no point was a critique such as the following attempted. No doubt, adherents of ubuntu hardly 
ever criticize it in a manner anticipated below. Never had scholarly inquiry into ubuntu received 
such a critique targeted at its (ubuntu’s) metaphysical grounding that prizes Western 
philosophical approaches of the world as its sponsors.  However, mine is open to further fruitful 
interrogation, critical scrutiny as well as rational, informed, and honest disagreements. In other 
words, I shall present but not make a case for it being the best critique that one could offer in 
reaction to ubuntu’s metaphysical grounding for post-colonial/apartheid (southern) Africa. And 
if there are Western philosophical approaches which metaphysically ground the possibilities of 
ubuntu’s relevance or ‘ubuntu talk’ for our own times, would that metaphysical grounding 
count as ‘the proper mode of philosophising’ about ubuntu’s relevance for post-
colonial/apartheid southern Africa? (Chimakonam, 2016).17 
Here is a grounding claim that I think can be formulated when one looks at the preceding 
sections so as to investigate the logic behind a metaphysical grounding I wish to target: 
 
16 My usage of ‘Metaphysical grounding’ is drawn from Bruce Janz’s (2009) Philosophy in an African Place. He 
talks about the ‘metaphysical grounding’ of the field of African philosophy or African philosophers who are ‘in 
the service of searching for a metaphysical grounding’ to legitimate the field of African philosophy (2009: 26 and 
29). Although I am inspired by Janz’s usage of ‘metaphysical grounding’, but I wish to designate its specialised 
context to thinkers/scholars who write on ubuntu for post-colonial/apartheid southern Africa. This is simply 
because there can also be a discussion about ubuntu’s metaphysical grounding: the manner in which ubuntu has 
been grounded. To be more specific, my critique of ubuntu is based on its (ubuntu’s) depictions as understood 
(and discussed in the light of or grounded upon) Western philosophical approaches of the world. For example, in 
this chapter I propose to argue that some Western philosophical approaches (cosmopolitanism, metaphysics, 
formal education, environmental ethics, humanism, law/jurisprudence etc) are used by scholars of ubuntu to 
search for its metaphysical grounding that will end up legitimating its (ubuntu’s) talk, or possibilities for post-
colonial/apartheid (southern) Africa. Unlike Bruce Janz (2009) my critique of ubuntu’s ‘metaphysical grounding’ 
is going to be framed by a specific ‘grounding claim’ that I am about to formulate in order to ease my investigation 
for the logic behind ubuntu’s metaphysical grounding: ubuntu and something(x) or ubuntu as something(x).  
17 Surely, Chimakonam (2016) is the prime candidate for arguing for what he calls ‘the proper mode of 
philosophising about ubuntu’. This is based on his argument in support of Metz’s systematisation of an ubuntu 
ethic. But I borrow his phrase not for the sake of defending scholarly inquiry into ubuntu but for registering my 




 The fact that there is cosmopolitanism; humanism; formal education; 
law/jurisprudence; and metaphysics in general and elsewhere not only grounds the 
possibility of, but also affirms the fact that ubuntu is this and that or is something 
related to cosmopolitanism; humanism; formal education; law or jurisprudence; 
environmental ethics; and metaphysics etc.18  
As from now onwards, I will refer to cosmopolitanism; humanism; formal education; law or 
jurisprudence; environmental ethics, and metaphysics etc, as x’s in plural or as x [e.g., 
cosmopolitanism] in singular. I use them because they seem to have grounded ubuntu’s 
affirmative postures or the possibilities for ‘ubuntu talk’. By x or x’s, I mean Western 
philosophical approach [es] of the world.  
What I wish to point out with this grounding claim is that when one reads the preceding section, 
she/he may suggest that these x’s can be said to have grounded ubuntu metaphysically as 
opposed to ubuntu grounding any x. She could argue that only when the above affirmative 
postures are shown to have done some tricks will one attest to ubuntu’s relevance in modern 
Africa. Indeed, she might say it appears that technical terms sponsored by Western forms of 
thinking are often the clearest and most salient markers of the archive within and against which 
the African theorist thinks or talks and writes or as Praeg (2017: 293) would have us believe. 
She might insist, quite seriously, that nowhere before ubuntu’s textual history was there such 
a metaphysical grounding for its relevance in traditional African societies. 
When she looks at these x’s, she may ask questions of the following sort: Why is it that the 
possibilities of talking about ubuntu’s relevance was for the first time, at least in its textual 
history, grounded upon ‘other philosophical approaches’ such as cosmopolitanism, formal 
education, humanism; metaphysics, jurisprudence/law, etc? Surely there are things she might 
end up attesting to. Whilst she could recognise and attest that adherents of ubuntu did manage 
to respond, “to the pressure of living up to the rigours and demands of Western philosophy” 
(Matolino, 2018: 348) but there are different kinds of oddities and questions that might lead 
her to think that this manner of grounding ubuntu is worth thinking through seriously. This is 
chiefly because it may not be entirely clear why did scholars of ubuntu search for new ways of 
saying “Yes” to Western philosophical approaches of the world in their affirmation for a 
traditional philosophy they deem suitable for our own times. 
 




All in all, what (ubuntu or Western philosophical approaches) grounds what (Western 
philosophical approaches or ubuntu)? Is ubuntu grounded on these approaches or are these 
approaches grounded on ubuntu? In other words, can one be justified in believing that it was 
ubuntu that universally grounded the possibilities of talking about metaphysics, law or 
jurisprudence, cosmopolitanism and formal education given the fact that its textual history is 
quite recent unlike that of these x’s? I do not want to think that this is the case. Or can one be 
justified in believing that it was the idea of metaphysics, law/ jurisprudence, formal education, 
and cosmopolitanism inherited from elsewhere that drove scholars of ubuntu to ground the 
possibilities of talking about it in modern Africa with specific reference to these x’s? Does this 
metaphysical grounding reiterate and perpetuate the epistemic violence of the disciplinary grid 
imposed and historically inflicted on the continent in order for it to speak back in a language 
already familiar to the Western scholar? (Praeg, 2017: 294). Well, it seems like adherents of 
ubuntu had some of these x’s in mind when fabricating, by way of interpretation, the 
possibilities of talking about ubuntu and its relevance for post-colonial/apartheid southern 
Africa. No doubt, this is another way of talking about ubuntu as scholarly inquiry.  
Most importantly, some interpretations of ubuntu purport to find comparisons and contrasts, 
similarities and relations with certain x’s: ubuntu as cosmopolitanism (Ngcoya, 2015; Eze, 
2017; and Etieyibo, 2017), ubuntu as jurisprudence (Furman, 2014: 150 – 165) ubuntu as 
humanism (Samkange and Samkange, 1980), ubuntu as environmental ethics (Murove, 2009) 
ubuntu and Kantianism (Metz, 2007); ubuntu and Christianity (Praeg, 2014: 37, and Koenane 
and Olatunji, 2017: 267); ubuntu and Hobbessianism (Metz, 2007); ubuntu and law (Mokgoro, 
1998; Ramose, 2005; Furman, 2014; Keevy, 2014: 54 – 78) etc. In fact, it reads as if only in 
this way a number of scholars can be sure that ubuntu is relevant for contemporary Africa. Or 
what my reading of ubuntu’s affirmative stances shows is that it is absorbed in the grounding 
claim formulated above. The reason why it seems to be absorbed in the grounding claim 
hitherto formulated is simply because ubuntu (as scholarly inquiry) in post-colonial/apartheid 
southern Africa is somewhat perceived from the standpoint of Western philosophy.  
However, I do recognize that some African scholars articulate, for example, African 
“metaphysics from the standpoint of Western philosophy” simply because of a lack of a better 
word in most African cultures (Mangena, 2016). This does not mean that African thinkers may 
not follow this path or use it to think differently and in a manner that is sensitive to the realities 
Africa is conditioned under. No doubt, Western philosophical approaches of the world can 




interrogations even on the African continent. As things stand, it turns out to be the case and it 
certainly is true that Western philosophical approaches are somewhat perceived as the 
gateways to our philosophising about ubuntu’s talk and relevance in modern Africa. It reads as 
if the most interesting part from this perpetuation somehow gives birth to an obsession to “draw 
the line between what is African from what is fundamentally Western” (Mangena, 2016). But 
this does not mean that I read pro-ubuntu scholars as insisting that the relevance of ubuntu in 
modern Southern Africa would have been inconceivable without them building relations, 
contrasts, making us realise some relations and comparisons with ubuntu to some Western 
philosophical approaches.  
Hence, I wish to focus on the question of ‘Western philosophical approaches’ grounding 
ubuntu metaphysically as opposed to ubuntu grounding any Western philosophical approach. 
The sole business for my questioning this metaphysical grounding which seems to register the 
talk or relevance of ubuntu in modern southern Africa as of vital necessity is simply to make 
sure that no one grants it “[the] status of unquestionability” (Kresse, 2005: 03). If ubuntu’s 
metaphysical grounding is granted any status of unquestionability it may stand a better chance 
of being “shield[ed] [..] from further fruitful interrogation” (Ibid.). In addition, this section 
raises some questions which cut across the motive or logic behind such a metaphysical 
grounding that can be deduced from a grounding claim hitherto formulated. This section will 
not be worried about the challenges and prospects of any of the above x’s linked to ubuntu in 
African philosophy. Neither will the entire section interrogate various angles from which 
ubuntu’s affirmative stances as metaphysically grounded upon some x’s have been registered. 
Nor will it suffice to interrogate how good or dodgy are certain relations and comparisons, 
similarities and contrasts attributed to ubuntu’s relevance or talk from the above x’s.   
For this reason, it seems like one may find him/herself trying “to find a way of adjudicating 
between the competing interpretations of ubuntu to see which one is correct or most plausible” 
(Matolino, 2015: 215). In this case, these are interpretations of ubuntu that are metaphysically 
grounded upon Western philosophical approaches. What if some of these competing 
interpretations (“ubuntu as/and”: cosmopolitanism, humanism, environmental ethics, 
jurisprudence, and formal education) rested on a mistake even though they are now endorsed 
as normal? However, this is not to suggest that there are no occasions in which one can deploy 
this metaphysical grounding (“ubuntu as/and”-propositions) or see its usefulness. Neither does 
it suggest that this metaphysical grounding should not count as a necessary criterion that must 




inquiry) for contemporary Africa. Nor does it suggest that this manner of grounding ubuntu 
(ubuntu as (or and) x) should count as a sufficient criterion for affirming ubuntu’s possibilities. 
In fact, I am tempted to think that it should not count as a sufficient criterion for affirming the 
possibilities of its relevance if this metaphysical grounding is not exhausted and defended with 
sustainable positions.  In addition, one must not forget to ask when it is necessary to make this 
deployment (ubuntu as (or and) something), and what the occasions are for and behind 
grounding ubuntu in this manner. Or what necessity does this deployment occasions ubuntu to 
be in contemporary Africa.  
Though I admit quite strongly that these patterns of thinking were important ones to have been 
voiced by thinkers who saw fit to voice them interruptedly or uninterruptedly, but 
unfortunately, I think they are up to scrutiny. For this reason, it is no hidden fact that the “first 
generation” -: [e.g. Samkange and Samkange (1980); Ramose (1999, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004; 
2005); and Tutu (1999)] and “second generation” -: [e.g. Prozesky (2003); Metz (2007); Battle 
(2009); Eze (2011); Gade (2011; 2012); Mangena (2012a; 2012b; 2013); Praeg (2014)] – of 
ubuntu scholars did break new grounds since ubuntu is now one of those things which have 
become a pop culture for many a professionally trained African philosopher. In pursuing this 
line of reasoning, I think ubuntu as a pop culture for many an African philosopher resonates 
well with what Nyasha Mboti (2015: 129 – 130) conceives of as a “bottomless magical bag”. 
He argues that if ubuntu were a bag, it certainly would resonate with a magical one “without a 
bottom”. It is this magical and bottomless bag that carries anything put into it since it never 
gets filled up nor will it ever overflow in abundance. The problem Mboti identifies with this 
magical bag is that the longer it takes to fill up, the further it postpones tasks of defining its 
objects (Mboti, 2015). For the purposes of this critique, one of the tasks this bag of tricks 
postpones is to account for the logic behind its metaphysical grounding with some x’s as its 
sponsors to affirm its possibilities for contemporary Africa: ubuntu as/and x. But for some 
thinkers, it is beyond any shadow of doubt that talks of ubuntu did produce some of the most 
vibrant exchanges among scholars of African studies (Koenane and Olatunji, 2017: 263). 
Thus, it is for these reasons that I suggest that if one refutes the said metaphysical grounding, 
she may not find herself in this “awkward position” (Matolino, 2015) of adjudicating between 
competing interpretations of ubuntu’s relevance or talk that are in tandem with this manner of 
grounding it: ubuntu as (or and) something(x). Of course, this manner of grounding ubuntu’s 
relevance and talk finds its proper place in post-colonial/apartheid southern Africa. This is not 




grounding if there seems to be a good justification for the logic behind it. But the extent to 
which ubuntu has been interpreted by some thinkers especially in post-colonial/apartheid 
southern Africa establishes the necessity to inquire. This is partly because some existing 
interpretations of ubuntu (as scholarly inquiry) may weaken either ubuntu itself as a publicly 
known practice or simply show that scholars and other elites bend ubuntu to their own purposes 
or develop its attractive parts to their own logic (Matolino, 2015 and Metz, 2014a: 447 – 448). 
Nevertheless, some adherents of ubuntu may contest this line of thought for the logic behind 
the foregoing affirmative postures: ubuntu as something(x)/ubuntu and something(x). The 
point I am getting at before any criticism can be levelled against this critique is that even some 
of these x’s were developed by certain individual thinkers who were not even worried about 
the traditional and communitarian set ups of places where “ubuntu was said to be a root of 
African philosophy” (Ramose, 1999; 2002; 2003; 2005). These x’s, one may argue, are 
somewhat constitutive of the logic for its [ubuntu’s] possibilities in modern Africa. 
Metaphysics, cosmopolitanism, jurisprudence, environmental ethics, and formal education etc 
are actually a good case in point here since not only were they developed by individual thinkers, 
but their pioneers and early commentators were never even bordered with an African 
“community that takes precedence over an individual” (Menkiti, 1984). 
On the other side, it appears as if some scholars of ubuntu adopted a comparative method. That 
on its own shows that I am not reluctant to acknowledging that some scholars insist that the 
effectiveness of something [African ethics] for example, can only be effective when it is 
comparative and context specific (Murove, 2009: xv). Murove (2009: xv) for instance, 
acknowledges that a comparative approach to ethics should sensitise students to the fact that 
no tradition is superior to any other but that all contribute equally to common world ethics. 
What this shows is that there are those instances where one may find this in the literature of 
African ethics. But this does not mean that the same Murove (2009) accounted for this 
comparative method even in philosophy, cosmopolitanism, metaphysics, and jurisprudence etc. 
What is more worrying, are the grounds on which ubuntu’s metaphysical grounding rest.  
To be more specific, it appears as if ubuntu (as scholarly inquiry) is somewhat grounded by 
these x’s: cosmopolitanism, humanism, metaphysics, jurisprudence, environmental ethics, and 
formal education to name a few. I claim, quite seriously, that ubuntu’s relevance or talk is often 
posited and adumbrated under the auspices of this metaphysical grounding. For this reason, it 




prove its existence and relevance for the post-colonial/apartheid southern Africa. Can one be 
justified in believing that this metaphysical grounding was invoked so as to establish spatial 
philosophy? Meaning this metaphysical grounding had and still has the tendency to regard 
certain x’s as establishing/legitimising and defending an intellectual territory (Janz, 2009: 213). 
Was it because adherents of ubuntu were prepared to respond to European’s denial with their 
affirmative stances or reactionary frameworks attributed to the philosophy of ubuntu? It 
remains unclear as to what it is that makes this metaphysical grounding a fog that must always 
blur and complement our thinking about ubuntu’s relevance and its “proper mode of 
philosophising” especially in post-colonial/apartheid southern Africa (Chimakonam, 2016).  
This is precisely because when one invokes ubuntu as x it automatically becomes a secondary 
citizen from its communitarian thinkers or its traditional African set ups: from ubuntu as 
worldview version to ubuntu as (cosmopolitanism; Law/Jurisprudence; Formal education) or 
as a “modern philosophical system” (Matolino, 2015; and Chimakonam, 2016: 228). Metz 
(2014a: 447 – 448) suggests that scholars do this to develop ubuntu’s attractive parts using 
‘their own logic’: scholarly inquiry into ubuntu. This is exactly what is perpetuated by a number 
of scholars when articulating or theorising about ubuntu so that whatever they do with ubuntu 
will somehow silence it by morphing some x’s into a privilege. This privilege is somewhat 
aligned to a metaphysical grounding which not only inaugurated ubuntu’s textual history but 
the one that makes the relevance of ubuntu with reference to it to persist. This renders ubuntu 
to be at the margins of whatever it is a scholar wants it to be because it is reduced as relative; 
comparative to; if not contrasted with x or strengthened to be a certain theory. Therefore, is 
that all there is to a proper mode of philosophising about ubuntu’s relevance in contemporary 
(southern) Africa? 
Even though I attempt to appeal to the logic behind grounding ubuntu as (or with) 
something(x), but I recognise that there seems to be another cluster of defining and grounding 
ubuntu as a human quality at least for Gade (2012) and other ‘traditionalists’ (Metz, 2014a: 
447). And it must be clear from the foregoing that I deal with the former: scholarly inquiry into 
ubuntu. The reason why the letter is not subjected to philosophical scrutiny here is primarily 
because scholars invoke ubuntu as a human quality or [what has always been “there”,19 unlike 
the above x’s, to tie people together even before ubuntu’s textual history] to affirm its relevance 
 
19 Things that were already there in Southern Africa before ubuntu’s textuality are its community, the relationships 




for modern Africa. Hence, my point of contestation aims at leaving aside a transfiguration of 
ubuntu as a human quality or way of life from traditional to modern Africa to ground the 
possibilities of its relevance. 
For this reason, I think we need to see this metaphysical grounding for what it is now, since 
what it establishes is that “ubuntu as an indigenous way of life”20 alone was not sufficient but 
needed a certain x to speak on behalf of it before anyone can see its relevance for contemporary 
Africa. Is it possible to think about ubuntu with specific reference to the community but outside 
of these x’s? An immediate response is a “yes” since it was not after its textual history that 
ubuntu was somewhat metaphysically grounded upon as a human quality or worldview. But 
why does ubuntu not only rely on folk/communal thoughts of African communities21 especially 
those that are “not affected by modern intellectual influences” (Wiredu, 1980: 37) to ground 
and affirm its relevance for modern Africa?22 Was this an attempt to create a balance between 
traditional and modern Africa: by appealing to Western philosophical approaches of the world? 
Was it because advocates of ubuntu are no longer interested in its ethnophilosophical 
commitments and its relations with narratives of return? Is it because most scholars of ubuntu 
have managed to develop it “beyond the confines of ethno-philosophical myopia”? (Bewaji 
and Ramose, 2003: 388). If it is true that some of them (e.g. Chimakonam (2016) and Metz 
(2014a: 447 – 448)) have sought to escape its ethnophilosophical commitments and its relations 
with narratives of return or its relations with ‘ancestors/invisible beings’ as ‘providing moral 
guidance’, then why certain x’s (Kantianism, Hobbesianism, cosmopolitanism, jurisprudence 
and humanism) are used as an “escape” to advance its relevance for modern Africa?23 Is it 
possible to have a talk about the relevance of ubuntu that maintains a proper distance towards 
its ethnophilosophical commitments, relations with narratives of return and some Western 
philosophical approaches? Is there something wrong about the idea of the traditional 
community in which one finds ubuntu and its relations with ancestors as providing moral 
guidance for human beings? If there is nothing wrong with the primacy of this community, in 
 
20 Here I mean ubuntu as grounded upon human qualities. 
21 I recognise that there are some scholars who interpret ubuntu with reference to traditional Africa. 
22 This is not to suggest that no one sought to ground ubuntu in this manner. 
23 Chimakonam’s contribution to the Matolino-Kwindingwi-Metz debate shows that Metz has managed to develop 
ubuntu (as a worldview version/narrative of return) into a new version (modernist interpretation of ubuntu) which 
represents ubuntu’s present state: theoretical sophistication and proper mode of philosophising.  He argues that 
Metz’s new version has managed to develop ubuntu beyond the confines of narratives of return (Chimakonam, 
2016: 227 – 230). He contends that Metz’s system is a ‘philosophical system’ that breeds ubuntu’s theoretical 




which one finds ubuntu, then what was the significance of, and the logic behind executing a 
specific x to ubuntu’s relevance for most thinkers in contemporary Southern Africa? And why 
since there is nothing wrong with this community? Or is there something new about the idea 
of the community for modern Africa that makes any talk of ubuntu with reference to traditional 
societies and its relations with invisible beings but devoid of its interpretations relative to 
certain x’s highly questionable? The same question thus remains: is that how each individual 
thinker must properly philosophise about ubuntu’s relevance in contemporary Africa? 
These are the kinds of questions that may also spark a certain kind of investigation about the 
possibilities of the relevance of ubuntu for contemporary Africa. The reason for raising such 
questions is to pin down the significance of, and logic behind grounding ubuntu with Western 
philosophical approaches of the world. In addition, it is no hidden fact that this metaphysical 
grounding does communicate something about ubuntu’s relevance or talk when one reads the 
existing literature of ubuntu. These Western philosophical approaches seem to make this 
communication effectual so that one may attest to ubuntu’s relevance by also acknowledging 
their presence. For instance, ubuntu and Kantianism/Hobbessianism; ubuntu and Christianity; 
ubuntu as or and Formal education; ubuntu and or as Jurisprudence. Or ubuntu as or and 
Humanism; ubuntu as or and Cosmopolitanism; ubuntu as or and Law; and ubuntu as or and 
Environmental ethics. Though I might not be correct but what I suspect is that this metaphysical 
grounding rested upon building relations, constituting relations that will somehow manifest 
comparisons or contrasts and making us realize these relations. And I do suspect that it cannot 
go beyond making us realize these relations. But this critique does not concentrate on things 
that could inspire philosophical interrogation after going beyond what makes us realize these 
relations. Rather, the point I am toiling to achieve with this examination is that the manner in 
which ubuntu was grounded especially after colonialism and apartheid rests upon breeding and 
constituting relations, similarities, comparisons, and contrasts with certain things so that one 
may realise the possibilities of talking about its relevance with reference to or as related to (or 
contrasted with) something(x). This attests to Matolino’s (2015: 216) claim that “whatever 
individual scholars do with ubuntu, the outcome is their own interpretation informed by, among 
other things, their training and proclivities”. For this reason, if ubuntu is interpreted in this 
manner, it may be argued that it is somehow boxed-in by this (‘ubuntu as/and-propositions’) 
metaphysical grounding. Thus, my questions at this stage are: Does understanding ubuntu 
through the prisms of breeding and constituting relations, similarities, comparisons, and 




the possibilities of its relevance for our own times? Why does ubuntu’s relevance have to be 
occasioned; constituted and interpreted in this manner, and what was the logic behind all of 
this? And can these occasions, interpretations or propositions constitute the hallmarks of the 
relevance for ubuntu together with its proper mode of philosophising for our own times? 
However, a reasonable person of the opposing view might be tempted to object that my 
argument is not convincing at this stage since it would be ethnocentric, if not silly to suggest 
that ubuntu is uniquely African. This temptation might even lead her to suggest that I have 
sought to identify a problem where there is none. She might argue that the mere fact that the 
tenets which underpin ubuntu are intensely expressed by Africans, does not make its values 
exclusively African. She might say the refusal to register a comparative method or 
acknowledge the similarities between ubuntu and other humanistic philosophical approaches 
reflects parochialism of southern Africa and a refusal to learn from others. And conclude that 
we must have the humility to acknowledge that we are not inventing unique problems in 
southern Africa nor are we likely to invent entirely new solutions (Munyaka and Motlhabi, 
2009: 67; Enslin and Horsthemke, 2004: 548 in Praeg, 2014: 108 – 109). Just in case there are 
some readers who may be wondering, this is the kind of objection that one finds in the existing 
literature of ubuntu (Teffo, 1998: 4; Enslin and Horsthemke, 2004: 548; Praeg, 2014: 108 – 
109; Koenane and Olatunji, 2017: 269). Since this is an objection that scholars of ubuntu might 
appeal to, I shall demonstrate that it is not convincing.  
In response, I think this objection misses my point of contestation at least in two respects. 
Firstly, I am not against the idea that ubuntu may have some similarities with other humanistic 
philosophical approaches of the world. Indeed, there is an interesting coincidence of insights 
even between African (ubuntu) and (Greek) Western philosophies (Ramose, 2014a: 75 – 76). 
Hence, my point of contestation is not grounded by the idea that ubuntu is “a peculiarly African 
way of thinking” (Wiredu, 1980: 39). Secondly, neither does this examination purport to 
demonstrate that thinking about ubuntu “with a mindset that has a place for all possible 
relations as the ingredient of authentic philosophising” amounts to no good (Asouzu, 2007: 
64). In fact, making us realize some relations, similarities, comparisons and contrasting views 
does hold some water. But a curious mind may also be interested in knowing what will happen 
after one has realized these relations, similarities, comparisons, and contrasting viewpoints. 
Such a mind may acknowledge that there is something going on about ubuntu and its relations 
with certain philosophical approaches. But it may strike him as problematic, (a) To be satisfied 




relevance for our own times (b) How thinkers who rely on these relations manage to 
demonstrate this appeal to the said metaphysical grounding as the proper mode of 
philosophising (c) And how those engaged in this pursuit (of grounding ubuntu with Western 
philosophical approaches) fail to penetrate and reveal the vast recesses of the logic behind 
ubuntu’s metaphysical grounding which somehow serves as a template for its relevance for 
post-colonial/apartheid (southern) Africa according to some scholars: (Metz, 2007; 2014; 
Chimakonam, 2016; and Koenane and Olatunji, 2017: 266).  On top of that, one might insist 
that we must test; relate; or compare ubuntu to other philosophical approaches of the world 
instead of testing it in isolation to demonstrate its proper mode of philosophising. And I am 
prepared to sympathise with a view which says the said metaphysical grounding (ubuntu as or 
ubuntu and something(x)) has been appealed to in accounting for different answers to the 
question about what the relevance of ubuntu is.  
For instance, I admit quite strongly that ubuntu can relate or be comparable to other contexts 
of Western forms of thinking with reference to its values such as brotherhood, sharing, dignity 
and trust (Prinsloo, 1998: 48). In fact, I do not have an issue in accepting that ubuntu shares 
some features with Kantianism and imago Dei-inspired ethics (Matolino, 2015: 220). I am also 
aware of Augustine Shutte’s (1993) Thomistic approach to philosophy that he implements to 
systematise ubuntu for post-colonial/apartheid South Africa. Elsewhere he argues for ubuntu’s 
relevance in contemporary South Africa. It is high time, Shutte (2001) argues, that ubuntu is 
exported to the international arena to demonstrate its relevance (Shutte, 2001 in Matolino and 
Kwindingwi, 2013: 199). But Augustine Shutte does not fall within the parameters of this 
examination since Ramose (2003) has dealt with his “Philosophy for Africa (1993)” decisively.  
I do recognise that Metz (2007) has attempted to develop a general ethical principle informed 
by values that could be compared to dominant Western theories such as Hobbesian egoism, or 
Kantian respect for persons. To be more precise, he concurs that “no one” has made this a 
primary aim that has been pursued in a systematic, and analytic way (Ramose, 2007: 347 – 355 
and Metz, 2007a: 37 – 38). Metz’s (2007) systematic and analytical approach is used to unveil 
one of the thinkers who compare ubuntu to other Western philosophical approaches of the 
world here. For this reason,  Metz’s goal was to present an ethical principle that does not only 
grow in Africa and differs from the west, but one that is specific; complete; has more of these 




Metz, on the other side, confirms that there are ways in which ubuntu and Confucian ethics 
tend to prize harmonious relationships. Not only is this so but he offers reasons for thinking 
that harmony is central to both ubuntu and Confucianism (Metz, 2016; 2017; 2017a). 
Furthermore, some thinkers have spoken approvingly of Metz’s systematised version of 
ubuntu. To exemplify this, Chimakonam (2016: 228 – 229) is amongst those who have credited 
Metz with the status of “developing a philosophical system” which he [Chimakonam] deems 
as the “modern version of ubuntu”. He concedes that Metz’s systematised version is 
philosophical. He holds the view that the project of systematising ubuntu especially the one 
carried out in the ethical dimension by Metz represents “a new version of ubuntu with 
theoretical sophistication”. And he takes very seriously the view that Metz’s project of 
systematising ubuntu is the proper mode of philosophising. Chimakonam (2016) registers this 
point in reaction to Matolino (2015). Next, I turn to reasons as to why readers may doubt 
Chimakonam’s approval of Metz’s systematisation as demonstrating ‘the proper mode of 
philosophising’ for our own times.  
Philosophers such as Ramose; Douglas Farland; Jason Van Niekerk; and Praeg etc, have also 
spoken disapprovingly of Metz’s version of ubuntu (Ramose, 2007; Metz, 2007a; Matolino, 
2015; Praeg, 2017). Metz acknowledges Ramose as the most critical commentator of his work. 
Ramose reads Metz’s claims as “questionable”; “tenuous”; “exaggerated and unsustainable”; 
“far-fetched and problematical”; “neither credible nor substantiated”; “neither illuminating nor 
convincing”; “lacking a clearly identified and specific standpoint”; “relying on dubious 
credibility”. And best of all, “addressing a cadaverous caricature of ubuntu” (Ramose, 2007 in 
Metz, 2007a: 375). Praeg (2017: 296) on the other side, does not only argue that Metz’s moral 
theory has not grounded any influential contemporary ethical theory, but he reasons that it 
(Metz’s theory) is subverted by two things. Firstly, it is subverted by the fact that values Metz 
associates with ubuntu are but fleeting, historical associations [functions of a nationalist matrix] 
of ubuntu with values derived from a historical and glocal interference with Christianity and 
human rights discourses. Secondly, it is subverted by the fact that his moral theory is premised 
on a simple confusion of cause and effect. Thus, he aptly thinks that the real African moral 




Indeed, these are one of the grounds which could show that Chimakonam’s (2016) approval 
would not go very far.24 For instance, it would be interesting to see how he could escape Metz’s 
critics before he approves of his philosophical system, in another paper: all of them. In his 
contribution to the Matolino-Kwindingwi-Metz debate, Chimakonam (2016: 229) does insist 
that “Matolino’s invocation of Ramose (2007) […] is merely a solidarity argument”. He thinks 
that the invocation of Ramose makes Matolino’s argument to be less glamorous.  He takes it to 
be the case that Ramose’s take on Metz does not “vitiate Metz’s attempt” to develop a 
philosophical system that represents ubuntu’s current state: theoretical sophistication and 
proper mode of philosophising (Ibid., 229). In this instance, I read Chimakonam as suggesting 
that Metz’s attempt could not be tossed to and fro by Ramose’s sceptical note. This is precisely 
because, for Chimakonam (2016: 229), “the edifice of philosophy is never completed and 
exhausted in any number of theories”. But Chimakonam seems to have misunderstood 
Ramose’s take on Metz (2007) deliberately. For this reason, it is my view that Ramose (2007) 
is one of Metz’s critics who could show that Chimakonam’s approval would not go very far.  
On this view, I think it was not Ramose’s purpose to sidestep Metz on the grounds of 
“completion” and “exhaustion” of any theories.  
For me, Ramose was trying to point Metz to other realities about his “no one” claim. Ramose 
must not be read as arguing that what Metz attempts has been exhausted and completed by 
other theories. Key amongst Ramose’s impatience with Metz was the “no one claim”. Ramose 
(2007: 349) argues that “the first problem with Metz’s comment on this [no one] claim does 
not serve to provide evidence that there is indeed “no one””. He contends that there is no 
evidence that supports Metz’s claim. He aptly thinks that Kwasi Wiredu and Benezet Bujo’s 
works would surely undermine Metz’s claim. In his appeal to Wiredu’s article, Ramose (2007: 
350) contends that Metz’s claim could be placed into doubt. Ramose (2007: 351) argues that 
“Bujo’s works [would] counter Metz’s exaggerated and unsustainable “no one” claim.  It is 
this “no one” claim that Ramose (2007: 350) deems as “neither credible nor sustainable”. Thus, 
Ramose makes an appeal to theories by Bujo, and Wiredu to assure that what Metz does is 
certainly not new on the African continent: Metz was not the first one to do this. Therefore, if 
my reading of Ramose (2007) were correct, then it certainly would be clear that Chimakonam 
 
24 In the next chapter, I revisit his contribution to the debate and conclude that his assessment of the debate is 




did not take heed of Ramose’s “no one claim” objection in his insistence that Metz’s attempt 
could not be vitiated by Ramose (2007).  
Moreover, even if Metz’s modern version of ubuntu represents theoretical sophistication and 
proper mode of philosophising as Chimakonam would have us believe, but it is somewhat 
boxed-in by the said metaphysical grounding. But my point of contestation should not be 
confused with one’s [e.g., Metz’s] logical form of grounding ubuntu with something(x) - 
Kantianism, and Hobbesianism - so as to build relations, contrasts and making us realise certain 
comparisons or similarities. Indeed, the above objection is not yet a strong one that a reasonable 
person might level against my point of contestation. Hence, the only issue that remains and 
strikes me as problematic is the motive and logic behind a metaphysical grounding responsible 
for interpreting ubuntu’s relevance or talk using or by building relations; contrasts; similarities; 
and comparisons with a number of x’s as if only in this way can we be sure that this manner of 
grounding ubuntu constitutes the hallmarks of its relevance for contemporary Africa. Thus, the 
logic from which this metaphysical grounding is grounded establishes the necessity to inquire 
and must not be given the status of unquestionability. 
Nevertheless, as from now, I provide a third reason as to why the potential objection hitherto 
invoked is not convincing and cannot rebut the forgoing critique about ubuntu’s affirmative 
stances: scholarly inquiry into ubuntu. The third reason must not be read as a contradiction. 
The third reason seeks to avoid the danger of being accused of committing a red herring fallacy 
in as far as the potential objection I did invoke is concerned. Some might insist that the above-
mentioned objection might somewhat divert readers from what is at stake by choosing to 
address what I have already justified in the course of this critique. Indeed, another reasonable 
person of the opposing view would not be satisfied with it to some extent. If I appeal to it as an 
objection that can be raised against this critique what she/he might point out is stated below. 
Key to the first philosophical gesture that she/he thinks might prove to undermine it is the 
persuasiveness of the objection itself with reference to what I have already justified in the 
course of this critique. Her philosophical gestures might point out that I took the weakest 
argument for an opposing view to this critique because that potential objection was already 
addressed before I even started to think about it. This is why she might think it serves as a side 
issue now. Hence, a need for another strong objection is necessary. This is what she might point 
out to readers so as to show that I took an objection that is already undermined by some 




 This is not to suggest that there are no occasions in which one can deploy this 
metaphysical grounding or see its usefulness. Neither does it suggest that this 
metaphysical grounding should not count as a necessary criterion that must be satisfied 
in understanding what it is like to talk about the possibilities of ubuntu in modern 
Southern Africa. Nor does it suggest that this manner of grounding ubuntu should count 
as a sufficient criterion for affirming its possibilities.25  
By quoting these lines, she might insist that the persuasiveness of the objection itself is neither 
fascinating nor insightful since I have already addressed this issue above. Hence, this is exactly 
why the objection itself is not a strong one that can be formulated against the foregoing critique 
of ubuntu’s affirmatives stances. If it is probably the case that the above objection cannot 
undermine my critique, at least based on three reasons hitherto advanced, then I will not 
consider “another one”26 in this main text. Rather, I will strengthen my point of contestation so 
as to establish another persuasive argument in favour of this critique that even a reasonable 
person of the opposing view will somewhat be sure to accept. On this way of thinking, 
strengthening my point of contestation demonstrates that thinking harder about ubuntu with 
reference to its metaphysical grounding - reminiscent of some x’s as its sponsors - is all there 
is to this critique.27 
From the above chain of reasoning, we can situate ubuntu as occupying a “B-status” instead of 
an “A-status” [x]. Both “A and B” statuses may be conceived of as properties of some sort.28 
The former is construed as an “accidental property”, whilst the latter is to be understood as an 
 
25 This is not a direct quote from someone. But it is a repetition of a direct passage that I draw from pages 35 of 
my dissertation.  
26 Another strong objection can be targeted at my use of “metaphysical grounding” or “grounding claim” and 
show that this critique is also trapped by a Western epistemological order on an African subject [ubuntu]. I think 
this objection can be proved to be weak since my critique is not targeted at ubuntu. But it is targeted at how ubuntu 
has been developed and articulated by different thinkers in post-colonial/apartheid southern Africa. Hence, I have 
formulated a grounding claim so as to deal with ubuntu’s metaphysical grounding as developed by individual 
scholars. I saw fit to use the same epistemological order that is somewhat invoked by modern scholars in their 
proclivities about ubuntu to question their perceived proclivities. Moreover, I think this objection cannot refute 
the manner in which my critique has been developed. Therefore, that is the reason why I said this objection will 
not be considered in the main text.  
27 I read ubuntu as sponsored by Western philosophical approaches of the world in modern Africa especially in 
matters concerning its relevance. 
28 There is a specific text that I borrow particularly form the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy to express the 
force of my argument in this section. This source emanates from analytic metaphysics and it discusses what is 
currently most commonly understood in terms of modal terms: essential versus Accidental properties (Teresa 




“essential property” of ubuntu’s relevance.29 By an “A-status” I mean, a primary source 
component which is an essential property of ubuntu’s relevance. In this component or property, 
one finds certain x’s, for grounding the possibilities of the relevance of “something”. In this 
case, this “something” accommodates ubuntu, which then falls into a “B-status”. By a “B-
status”, I mean, a secondary source component which must be read as an accidental property 
that does not prove the relevance of something. This secondary source component is grounded 
by an “A-status” or x, which attempts to attest to “something’s” relevance. In this case, I am 
referring to ubuntu’s relevance. This simply means that this metaphysical grounding gave birth 
to ubuntu’s scholarly inquiry [(B-status)] as defined and grounded by x [(A-status)].30 That is 
to say, it is by virtue of being contrasted with, related if not comparable to something 
universally recognizable [Law and jurisprudence; formal education; humanism; 
cosmopolitanism; environmental ethics; metaphysics etc], that ubuntu then becomes 
automatically relevant for contemporary Southern Africa. If one has read the previous section 
properly, she or he must have understood that an “A-Status” is an essential property that must 
be possessed and married by ubuntu (B-status) in order for its relevance to thrive or be made 
manifest. Hence, advocates of ubuntu situated it as a secondary component [(B-status)] to 
affirm its relevance by grounding it with certain x’s [(A-status)] – which I deem as an essential 
property for ubuntu’s relevance.   
If it were to be the case that none of these x’s existed, then one may be rest assured to insist 
that a metaphysical grounding for ubuntu which registers certain x’s would not even be 
possible. Or it would be different. The reason why x resonates with an [(A-status)], at least 
here, is simply because it is that which grounds “something’s” relevance - [(B-status)].31 That 
is the reason why ubuntu - [(B-status)] - is not at the forefront but the margins of its 
communitarian thinkers, because it needs an [(A-status)] or x to attest to its existence and 
 
29 An essential Property is an object or something is a property that it must have, while an accidental property of 
an object or something is one that it happens to have but that it could lack (Robertson and Atkins, 2013). In other 
words, A property is essential for a thing if the thing must have the property to exist and be the kind of thing that 
it is. We say a property is accidental if the thing has the property but does not have to exist (A glossary for 
philosophical terms, p. 839, https://global.oup.com.  
30 This is not to suggest that any talk of ubuntu was made possible after it was grounded upon x’s. I recognise that 
ubuntu has been a lived philosophy for traditional societies for years.  What I mean is that scholars of ubuntu write 
as if any talk of ubuntu was realised after they invoked their metaphysical grounding for the possibility of ubuntu 
in modern philosophical discourses. 
31 But if it were to be the case that ubuntu had grounded something elsewhere especially outside Africa, I could 




relevance for it to be recognised as philosophy, humanism, cosmopolitanism, law or 
jurisprudence or even a remedy to a number of telling problems facing modern day Africa.  
However, this does not mean that ubuntu is not open for other interpretations. This is far from 
saying a form of thinking proper to ubuntu in post-colonial/apartheid southern Africa is only 
through a comparative method or the said metaphysical grounding. As demonstrated above, I 
do recognise that ubuntu can be interpreted as a way of life, publicly known practice, or human 
quality in small-scale and tight knit communities. The only thing that strikes me as problematic 
for now is the logic behind the affirmation for ubuntu’s place in modern Southern Africa: 
ubuntu [(B-status)] as “something” or x – [cosmopolitanism]- [(A-Status)]. Or “something” [(A-
Status)]: Humanism, Law, Jurisprudence as ubuntu [(B-Status)]. Or scholarly inquiry into 
ubuntu in general. Sometimes some scholars (e.g., Biney, 2014: 29; Gaylard, 2004: 265; or 
Eze, 2011, and Samkange and Samkange, 1980) adumbrate ubuntu or humanism to mean one 
and the same thing: [(B-Status)] and [(A-Status)] connote one and the same thing.32  
The most important thing to note here is that the motive and logic behind this metaphysical 
grounding is hardly contested and exposed. I think, this may be due to reasons unbeknownst to 
some readers of African studies in general and philosophy in particular. For this reason, it 
seems unclear as to why this metaphysical grounding is left hanging and unattended since it is 
amenable to philosophical scrutiny. Maybe this should not be taken as a telling problem since 
some scholars might insist that testing ubuntu in isolation or without other rival x’s [which are 
granted an “A-status” by its sympathisers] is meaningless. Some may even insist that I am 
raising a side issue that can only be dismissed as a pseudo-problem since most advocates of 
ubuntu seem not to be worried about it. But what if the motive or logic behind this metaphysical 
grounding rests on a mistake? What if this metaphysical grounding ruins projects of ubuntu 
considerably? Does it [metaphysical grounding to ubuntu] really rest on a mistake? What is 
that mistake? What if there is nothing more interesting about this unexamined metaphysical 
grounding since what it does is only to build relations, contrasts, comparisons, and similarities 
that justify its own method of executing x’s or what falls under an [(A-Status)]? Does this mean 
that we can no longer go beyond any scholarly interpretation of ubuntu [(B-status)] as grounded 
upon “something”/x; or an [(A-status)], if we push its B-statuses to its own limits?  
 
32 Even if this is the case, but I do recognise that Ramose (1999; 2002; and 2005) contrasts ubuntu with humanism. 




Although advocates of ubuntu confidently support and theorise about ubuntu [(B-status)], the 
logic behind its metaphysical grounding by way of building relations, contrasts, comparisons, 
and similarities with an [(A-status)] or a number of x’s remains a mystery that is not yet 
revealed to literature. Is it because this is a mystery that must not be revealed, but be left 
unscrutinised since it served as some sort of ritual from which to establish a number of 
possibilities for ubuntu in contemporary Africa? Is it because there was no logic behind this 
manner of going about things since southern Africa was desperately in need of a common and 
shared humanity which was not only antithetical to dehumanisation but also relevant for 
restoring the dignity of the black majority? Therefore, I think that we need to rethink our 
thinking about the relevance of ubuntu attached to the said metaphysical grounding especially 
in modern philosophical discourses. That is why the motive and logic behind a metaphysical 
grounding responsible for interpreting ubuntu using or by building relations, contrasts, 
similarities, and comparisons with a number of x’s - as if only in this way can we be sure that 
this manner of grounding ubuntu constitutes the hallmarks of its relevance and proper mode of 
philosophising for contemporary Africa - strikes me as problematic.  
2.4 Concluding Remarks. 
The aim of this chapter was two-folded. Firstly, it sought to foreground some of the dominant 
views/assertions that affirmed the possibilities of ubuntu’s talk or relevance in the post-
colony/apartheid regime. This was done with an intention to foreground different ways in 
which the possibilities of ubuntu’s relevance have been grounded in Southern Africa: scholarly 
inquiry into ubuntu. In discussing this logic for the possibilities of ubuntu’s affirmations, this 
chapter was not concerned with which of them best accounts for plausible answers to the 
question of ubuntu and its relevance. Thus, it has foregrounded some but not all thinkers who 
[or views that] did establish a metaphysical grounding for the relevance of ubuntu for 
contemporary Southern Africa. Secondly, it sought to present a critique for the logic behind a 
metaphysical grounding for these affirmative postures attributed to ubuntu’s relevance in 
southern Africa. Therefore, it is this critique which was at the level of detail that sufficed to 
build a foundation for thinking harder about ubuntu and its relevance in the subsequent 
chapters. And this chapter did not make a case for it being the best critique that one could offer 





The Matolino-Kwindingwi-Metz Debate: Reflections and Recommendations. 
 
3.1  Preliminary Remarks. 
The preceding chapter has challenged the logic behind affirming the possibilities of ubuntu’s 
relevance in modern Africa. It did register a critique of a metaphysical grounding responsible 
for interpreting ubuntu so as to set the tone for a thorough examination for it and the Matolino-
Kwindingwi-Metz debate. However, a critical examination of ubuntu in modern philosophical 
discourses is precisely what this chapter’s central aim seeks to contribute to literature. In 
demonstrating exactly what its usefulness is, this chapter outlines the nature of the debate; 
targets Metz’s (2014) intervention and Chimakonam’s (2016) contribution for critical scrutiny. 
Not only do I refrain from reading this specific debate with exaggeration as it deserves absolute 
impartiality, but I endorse it as one of the most outstanding debates in philosophical discourses. 
For this reason, the present chapter is a strong demonstration of how I go about convincing the 
reader, in the subsequent chapters, that my main position on this debate is correct and most 
plausible.33 These chapters must be read in this light since they contribute constructively to the 
main thesis I defend in this project. Though this chapter is a strong demonstration, but in no 
way should these chapters’ baseline degrees of correctness and plausibility be read, or skim 
read as exhausting the entirety of ubuntu’s philosophical issues, as I remain neutral on the other 
ones below.34 So, my position on this debate, together with grounds for its defense, rest upon 
examining ubuntu under its auspices. In providing some hints as to what this chapter’s position 
will be, together with grounds carried out in its defense, I shall appeal to what the problems are 
with reflections and contributions to the debate. Therefore, the defense for the position I 
articulate below shows that reflections and recommendations by Metz (2014); and 
Chimakonam (2016) are neither compelling nor should they be adumbrated as standard replies. 
3.1.1 Outline.  
I map out the overall structure of the chapter in a three-fold manner. Firstly, I outline the nature 
of the debate. Secondly, I review and respond to Metz’s (2014) intervention. Finally, I revisit 
Chimakonam’s (2016) contribution and raise two objections against it.  
 
33 The plausibility of this position must be read as limited to three papers only. In this chapter it targets [(Metz 
(2014); Chimakonam (2016); and in the next chapter it targets Koenane and Olatunji (2017)] and it excludes 
Matolino (2015) and Praeg (2017) since interrogating them is beyond the scope of this current research. 




3.2  The Nature of The Debate. 
3.2.1 Matolino And Kwindingwi’s Account. 
As outlined in the introductory chapter, I conceive of Matolino and Kwindingwi’s essay as 
based on questioning ubuntu, its relevance and how ubuntu ought to reach its end in modern 
southern Africa. The end of ubuntu that these thinkers wish to articulate rests upon two basic 
tenets:  
(a) The end of ubuntu in both academic and 
(b) Political circles.  
In order to articulate their view on the end of ubuntu they “argue that the aggressive promotion 
of ubuntu in South Africa is an elitist project so conceived by the new black elites” (Matolino 
and Kwindingwi, 2013: 197). They insist that black elites conceive of ubuntu as a restorative 
move; an attempt at securing the dignity of black masses as well as an attempt at forging a so-
called black identity. This first line of reasoning draws on historical cases that sought to 
“aggressively promote” an African mode of being which coincided with both the end of 
colonialism and the rise of black elitism (Ibid.). These scholars note that such attempts ended 
in very public and political failures. On this view, there is a sense in which ubuntu is construed 
as the “aggressive promotion” or a revival project by black elites aimed at restoring and 
securing the dignity of black masses. In addition, even the African mode of being is consumed 
by this aggression of ubuntu which ended in public and political failures on the continent. In 
their second line of reasoning, they question the desirability of ubuntu as a mark/guide of the 
spirit of the nation. Their critique of ubuntu concentrates on the disjunct that exists between 
the metaphysical conditions necessary for the attainment of ubuntu and the stark ontological 
and ethical crisis facing the new elites and “our people” (Matolino and Kwindingwi, 2013). 
They understand ubuntu as a narrative of return that could be linked to other narratives that 
were once propounded by African political leaders such as Julius Nyerere; Leopold Senghor; 
Kwame Nkrumah; and Kenneth Kaunda. They contend that narratives of return did not register 
their success, because the continent has been compromised by their ideals and pursuits. They 
point readers to their ill-functionality as guides and inspirations of what it was to be 
authentically African (Matolino and Kwindingwi, 2013: 198). These narratives were construed 
as providing a perfect interpretation of reality (Ibid., 202). They insist that Africa’s search or 
promotion of its lost identity did fail to take note of detailed guidelines of the nature of person, 




as an awakening to the authentic African life that ought to be desired by everyone. This is 
exactly what undermined “space for the possibility of other interpretations that could be at 
variance with their preferred narratives” (Matolino and Kwindingwi, 2013: 199). The most 
problematic aspect of these narratives is that they view African life as monolithic both in its 
interpretation and how it is lived.  
As a result, Matolino and Kwindingwi aim to articulate a critique of ubuntu that is two-fold. 
The first one rests upon two points that are of “greater” and “less” significance (Matolino and 
Kwindingwi, 2013: 201 - 202). Of less significance is their point that readers must not negate 
the existence of other competing or rival, and maybe inferior or superior interpretations of life 
in Africa’s traditional set ups that were not aligned with the tenets of ubuntu. They recognise 
the persistence of these interpretation since it is in the nature of human beings to interpret life 
from different angles and to uphold values that are not always the same. The possibility for the 
existence of these values need not be negated even if they were undermined or excluded in our 
traditional societies. If these values are undermined and excluded that could show that one 
undermines Africa’s capacity for free intellectual activity (Ibid., 201). Of greater significance 
is their point that delves on the disadvantages of revivalism. They conceive of revivalism as 
the project of pursuing the narrative of return as embedded in Africa’s search to revive an 
outdated African mode of being. They do not seem to sympathise with traditionalists in 
claiming that “everything African has to be found in the pristine state of Africa prior to slavery 
and colonialism” (Matolino and Kwindingwi, 2013: 201).  This is simply because the authentic 
mode of being is given to varying shifts that retain multiple identities. They understand the 
realities and impacts of modernity, globalisation and colonialism and other dynamic factors as 
deep signifiers that could also contribute “on the shaping and development of the African mode 
of being” (Ibid., 201). They take it to be the case that being African does not mean the same 
thing to all Africans, because it cannot be true that the only mode of being that Africans must 
tap into is one that takes the pristine state of Africa that existed prior to slavery and colonialism 
very seriously.  
For this reason, Bloemfontein of South Africa is actually their good case in point. They contend 
that this large city does have various competing values that are not necessarily occasioned by 
how ubuntu is interpreted. They then set one crucial requirement that could somehow guarantee 
the effectiveness of ubuntu. That is, the success of ubuntu does not depend on large-scale cities 




on undifferentiated, small-scale, and tight-knit communities that are relatively undeveloped 
(Matolino and Kwindingwi, 2013: 202). For the spirit of ubuntu to flourish and register its 
success it must be immersed in communities that are interdependent. They think that it is the 
existence of these communities that could register its effectiveness and success. And if these 
communities do not exist ubuntu will “become [..] an appendage to the political desires, wills, 
and manipulations of the elite in [their] attempt to coerce society towards the same ideology” 
(Ibid., 202). 
The second part of their critique rests upon “the context in which narratives of return arise”. 
They suggest that narratives of return seek to affirm the dignity of Africans in the face of the 
excesses of slavery and colonialism (Ibid.). They contend that those in the business of returning 
the narrative are effectively propping up a certain political worldview without being explicit 
about their move. They suggest that the idea of being African, the one that readers could draw 
from these narratives, can easily clash with other ideals. They take it to be the case that small-
scale communities, that make it easier for ubuntu  and its values to thrive, are not only intolerant 
towards divergent ideas, but are also notorious for their dislike for outsiders and place a high 
price and value on blood relations in recognising the other. This leads them to argue that if one 
is effectively committed to the values of ubuntu, he or she must know that he is committed at 
the exclusion of other values (Ibid.). Moreover, they opine that to fit ubuntu into a relatively 
modern and highly differentiated society like south Africa is not as easy as other thinkers would 
have us believe. Were this the case about ubuntu, then it certainly would show that ubuntu is 
only advanced to serve a certain Africanist agenda that best suits the elite (Ibid., 202). They 
further go on to argue that ubuntu or Afrocentric approaches in general tend to be exclusive of 
other views that are more inclusive. This is a direct result of how narratives of return are. These 
narratives take pride in emphasising and reviving certain aspects of being African in their quest 
for securing their political goals of what they take it to mean for a polity to be authentically 
African. Since these narratives are more exclusive and less inclusive, then anyone who purport 
to demonstrate his/her interests towards operating in conflict with them would be derided as a 
non-person or un-African (Matolino and Kwindingwi, 2013: 203). Matolino and Kwindingwi 
(2013: 203) take ubuntu as a failed philosophy since it does not seem “to capture [and 
articulate] the wishes of [the ordinary] citizens. These citizens are here and now, and the 
narrative of return does not help them. This is precisely because ubuntu as a narrative of return 
is not well suited for complex and multi-cultural societies that do not prize communality to 




as a pointer to how ill-suited ubuntu could be to the current social realities that call for ethical 
reflection (Ibid., 203). They contend that for one to understand its ill-suitability one must 
understand that impacts of irreversible effects of factors such as modernity, and 
industrialisation, must be taken seriously if Africa is really concerned about changes that 
unfold. If these irreversible effects are taken seriously then one would see that the values of 
ubuntu are now extinct especially in large-scale societies where multiple identities and 
divergent ideas are said to have thrived. As a result, for one to see the values of ubuntu as a 
reality for everyone, he or she must understand that ubuntu is possible once it is “embedded in 
the strictures of communalism”, because without communalism there is no possibility for 
ubuntu to register its success. This idea arises form Matolino and Kwindingwi’s view that “the 
mutability of African societies (away from their traditional antecedents) has rendered ubuntu 
dissonant with the naturalness of the opportunities for its realisation” (Ibid., 203). 
Moreover, they argue that being African can be anything without thinking that it has to be in 
concord with the dictates of ubuntu. They are of the view that there are other instances of being 
African that are not necessarily consistent with ubuntu. For this reason, ubuntu as a project of 
elitism, ordinarily understood as a narrative of return, the advocacy of the theory and practice 
of ubuntu as an authentic form of being African has lost currency, write Matolino and 
Kwindingwi (2013: 204). On this view, ubuntu’s yearning for the restoration of Africa’s lost 
identity or pristine mode of being is disjoined from the reality of ordinary people. Matolino 
and Kwindingwi (2013: 204) then suggest that even though there may be some political 
interests from elites that aim to defend their project of elitism, but its efficacy will never be 
realised. Therefore, for these thinkers, ubuntu in the academe and political circles has reached 
its end (Ibid., 204). 
3.2.2 Metz’s Account. 
Metz (2014) comes along and begs to differ since in no way he did succumb to Matolino and 
Kwindingwi’s recommendations that ubuntu ought to reach its end both as an ethical theory 
and way of life. He responds to them by contending that we should view scholarly inquiry into 
ubuntu and the political application of ubuntu as projects that are only now properly getting 
started (Metz, 2014: 66). He seeks to affirm - instead of questioning - the beginning for and the 
relevance of ubuntu in his “reply” to these thinkers. He can be read as offering “a defence of 
the relevance of ubuntu theorists” (Matolino, 2015). No doubt, only after Matolino and 
Kwindingwi had criticized ubuntu did Metz thought about its beginning. This is made manifest 




For this reason, I read Metz’s argumentation as imbedded in two-pronged strategies: (a) That 
of scholarly inquiry; and (b) Political application. His reading of Matolino and Kwindingwi 
depicts them as portraying dyadic equivalences. The first equivalence is sociological whereas 
the second one is philosophical. The former adumbrates them as insisting that political elites 
who have most influentially invoked ubuntu have done so in ways that serve nefarious social 
functions. Narrowing down the discourse about how to live is reminiscent of these nefarious 
functions. The latter adumbrates Matolino and Kwindingwi as insisting that the moral ideals 
of ubuntu are appropriate only for a bygone era or pre-modern age.  
Metz’s account proceeds from both the position of negativity and positivity. At the negative 
side of the spectrum is Metz’s view that considerations proffered by Matolino and Kwindingwi 
are insufficient to draw their conclusion. The said insufficiency inaugurates and sets Metz’s 
negativity towards them. On the positive side of the spectrum, Metz provides reason to think 
that ubuntu as an ethical theory has a lot going for it as an account of how individuals and 
institutions should be moral in the twenty first century. Not only does Metz’s “body of work” 
serve as his defence of ubuntu but he was generous enough to grant other “interpreters of 
ubuntu” the opportunity to air their views against Matolino and Kwindingwi on their own 
(Metz, 2014: 66). It does seem that there is none amongst scholars – except Leonhard Praeg – 
that Metz cites who has reacted to his call up to now. He thinks that there are strong grounds 
for believing ubuntu as a theory about how one ought to treat others morally in modern African 
realities. Praeg is one of the experts on ubuntu or should be cited as one in Metz’s view. As it 
turns out Praeg (2017) does not share even his interpretation of ubuntu as an ethical theory. He 
aptly thinks that the moral theory is yet to be theorised on the African continent. What this 
shows is that he does carry out his own contribution in a manner unbefitting Metz’s expectation 
(Ibid.). It does seem clear that Metz’s (2014: 66) clarion call has not received a better hearing 
since most scholars he did cite have remained silent so far. 
He then divides his paper into three sections. In the first section Metz commits himself to the 
social functions of ubuntu. He argues that there is nothing false and epistemically unjustified 
about ubuntu as a moral theory. He reads Matolino and Kwindingwi as “maintaining that talk 
of and thought about ubuntu ought to die out because there is nothing philosophically 
worthwhile about it to compensate for its undesirable social function” (Metz, 2014: 66). He 
then proceeds to agreeing that ubuntu is a narrative of return. He thinks that narratives of return 




return tend to prize pre-modern or traditional lifestyles that are far from modern African 
realities. He finds it difficult to oppose them on this issue. He admits that there are undesirable 
functions that are inherent in these narratives and also agree with them that ubuntu is “often 
invoked” as “a narrative of return even in south Africa” (Metz, 2014: 66). He further goes on 
to argue that not only do these narratives serve ideological functions but “should be avoided in 
(South) African political discourse” (Metz, 2014: 67). He makes some remarks about ubuntu 
and political elites. He contends that philosophers both “could” and “should” write about 
ubuntu in a way that does criticise them. He suggests that thinkers must see the responsibility 
“to reclaim talk of ubuntu” as something that is incumbent upon themselves to fulfil so that 
they could “contest its misuse by elites” (Ibid., 67). If it were to be the case that narratives of 
return could be reinforced unintentionally by any philosophic work, then it certainly would not 
be obvious that one should stop expounding ubuntu. He then argues that “if the truth or 
plausibility of ubuntu as a philosophy were great, then one could have [..] reason to keep 
spreading the word” (Ibid.). This is one of the projects that have just begun for Metz (2014). 
The second section delves on ubuntu as a moral theory, since he seeks to combat their claim 
that it is not a promising ethical theory. He reads Matolino and Kwindingwi as doubting ubuntu 
especially when it comes to its application to contemporary Africa. He then reviews “what they 
say about ubuntu as an ethical theory in their article to demonstrate that people residing in 
Johannesburg of south Africa could be said to live up to these (caring, humanness, respect and 
compassion) values” (Matolino and Kwindingwi, 2013: 199, in Metz, 2014: 68). The main 
thrust of his argument seeks to sidestep Matolino and Kwindingwi’s claim that ubuntu “cannot 
be exhibited in a modern, urbanised, industrialised and multicultural society” (Metz, 2014: 68). 
He contends that there is “no reason to think that [its values] are unique to a pre-industrial, 
small-scale setting. He could also be read as insisting that “the prospect of encountering 
precisely these kinds of caring and sharing relationships in Johannesburg is remote, Matolino 
and Kwindingwi are maintaining” (Metz, 2014: 69). He then gives readers three instances of 
why they should doubt what is being maintained by Matolino and Kwindingwi. By this Metz 
(2014: 69 – 70) seeks to convince readers that ubuntu is relevant for modern Africa. Namely: 
Being hospitable to strangers; state bureaucracy; and Letsema.  
Metz (in the last section) insists that agreeing with these examples means agreeing that ubuntu 
is far from at an end. These examples are the ones that he spent some time discussing in his 




she/he agrees with Metz that ubuntu is far from at an end. This (last) section serves as his 
conclusion about “traditional ethics for contemporary Africa”. He thinks that ubuntu is rather 
getting started in the sense of now being in a terrific position to steer away from undesirable 
ways of life with which it has been associated, such as sexism, and conservatism, and to 
incorporate the insights of science, the benefits of technology and more generally, the desirable 
facets of modernity (Metz, 2014: 71). He understands ubuntu to be open up for modern 
demands. He then proceeds to articulate an ethical theory “that underlies the above examples 
(being hospitable to strangers; state bureaucracy; and letsema) of how contemporary society 
could be organised so as to manifest more ubuntu” (Ibid., 71). It is this ethical theory that Metz 
construes as part of the project that has just begun. He aptly thinks that these examples are 
attractive and should not be dismissed since “they are grounded on a moral principle that is 
philosophically powerful and under-explored in the international arena” (Metz, 2011 in Metz 
and Gaie, 2011; and Metz, 2014: 71). As for Metz, when one construes ubuntu as an ethical 
theory one would see that it “is well understood to prescribe honouring relationships of sharing 
a way of life and caring for others’ quality of life (Metz, 2014: 71). Metz suggests that this is 
an ethic that he finds promising in the African tradition. Not only is this so, but he insists that 
this is an ethic that he has sought to articulate, refine, apply, and export to a local and 
international audience. For this reason, he thinks that project has only just begun, and scholars 
must find it worth continuing chiefly because it is so philosophically interesting and compelling 
(Ibid., 71). 
3.3  A Response to Metz’s Account. 
3.3.1 The Logically Inconsistent Objection. 
This section contests Metz’s account and shows that it rests upon logical inconsistency. 
However, its point of contestation differs from the ones levelled against him by Matolino 
(2015) and Praeg (2017). By this objection, I seek to subvert the force of his argument in his 
“reply”. As a matter of fact, Metz construes political application of ubuntu and scholarly 
inquiry into ubuntu as projects that are now properly getting started. He justifies this as a fact 
from which to view these projects. This is an interesting submission to have been made, for 
Metz, in order to respond to Matolino and Kwindingwi. On this view, he might think of his 
current defence of ubuntu as un-controversially true. He might think there are strong grounds 
for thinking that his defence of ubuntu does not rest on any logical inconsistency.  
However, there is one thing that readers must take into consideration. When one presumes a 




articulates a defence of ubuntu that rests on a logical inconsistency. In other words, the first 
philosophical gesture that must come to a reader’s mind should reflect on his title: “Just the 
beginning for ubuntu” and these projects. To point readers to views that constitute this logical 
inconsistency they must notice that Metz argues for (a) The beginning for ubuntu and (b) 
Construes political application of ubuntu and scholarly inquiry into ubuntu as projects that are 
only now properly getting started. Most importantly, he can be accused of logical inconsistency 
simply because he did not specify the sort of justification readers could glean from his 
commitment to the beginning for ubuntu. Rarely did Metz spend some time defending (a) The 
beginning for ubuntu but his defence of ubuntu pales into logical inconsistency since he only 
justifies (b) The projects of ubuntu that he deems as now properly getting started: scholarly 
inquiry, and political application. On this way of thinking, if readers could presume a 
distinction between arguing for (a) The beginning for ubuntu; and (b) Political application and 
scholarly inquiry as projects that have just begun, they could notice  that Metz does not provide 
good reasons for thinking there is something he can associate with (a): The beginning for 
ubuntu. Rather he only gives a justification that accounts for (b): The projects of ubuntu that 
he deems as properly getting started.  
So conceived, there is nothing in Metz’s account that guarantees the truthfulness of his “just 
the beginning for ubuntu”. From this, we could accuse Metz of being inconsistent because he 
abandons the justifications for his understanding of the “beginning for ubuntu” by tapping into 
its projects: Political application and scholarly inquiry. As a result, does Metz mean the same 
thing when he talks about (a) The beginning for ubuntu and (b) The beginning for the projects 
that he deems as now properly getting started? It is without any doubt that Metz ends up arguing 
for the beginning for its projects: political application and scholarly inquiry. But readers are 
not likely to confuse the differences between his justification of (a) The beginning for ubuntu 
and (b) The projects of ubuntu that are now properly getting started. It is clear that Metz 
“beginning” purport to demonstrate the beginning for ubuntu’s projects. It does not purport to 
demonstrate the “beginning” that he associates with ubuntu itself. If Metz’s aim is to show the 
beginning for ubuntu, then why does he change his moves and spends the rest of his paper 
justifying the beginning for its projects that he deems as properly getting started? Political 
application and scholarly inquiry into ubuntu and ubuntu itself do not mean one and the same 
thing. Is Metz telling us about the beginning for ubuntu because it did not have its beginning 
before? What is the sort of ‘beginning’ that Metz aligns himself with? Does he mean that there 




to the beginning for ubuntu? For this reason, it is my view that there are no sufficient grounds 
for accepting that he argues for the beginning for ubuntu itself. This is simply because he was 
not consistent in this pursuit.  
3.4  Revisiting Chimakonam’s Contribution. 
This section seeks to revisit and engage Chimakonam’s contribution to the debate. For the 
purposes of this project, I read Chimakonam (2016) as providing answers to this project’s key 
research question. It provides answers in the sense that he affirms Metz’s modern version of 
ubuntu as registering its relevance for a modern society. Moreover, the force of my argument 
in this section is that Chimakonam’s take is not compelling and therefore should not be 
adumbrated as standard reply. Thus, this section must be conceived as continuing with 
defending my position about “Metz’s”,35 “Chimakonam’s”,36 and “Koenane and Olatunji’s”,37 
contributions. If one struggles to understand what my intentions are in this section, she or he 
must read it as bringing him/her one step closer to accepting the cogency of the position I wish 
to articulate in this chapter at least. By so doing, I foreground this section in a manner that 
follows a clear logical pattern. Firstly, I give a preview of his contribution to the debate. 
Secondly, I give an explication of his assessment of the debate. Thirdly, I raise two objections 
against his contribution. Namely, I raise a general objection about his position about both 
Matolino (2015) as well as Metz’s (2014) rejoinder. Finally, I give a specific objection to the 
credibility he attaches to his assessment of the debate. 
3.4.1 Chimakonam’s Contribution to The Debate. 
Chimakonam’s contribution aims to “show the philosophical significance” of what he 
identifies as a “conundrum” that resonates with Matolino and Kwindingwi. I take it to be the 
case that his maximal attention was limited to “showing the philosophical significance of the 
conundrum and the strengths and weaknesses in arguments” by Kwindingwi and Matolino. The 
philosophical significance of this conundrum is construed as “remaining decisive”. But it is 
only arguments marshalled in support of it that are construed as “not decisive”. The first gesture 
that I identified with Chimakonam resonates with what he thinks lies in Kwindingwi and 
Matolino. His reading of these thinkers led him to “a problem”. This problem ensued from his 
reading. This reading shows that to insist “ubuntu has reached its end is not a mere declaration 
 
35 Consider my position of Metz’s reply to Matolino and Kwindingwi in the preceding section and the final chapter 
of this project. 
36 The present section attempts to establish my position on his contribution to the debate. 




or position or conclusion” but it “is a problem”. His reading of Matolino and Kwindingwi 
points us to an understanding that he does not succumb to Matolino (2015: 214) who read their 
paper as “our position that ubuntu has reached its end”. It is this position which Matolino, when 
he responds to Metz, thinks “poses no threat” as he reads it as the original one. This is the 
position which insists that “ubuntu both as a recommended way of life, and as an ethical theory 
has reached its end” (Matolino and Kwindingwi, 2013). Chimakonam (2016) intervenes where 
this “position” ought not be viewed as “a position or mere declaration” since he identifies it 
“as a problem”. He tells us that not only would the significance of this “problem” redefine the 
sphere of ubuntu philosophy but even the historicity of African philosophy as a whole. He 
argues that even though Metz (2014) “may have offered systematization of ubuntu” but he 
agrees “with Matolino that Metz’s system may not be as impregnable as he envisages” 
(Chimakonam, 2016: 224). His recommendation resonates with arguing for the re-invention of 
ubuntu using the tool of conversational thinking. Moreover, Chimakonam chooses to work on 
two-pronged questions which his paper seeks to shed light upon. Firstly, has ubuntu philosophy 
reached its end as Matolino and Kwindingwi argue? Secondly, is ubuntu philosophy just the 
beginning as Metz insists? The simplest thing to be noted is that these questions spring from 
the main tittles from which the former and the latter are couched in. In response to the former, 
Chimakonam thinks that ubuntu has reached its end is a serious argument to put forward: a 
nihilistic one. In response to the latter, it is not entirely clear what could his response attempt 
to show, except the excitement he associates with Metz’s rejoinder. And he thinks Metz drew 
this excitement from the “presentment of murkiness in Matolino and Kwindingwi’s position”. 
It is this presentment of murkiness found in Matolino and Kwindingwi that supplies 
philosophical excitement according to Chimakonam. In addition, he gives us two ways of 
looking at Matolino and Kwindingwi in his introduction. Firstly, he thinks that dismissing 
Matolino and Kwindingwi as a misnomer is one way of looking at what he calls “this position”. 
Secondly, he thinks the more fruitful one resonates with considering the philosophical 
significance of “this position”. But this chapter does not dwell on the philosophical 
significance he attaches to Matolino and Kwindingwi as well as his “Toward a conversational 
mode of philosophizing”. Instead, it is limited to his assessment of the debate 
3.4.2 Chimakonam’s Assessment of The Debate.  
Not only did Chimakonam (2016: 225 – 227) task himself with espousing the significance of 
the debate as well as his “Toward a conversational mode of philosophizing” but he does launch 




debaters is two-fold. It is this credible assessment that attempts to underscore Kwindingwi and 
Matolino’s (2013) and Metz’s (2014) understandings of ubuntu. The most important thing to 
note here is that he attempts to deal with these debaters. On the one hand, his assessment relies 
on Metz (2014) and the sheer number of his publications on ubuntu related themes. For 
instance, he writes “On Metz’s side, I shall appeal to choice essays from a pool of numerous 
publications on ubuntu and ubuntu-related subjects” (Chimakonam, 2016: 227). On the other, 
he makes it very clear that his assessment takes heed of Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013) and 
Matolino (2015). For instance, he writes “I shall appeal to two essays from Matolino’s side, 
namely “The end of ubuntu”, co-authored with Kwindingwi, and “A response to Metz’s reply 
on the end of ubuntu”” (Chimakonam, 2016: 227). For the purposes of this project, these are 
four “essential properties”38 that ought to be read as templates for a philosophical interrogation. 
I do this for analytical purposes at least: 
(a) Metz (2014) – Properties>a 
(b) Metz’s publications “on ubuntu and ubuntu-related subjects” – Properties> b. 
(c) Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013) – Properties> c.  
(d) Matolino (2015) – Properties> d.  
No doubt, it seems like only in this way he does propose what he deems as the credible 
assessment. From this, readers must understand that Chimakonam proposes an assessment that 
takes these properties as the essential ones. If his assessment does not take heed of these four 
properties as essential, then it must be viewed with suspicion and be dismissed as non-credible 
since these are the only properties he deems as essential. All of these essential properties are 
things that his assessment must have and satisfy in order for it to count as credible.  
The most important thing to note is that Chimakonam (2016: 227) targets properties> c or - 
Matolino and Kwindingwi’s “version of ubuntu” - since it appears to be his first concern for a 
philosophical interrogation. The point he is getting at is that Matolino and Kwindingwi’s 
“understanding of ubuntu is limited to what can be called the “worldview ubuntu”. He 
conceives of this version of ubuntu as an ethnographic description of the 
precolonial/premodern sub-Saharan African outlook to life. It is this version of ubuntu that he 
construes as “community thought” and narrative of return. He thinks it was appropriate for 
Matolino and Kwindingwi to christens ubuntu as the narrative of return. In addition, his reading 
 
38 See the last section of Chapters two entitled “The “Logic Behind” The Foregoing Affirmative Stances: A 





of Matolino and Kwindingwi is unlike Koenane and Olatunji’s who argue that ubuntu must not 
be viewed as a narrative of return (Koenane and Olatunji, 2017). He then appeals to properties> 
d - Matolino (2015) - to demonstrate his reading of ubuntu as “worldview ubuntu”. However, 
readers must notice that there is a shift that has just occurred: a shift from properties> c to 
properties> d. This shift seeks to establish the idea of “worldview ubuntu” as quite embedded 
in properties> d or – Matolino’s (2015) contribution.  
For this reason, Chimakonam (2016: 227) reads Matolino - properties> d - as attesting to this 
version of ubuntu: the only possible version of ubuntu. He then cautions Matolino against what 
he calls “the costly error of assumption” (Ibid.). He thinks that there is nothing hasty about the 
manner in which he reads Matolino. He then attempts to make the state of this hastiness more 
apparent by providing Metz’s understanding/ interpretation of ubuntu to reflect on properties> 
d and not properties> c.39 As this shall be seen, this attempt seems to target properties> d alone 
because he never goes back to properties> c. For me, what this shows is that he has just opened 
a whole new can of worms in properties> c and tries to prove that properties> (a and b) would 
do a much better job of both sidestepping properties> c & d - though he no longer returns to 
properties> c properly.  
No doubt, the state of this hastiness is only targeted at Matolino (2015) whom he accuses of 
committing a costly error of assumption. It is this costly error of assumption that is going to be 
elucidated by way of appealing to Metz’s construal of ubuntu. Chimakonam’s first attempt of 
what he deems as a “credible assessment” is in parenthesis with properties> d; properties> b; 
and properties> a. In other words, it is a combination of both properties> a – Metz (2014) and 
properties> b - Metz’s numerous publications “on ubuntu and ubuntu-related subjects” - 
attempting to sidestep properties> d – Matolino (2015). It has no business in assessing 
properties> c – Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013) - in this instance or at this stage at least. One 
could read Metz as demonstrating to Matolino (2015) that he is only committed to nothing but 
the “worldview ubuntu” (Chimakonam, 2016: 228). This is what Chimakonam (2016: 228) had 
to say in order to demonstrate the most obvious instance of the hastiness, and “costly error of 
assumption” he attaches to Matolino’s version of ubuntu: 
 
39 Readers must notice this, as from the fourth paragraph of his assessment of the debate Chimakonam (2016: 227 
– 230) no longer makes any reference to properties> c – Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013). He just commits 
himself to assessing a single property (d) instead of other properties. I will come to this in my second objection 




“Metz does not deny the fact that ubuntu exists as a worldview of the people of sub-
Saharan Africa (Metz and Gaie 2010, 274 – 275). But Metz also admits the limitations 
of the worldview version (Metz 2011, 533 – 534).” 
Chimakonam can be read as making two remarks here. Firstly, he thinks that Metz is not in 
denial of the existence of a worldview version of ubuntu. Secondly, he reads Metz as 
understanding the limits that are embedded in this worldview version. He thinks that Metz did 
a much better job of going beyond whatever limits that seem to bedevil the worldview version. 
He understands Metz as developing another version of ubuntu that not only transcend the 
shortcomings of the worldview ubuntu but one that is modern. He makes of this new-fangled 
approach to ubuntu as a philosophical system. By this he seeks to surmount Matolino (2015) 
by way of morphing Metz’s version of ubuntu into a philosophical system.  
One may also want to read Chimakonam (2016) as insisting that Metz is very much aware of 
the limitations attended to the worldview version. He conceives of Metz’s version as “a 
systemic/systematized account”. It is this account that he deems as categorical and prescriptive. 
This version of ubuntu fits with rational principles that make it adequate and universally 
applicable. The applicability of Metz’s version of ubuntu is one that must be construed as 
philosophical. Chimakonam then reads Metz (2013, 80 – 81, 2014, 67) as recognizing 
“philosophically attractive germs” that are inherent in the worldview version of ubuntu. But he 
thinks that these are attractive germs that philosophers can tap into to construct a modern 
rigorous system such as an ethic of relations. This modern system is one that is in tandem with 
individual liberty and accounts for modern African realities. Not only is this so, but it can be 
construed as taking modern realities very seriously. It is also this version that is posited as “a 
promising ground for human rights” (Metz, 2011: 534 in Chimakonam, 2016: 228).  
Chimakonam invokes Metz’s version to show that properties> d – Matolino (2015) - did fail 
to understand that it “is a philosophical system” that only takes “inspiration from the worldview 
version” (Ibid., 228). He shows that Metz’s understanding of ubuntu varies from Matolino’s 
prescription of a narrative of return. I read Chimakonam as insisting that properties> d did fail 
to presume a distinction between the “worldview version”, and the “systematized” one. He 
suggests that Matolino’s version is sociological whilst Metz’s is philosophical. By recognizing 
that ubuntu is a narrative of return Chimakonam argues that Metz understood that it was in 
concord with the worldview ubuntu but not the systemic approach to ubuntu. He takes it to be 




Metz’s understanding of ubuntu – (systematized version). He does not succumb to Matolino’s 
insistence that there is only one possible version of ubuntu, except the worldview version. He 
thinks it is Matolino who has misread Metz as confirming his position that there can only be 
one collectivist interpretation of ubuntu. He argues that Matolino’s assertion that “any attempt 
to construct another would become an individual effort that must be completely be kept apart 
from ubuntu itself” is a skewed claim (Chimakonam, 2016: 229). He aptly thinks that Metz’s 
re-articulation of worldview ideas is at a higher level of understanding. It is this re-articulation 
of worldview ideas which Chimakonam construes as “the project that has only just begun” 
(Metz, 2014: 71 in Chimakonam, 2016: 229).  
As for Chimakonam, Metz’s re-articulation of ubuntu, and ethnophilosophy or ubuntu 
worldview version must not be tarred with the same brush. This is simply because, for 
Chimakonam, Metz’s new version does a much better job of breeding the proper function of 
philosophy. He suggests that Metz’s project of systematizing ubuntu represents a new version 
of ubuntu with theoretical sophistication. This then, qualifies the worldview version of ubuntu 
to fall short of a theory. This version only qualifies to be construed as a narrative of return. He 
contends that Matolino has fired his trenchant criticism at the wrong theory: the one that breeds 
theoretical sophistication and proper mode of philosophizing. He has fired the wrong criticism 
simply because he thinks it [Matolino’s criticism] is “not only mistaken but epistemically 
misleading” (Chimakonam, 2016: 229). It is mistaken and epistemically misleading in the 
sense that it denies the new version that takes modern realities very seriously unlike the 
worldview version that does not (Ibid., 229). Chimakonam understands Metz’s re-articulation 
of the worldview version as a philosophical system that does not fall short of being an ubuntu 
version even if Matolino “derides” it as Metzian. Whilst Matolino (2015) thinks that Metz 
agrees with him – that ubuntu is a narrative of return, - Chimakonam (2016: 229) suggests that 
it is “Matolino who unknowingly affirms Metz’s position to the detriment of his own”.  
However, even though I do not want to scrutinize Chimakonam’s argument against properties> 
d or -Matolino (2015) - in this project, but there is something interesting that careful readers 
would have to notice. Chimakonam’s impatience with properties> d would not go very far 
simply because it is built on what properties> c or [Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013: 203)] 
have already anticipated as a “disingenuous” objection. What is being attempted by 
Chimakonam in reaction to properties> d can be intertwined with what Matolino and 
Kwindingwi or (properties> c) had already anticipated. Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013: 203) 




“A possible objection to our position could possibly seek to show that our 
criticism actually misses the point of the project of ubuntu”. 
Here, Chimakonam (2016) thinks that it is Matolino (2015) who misses the point of Metz’s 
ethical theory. He thinks that Matolino or (properties> d) does not understand that Metz’s 
version of ubuntu is not a narrative of return. 
“Such an objection could possibly point out that our concentration of the 
narrative of return is misguided” (Matolino and Kwindingwi, 2013: 203). 
Here, Chimakonam (2016) thinks it is wrong to construe that Metz’s version of ubuntu as an 
ethical theory is a narrative of return. He thinks there is a worldview version of ubuntu and a 
philosophical system of ubuntu.  
“The objection could be extended to claim that a narrative of return in itself does 
not compromise the ethical efficacy of ubuntu […]”  
(Matolino and Kwindingwi, 2013: 203). 
Here, Chimakonam (2016) insists that there is a difference between ubuntu as a narrative of 
return – worldview version – and Metz’s ethical theory – systematized version. He argues that 
the worldview version does not compromise the ethical efficacy of Metz’s modern version of 
ubuntu- as an ethical theory. In fact, he is of the view that Metz (2013, 80 – 81, 2014, 67) 
recognizes that there are “philosophically attractive germs” that are inherent in the worldview 
version of ubuntu that philosophers can tap into in order to construct a modern rigorous system 
such as an ethic of relations. This modern system is one that is in tandem with individual liberty 
and accounts for modern African realities. Not only is this so but it can be construed as taking 
modern realities very seriously. This version is posited as “a promising ground for human 
rights” (Metz, 2011: 534 in Chimakonam, 2016: 228).  
“The objection could seek to state that our emphasis on ubuntu as a narrative of 
return as opposed to seeing it as an African ethical theory has distorted matters”. 
[..] “On the contrary, the advocate of ubuntu may claim that [ubuntu] must be seen 
merely as an outline of an ethical theory” (Matolino and Kwindingwi, 2013: 203). 
Here, Chimakonam (2016) thinks that Matolino (2015) has distorted matters in the sense that 
he does not understand that Metz’s ethical theory is at a higher level of understanding, and that 
ubuntu as a narrative of return is not a philosophical system but a worldview version. For this 




of ubuntu that has just begun. That is, it is “an outline of an ethical theory” that breeds 
theoretical sophistication and proper mode of philosophizing.  
However, if readers could follow this carefully, they could see that Chimakonam articulates or 
rather defends a point of view that Matolino and Kwindingwi construe as “disingenuous”. But 
to delve into the details of this reading or and to penetrate the vast recesses of Chimakonam’s 
impatience with Matolino (2015) – properties> d – is beyond the length parameters of this 
project. Rather, what I aim to do is to scrutinize Chimakonam’s contribution relying on two 
possible objections that will be discussed in the following section.  
3.5  Two Possible Objections Against Chimakonam’s Assessment. 
3.5.1 The First Objection: A Response to Chimakonam’s Stand with Matolino 
And Metz 
The first (general) objection I raise against Chimakonam resonates with his position about both 
Matolino (2015) and Metz (2014). I claim, quite seriously, that never before has Chimakonam’s 
contribution been criticised in a manner I anticipate in this section. In other words, I am not 
aware of any criticism targeted at his support of Matolino together with his impatience with 
Metz. However, besides citing thinkers that could show that his support of Metz would not go 
very far, as argued in the previous chapter and the above section, there are other strong 
objections that can be raised against his contribution. For this reason, it does seem clear that 
Chimakonam is not clear about where he stands in Metz’s systematisation of an ubuntu ethic. 
On the one hand, he thinks that Metz’s systematisation of ubuntu may not be as impregnable 
as Metz envisages. He makes this claim in agreement with Matolino (2015) (Chimakonam, 
2016: 224). On the other, he takes it to be the case that Metz’s systematised version of ubuntu 
is not only modern, but it does represent the proper function and mode of philosophising 
(Chimakonam, 2016: 228 – 229). The former demonstrates his impatience with Metz’s 
systematised version since he agrees with Matolino, whilst the latter reserves his sympathies 
for Metz’s systematised version because he no longer agrees with Matolino.  
On this view, I read these lines as presuming two crucial distinctions. In other words, the same 
Chimakonam is split into two: he sides with Matolino on Metz’s systematisation of ubuntu 
(e.g.  “Metz [..] may have offered systematisation of ubuntu but I agree with Matolino that this 
new system may not be as impregnable as he envisages”) and supports Metz’s systematisation 
of ubuntu at the same time (e.g., “The project of systematising ubuntu carried out in the ethical 




this is the proper mode of philosophising” (Chimakonam, 2016: 224 and 229). On the contrary, 
there are no instances where Chimakonam opens up  for (or justifies) his agreement or stand 
with Matolino’s rejection of (or impatience with) Metz’s systematisation of ubuntu in a manner 
that relies on sufficient grounds or plausible arguments at least. To my mind, his support of 
Matolino’s rejection of Metz’s systematisation lacks a clearly identifiable standpoint. When 
one reads Chimakonam along these lines one would see that there is another justification or 
proof that Chimakonam is reluctant to give in his contribution: the one that shows that he 
“agree[s] with Matolino that [Metz’s] new system may not be as impregnable as he envisages” 
(Chimakonam, 2016: 224). Rarely did he spend some time trying to justify this crucial point. 
In fact, he just abandons this important point, and leaves his readers scratching their heads, 
since the justification for grounding his agreement or stand with Matolino’s impatience with 
(or rejection of) Metz’s systematisation is nowhere to be found. Even if Chimakonam (2016: 
230) were to show readers that he did argue that “Metz’s theory is [not] impregnable”, what 
destroys his attempt is his unsustainable grounds against Metz (2014) as well as his intention 
to agree with Matolino’s rejection  (2015) of Metz’s systematisation of ubuntu for 
contemporary Africa.  
For this reason, I am still wondering about what exactly the point of Chimakonam’s assessment 
is. Is he trying to assess the Matolino-Kwindingwi-Metz debate or Matolino (2015) and Metz 
(2014)? I think this is one of the most uncritical parts of his contribution besides the other one 
that I aim to register in the next section. Not even a single instance of his impatience with Metz 
could be found in his contribution. The following are Chimakonam’s (2016: 230 – 233) precise 
words: 
 “But to go into an elaborate criticism of Metz from what he has produced in ubuntu is 
beyond the scope of this essay”.  
In his concluding remarks he argues that he has: 
 “assessed the arguments of Matolino and Metz”.  
But where exactly did Chimakonam (2016: 230 – 233) bring this into completion?40 It turns 
out to be the case, at least when one reads Chimakonam carefully, that he has not finished or 
pushed his mission “to agree with Matolino’s take on Metz’s new system” up to the end. So 
long as Chimakonam offers no support for his “elaborate criticism” of Metz, and agreement 
 
40 This question has something to do with the second quotation and its relationship with what Chimakonam claims 




with Matolino’s take on Metz’s new system, his approval of Metz must be viewed with 
suspicion. 
It does seem clear that Chimakonam finds nothing wrong in opening a can of worms and then 
tells the reader that dealing with it is beyond the scope of his essay.  In other words, there is no 
support offered in support of Chimakonam’s claim that Metz’s new system is not impregnable. 
Not only is this so but there seems to be no justification in support of the claim that he has 
assessed Metz. This is simply because he does admit that going into an elaborate criticism of 
Metz is beyond the scope of his essay. Moreover, Chimakonam’s assessment is guilty of 
equivocation. This is chiefly because in some instances he qualifies it as “an assessment of the 
strengths and weaknesses of arguments by the Matolino-Kwindingwi-Metz debate”, whilst in 
other instances he construes it as an assessment of arguments by only two thinkers: Matolino 
and Metz (Chimakonam, 2016: 225 and 233). None of these assessments interrogated Metz, 
and Matolino and Kwindingwi philosophically.41 The question that may be asked is: does 
Chimakonam’s impatience with Metz’s new system seem to be justified by substantial reasons 
given the fact that he has deferred what he had proposed in the abstract: “I agree with Matolino 
that his new system may not be as impregnable as he envisages”? (Chimakonam, 2016: 224). 
It does seem clear that at no point were both Chimakonam’s (a) Approval of Matolino’s 
impatience with Metz’s systematised version and (b) His justification for dismissing Metz’s 
systematised version [up to this present day], made manifest and carried up to their logical 
conclusions. 
3.5.2 The Second Objection: Scrutinizing The ‘Credibility’ of Chimakonam’s 
Assessment.   
Chimakonam’s contribution is hardly ever seriously scrutinized when it comes to the credibility 
he attaches to his assessment of the debate. It reads as if only after his assessment of properties> 
d and not properties> c & a seem to have done some tricks will one attest to the said credibility 
of his one way of assessing the debate: (a) and (c). When one reads the preceding section, one 
would see that Chimakonam only attempts to surmount properties> d by appealing to 
properties> b & properties> a. Surely, this was an interesting assessment to have been made, 
but I think it does not deserve the status of “credible assessment”. There is nothing that 
Chimakonam does to assess Matolino and Kwindingwi - (properties> c) and Metz - 
(properties> a) as he promises in his contribution. This is simply because that which had 
 




promised to “assessing the arguments of the Matolino-Kwindingwi-Metz debate” turns out to 
be an assessment that only singles out properties> d - Matolino [2015] - (Chimakonam, 2016: 
227). It singles out Matolino in the sense that its maximal attention aims to accuse him of the 
“costly error of assumption” (Ibid.). It reads as if this is just an assessment of Matolino’s (2015) 
response to Metz (2014). Moreover, what also appears to be an assessment of the Matolino-
Kwindingwi-Metz debate, turns out to be summarized in Chimakonam’s conclusion as 
something that has “assessed the arguments of Matolino and Metz” even though it was reluctant 
to credibly assessing Metz - or (properties> a) - (Chimakonam, 2016: 233). Rarely did 
Chimakonam spend some time, presuming a distinction, or accounting for some relations 
between “assessing the arguments of the Matolino-Kwindingwi-Metz debate”, as well as 
claiming that he has “assessed the arguments of Matolino and Metz” (Chimakonam, 2016: 227 
and 233). He did not even attempt to strike a balance between the specialized meaning or 
context that readers could glean from these ambiguities: assessing the Matolino-Kwindingwi-
Metz debate versus assessing Matolino and Metz (Chimakonam, 2016).  
Chimakonam’s move from properties> (a) & (b) to surmount properties> d, is somewhat 
incompatible with the credibility he attaches to his assessment. It is incompatible in the sense 
that he does not even show how appealing to these properties [(a) & (b)] - that he uses to 
scrutinize the merits of the arguments marshaled by (properties> d) - advance the force of his 
argument about the debate he did promise in his “assessing the arguments of the Matolino-
Kwindingwi-Metz debate” section (Chimakonam, 2016: 227). It is not entirely clear how does 
dealing with a single property - (d) - contribute to credibly assessing the debate. If his aim is 
to credibly assess the Matolino-Kwindingwi-Metz debate, then how does criticizing 
properties> d and not properties> c & a contribute to the credibility he makes out of his 
assessment? Can one be justified in believing that Chimakonam has credibly “assessed the 
argument [..] of [..] Metz”, as Chimakonam tells us towards the conclusion that he did manage 
and succeed to assess the merit of his (Metz) argument? In other words, does Chimakonam 
succeed in ‘credibly assessing’ the merits of Metz’s argument? (Chimakonam, 2016: 227 and 
233). I specifically do not want to think that this is necessarily so or probably the case. 
Chimakonam has abandoned some properties that are intrinsic and essential to his assessment: 
(properties> c) and (properties> a). This is exactly what ruins his reflections on the debate 
because his assessment targets properties> d, and not properties> c & a. He seems to have not 
provided any justification for leaving other properties hanging and unattended and this is 




However, a reasonable person of the opposing view might object that my argument is not 
convincing at this stage. He or she might argue that Chimakonam did make a case for the 
credibility of his assessment. But in response, that ‘credibility’ turns out to be directed at a 
single property (d) that he thinks is justifiable in dealing with properties> c or Matolino and 
Kwindingwi. On top of that, he ended up shifting his focus from Matolino and Kwindingwi 
(2013) to Matolino (2015). This shift occurs when his disapproval of Matolino and Kwindingwi 
has not matured. Or it just occurs when there are no specific directions for the ‘credibility’ that 
one may glean from his assessment of Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013). One would have 
noticed that this shift is exactly what has led Chimakonam to read Matolino’s “declaration 
about one possible version of ubuntu and of its irrevocable ends [as] hasty” (Chimakonam, 
2016: 228). Surely, there is one thing that readers would not doubt: this hastiness aims to 
specifically deal with a single property (d) - Matolino (2015) alone - and leave other properties 
aside. This property - (d) - alone does not exhaust the point that he was toiling to achieve: a 
credible assessment of the debate. Dealing with this only one property - (d) - does not 
demonstrate that Metz’s systematized version is not impregnable. It does not even show that 
Chimakonam agrees with Matolino (2015) that this new system may not be as impregnable as 
Metz (2014) would have envisaged. Let alone the assessment of Metz that he concludes as 
demonstrated successfully. If Chimakonam thinks that he has succeeded in assessing Metz’s 
argument (probably as I do not), then what does his reluctancy to provide ‘an elaborate criticism 
of Metz’ brings the ‘credibility’ of his one way of assessing the debate into? (2016: 227 – 233). 
And if Chimakonam is ready to admit that his stand with Metz’s argument is surely a story for 
another day, then what sort of communications and consequences will his ‘reluctancy’ have or 
do to his ‘one way of credibly assessing’ the Matolino-Kwindingwi-Metz debate? (2016: 227).  
As a result, his assessment remains a piece of unfinished business since it raises a whole lot of 
questions about the status, or province of its credibility. It remains a piece of unfinished 
business simply because it lacks all sorts of justifications that could satisfy the credibility he 
does attach to his assessment. Were this the case about his assessment, then it probably would 
invite more questions than answers. The most crucial point to notice is that Chimakonam’s 
readers will be faced with another dilemma. They will fail to understand along what specific 
lines does the said “credibility” proceeds and intermingles with his assessment. It is not easy 
to pin down which direction(s) readers must follow in order to get into the province of this 
assessment’s “credibility” except his appeal to properties> b & properties> a that ended up 




that readers must zoom into in order to get into the bottom line of this assessment’s credibility, 
then how credible is Chimakonam’s ‘one way’ of assessing the debate? And it does seem clear, 
at least when one reads Chimakonam charitably, that there is no specific direction or valid 
criterion for locating his assessment of the debate into its desired place: the province of 
“credibility”. It is my view that he has promised to give a “credible assessment” right from the 
very beginning of his assessment, but he has never managed to accompany and locate this 
assessment to its province of “credibility”. On this way of thinking, the issue of his assessment 
and desired strategy to locate it in its special and desired province - (credibility) - is not only 
unsettled but ought to remain as a problem that readers must worry about.  
No doubt, Chimakonam spends some time justifying that (b) and (a) properties do a much 
better job of surmounting properties> d, forgetting that the bottom line of his assessment was 
directed at two properties that are at the nerve of the debate before its contributors: (c) and (a). 
If it is necessarily so or likely to be that he has abandoned or deferred properties> c & a in his 
assessment, then what sort of justification could there be for demonstrating the credibility of 
his assessment of the Matolino-Kwindingwi-Metz debate? Is it not the case that Chimakonam 
attempts to interrogate d> properties by appealing to (b) and (a) properties? If that were to be 
necessarily the case, then is d> properties part and parcel of the debate that he is laboring to 
assess credibly: Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013) and Metz (2014)? Or should it be understood 
as a contribution/ “continuation of the debate” as Matolino (2015: 214) would have us believe? 
Since ‘d> properties’ is a contribution to the debate, how does criticizing it accomplish 
Chimakonam’s attempt to ‘credibly assessing’ (c) - Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013) - and (a) 
- Metz (2014) – properties? (Chimakonam, 2016: 227 – 233).  
So conceived, one ought to remember that Chimakonam’s assessment is supposed to be mainly 
about the debate (a) & (c) properties and not one of its contributions – (properties> d). It is no 
hidden fact that properties> d is the first contribution, and therefore is related to the debate but 
not related enough to the point that Chimakonam is toiling to achieve (Chimakonam, 2016). 
His point then is to credibly assess the debate: (properties> a) and (properties> c), not one of 
its contributions (properties> d) or thinkers who so wish to “continue the debate” 
(Chimakonam, 2016; and Matolino, 2015: 214). Why is he distracting readers from what is at 
stake? Why is he distracting readers by only targeting ‘properties> d’ that emerges after the 
debate (a) and (c), and defers his credible assessment of (c) and (a) properties deliberately? Of 
course, he would have not probably distracted readers had he assessed properties> d and other 




credibly assessing” the debate (Chimakonam, 2016: 227). In other words, he has abandoned 
his commitment, which is the ‘credible assessment’ not contributors or thinkers who ‘continue 
[with] the debate’ (Chimakonam, 2016; and Matolino, 2015: 214).  
Most importantly, let us assume, for argument’s sake, that Chimakonam’s assessment of the 
debate is positioned at point number one: P1, and that the credibility he assigns to his 
assessment is positioned at point number two: P2. Let us also read Chimakonam as committed 
to demonstrating that P1 is identical with or at least complements P2. What I attempt to do here 
investigates whether Chimakonam did manage to articulate an assessment that does not lack 
coherence or the one that either morphs it into its desired province of credibility or not. The 
reason why P1 compliments P2, at least here, is chiefly because it is the same Chimakonam 
(2016: 227) who does aim at “credibly assessing the merits of the arguments marshalled by the 
debaters”. These debaters are Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013) as well as Metz (2014). The 
impression that one gets is that Chimakonam (2016: 227 – 230) seeks to give a “credible” [P2], 
“assessment” [P1] of “the arguments of the Matolino-Kwindingwi-Metz debate”. As noted 
above, he seeks to invoke Matolino (2015) in the process of “credibly”-[P2]- “assessing”-[P1]- 
Matolino and Kwindingwi’s side, and Metz’s “numerous publications on ubuntu and ubuntu-
related subjects”. He does this - on Metz’s side - in the process of “credibly”-[P2]- “assessing”-
[P1]- his (2014) rejoinder. The most important question to ask Chimakonam at this stage is: 
How is it that his P1 is located in its desired province (P2)? This question seeks to search for 
the most obvious instances where his P1 could be said to cohere with his desired P2. Hence, the 
following passages make a case for why Chimakonam’s assessment (P1) should not count as 
the credible one (P2) in the Matolino-Kwindingwi-Metz debate. 
Predominantly, what needs to be emphasized is that, in Chimakonam’s reflections on the 
debate, P1 must be divorced from any identity or status which philosophers could attribute to 
P2. This is chiefly because what he has ended up achieving makes it difficult for P1 to sustain 
its identity with P2. It is this P2 that speaks to the “credibility” status. For this reason, it is no 
longer easy, as Chimakonam makes it even harder for readers, to identify the possibilities of 
P1 as identical with or attuned to P2. This is justified by the claim I have made above that he 
did not make a case for other properties – [(a) & (c)] – that are intrinsic and essential to his P2, 
as other properties [besides (d)] that morph P1 [his assessment] into the status of credibility – 
P2. It is my view that the said credibility is still awaiting and difficult to pin down. P1 and P2 
are neither identical nor complementary. They are neither identical nor complementary in the 




of exhausting the ones that are intrinsic and essential to the credibility of his assessment of the 
debate: (c) and (a). 
As a matter of fact, (c) and (a) properties are still in need of a philosophical interrogation if 
Chimakonam really wants to succeed in demonstrating the possibilities of P1 as identical or 
complementary with P2. On this view, P2 is still loading and pending precisely because P1 has 
never unlocked its own possibilities and potentialities of being morphed into some coherencies 
that philosophers could easily attribute to P2. That on its own shows that there are no attempts 
or at least “one way of credibly assessing” properties> c as well as properties> a properly in 
his contribution to literature. Chimakonam’s (2016: 227) view that he engages the debaters 
proper: (c) and (a) must be viewed with suspicion because it is not supported by compelling 
arguments. Indeed, P1 is far from realizing its potentialities and possibilities of being identical 
or at least complementary with P2.  
As noted above, Chimakonam has only achieved one thing. That is, assessing only one property 
- (d), - by using properties> a and properties> b. This must not be construed as the one way of 
‘credibly’ assessing the debate. This ‘one way’ must be composed of all the essential properties 
(e.g., (a) and (c)) that Chimakonam seeks to attach to the credibility of his assessment. As a 
result, there needs to be a clear separation of P1 and P2. In fact, the idea that P1 and P2 must be 
used with quotation marks [since there is nothing in Chimakonam’s reflections that shows he 
has interrogated properties> c & a philosophically] is exactly what I take into consideration. 
Not only is this so, but it must be used with quotation marks if P1 and P2 were neither pursued 
up to the point where they could breed compelling arguments against the debate, in a manner 
that makes things possible for P1 to manifest more of P2. And of course, in P1’s attempt to 
demonstrating that it is identical or at least complementary with P2. For this reason, there needs 
to be a gap that must be left wide open between Chimakonam’s P1 and, P2 so as to demonstrate 
the shortcomings or non-credibility of his one way of assessing the debate. It is clear from the 
foregoing that Chimakonam’s one way of assessing the debate is not as credible as he makes it 
sound (Chimakonam, 2016: 227 – 230).  
Furthermore, when one reads Chimakonam (2016: 227 – 230) the impression that one gets is 
that whenever thinkers grapple with the debate, the most obvious or one credible assessment 
to make is only through invoking (b) and (a) properties to surmount properties> d. There seems 
to be no room for other properties that must be interrogated philosophically - properties> c & 




be an exaggeration to claim that Chimakonam has tasked himself with subjecting the Matolino-
Kwindingwi-Metz debate to P1 and hoped for the manifestations of P2 in his P1. It turns out to 
be the case, at least for him, that one would still examine properties> c only by criticizing a 
single property – (d). And he does this very strictly as he was unapologetic about appealing to 
other properties: (a) and (b). If my reading of Chimakonam were correct, then one would still 
have to argue that the other two properties are not taken seriously in his “one way of credibly 
assessing” the debate. The only property he ended up subjecting to critical scrutiny (d) is not 
compelling enough to demonstrate that his P1 falls within the province of P2. It is only by 
interrogating philosophically the two properties he left un-assessed that Chimakonam’s P1 
would be said to be located to its desired province – P2. Thus, P1 does not do a much better job 
of migrating to its desired P2. Therefore, Chimakonam’s assessment of the debate is not as 
credible as he would have us believe. It is not compelling enough to be located into (or at least 
cohere with) its desired place – P2. And under no circumstances should this assessment count 
as standard reply to Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013: 197 – 205).  
3.6  Closing Remarks. 
This chapter sought to provide a critical examination of ubuntu in modern philosophical 
discourses. In demonstrating exactly what its usefulness was, it has outlined the nature of the 
Matolino-Kwindingwi-Metz debate; targeted Metz’s (2014) intervention and Chimakonam’s 
(2016) contribution for critical scrutiny. Its philosophical point of departure was that reflections 
and recommendations by these thinkers are neither compelling nor should they be adumbrated 










Three Specific Problems for A Philosophical Interrogation: A Response to 
Koenane And Olatunji’s Contribution. 42 
4.1 Preliminary Remarks. 
This chapter presents three specific problems that deserve to be interrogated philosophically in 
Koenane and Olatunji’s (2017) contribution: (a) Through a close analysis of their 
contribution;43 (b) A misreading of Matolino and Kwindingwi’s anecdote; and (c) A 
misinterpretation of Matolino and Kwindingwi’s understanding of ubuntu. This is not to 
suggest that only what is contained in this chapter should count as the main template that 
deserves serious philosophical attention in these philosophers’ contribution. But, and besides 
the manner in which these philosophers are interrogated in the present chapter, there is 
something one should not be in denial of. That is, theirs is hardly ever seriously scrutinized and 
interrogated up to the end, and therefore has not received considerable attention in 
philosophical circles. For the purposes of this project, theirs springs not only from arguments 
that are neither compelling but under no circumstances should one adumbrate it as standard 
reply to Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013). Its shortcomings rest upon their failure to 
understanding the gist of the debate. But this is not to suggest that their contribution is bereft 
of philosophical reflection. Rather, the menu of its problems presented below entertains the 
possibility that these philosophers have mishandled the debate even though they conceive of 
themselves as making sure that it is “read and reread [...] many times” (Koenane and Olatunji, 
2017: 273). This chapter registers some grounds of scepticism against these philosophers since 
it conceives of their contribution as vulnerable to significant flaws. In doing so, it interrogates 
three problems to arrive at the conclusion that their arguments are neither compelling nor 
should they be adumbrated as standard reply to Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013: 197 – 205).  
4.1.1 Outline.  
This chapter is comprised of four sections. Firstly, it provides an explication of Koenane and 
Olatunji’s contribution to the debate. Secondly, a close analysis of their contribution. Thirdly, 
a rejection of their reading of Matolino and Kwindingwi’s anecdote. Finally, a rejection of their 
interpretation of Matolino and Kwindingwi’s understanding of an ubuntu ethic. 
 
42 I interrogate these philosophers chiefly because I acknowledge and recognize their contribution as providing 
answers to this project’s main question: what is the relevance of ubuntu in modern southern African societies? 
43 The first problem is in a form of ‘Analysis’. It addresses two shortcomings: (a) The perspective they have 




4.2 An Explication of Koenane And Olatunji’s Contribution.  
Koenane and Olatunji (2017) react to Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013) by arguing for the 
relevance and competitiveness of ubuntu (as a moral theory and way of life) for contemporary 
Africa. They state their contribution as “challenging the proposition put forward by Matolino 
and Kwindingwi that values associated with ubuntu no longer apply in South Africa” (2017: 
263). Their “contention is that [ubuntu] is still alive, relevant, and can play a vital role in civil 
society” (Ibid.). Their contribution seeks to provide a critical overview of Matolino and 
Kwindingwi and upholds Metz’s rejoinder as offering a more plausible argument. Their essay 
is composed of three important sections: (i) Logical structure of Matolino and Kwindingwi’s 
argument; (ii) Ubuntu and social order/disorder; and (iii) Moral erosion and ubuntu.  
The first section points readers to what these scholars identify as misleading and hidden 
inconsistencies. These inconsistencies emanate from Matolino and Kwindingwi’s ‘sociological 
observations’ and conclusions that seem like they were responding to previous scholars. For 
this reason, it is not quite clear whether Matolino and Kwindingwi posit ubuntu as a scholarly 
construct or sociological phenomenon, write Koenane and Olatunji (2017: 264). They resort to 
a comparative method that seeks to understand and challenge Matolino and Kwindingwi in the 
light of pragmatism and capitalism. They think that Americans would not deny pragmatism as 
authentically American because it fosters individualism or the commodification/ 
commercialization of human value. They suggest that to be committed to the values associated 
with ubuntu does not necessarily mean the exclusion of other values. They think that one would 
not outlaw capitalism just because (as a result of sociological observations) it has been linked 
with violence, economic competition, crime, and terrorism (2017: 264 – 265). They suggest 
that the position that ubuntu fosters conformity and that an ubuntu community would look 
askance at contrary position is supported by a curious logic. They think that there is nothing 
which proves that other competing theories have a lower status than ubuntu. They direct readers 
to what they posit as resting on unsupported grounds. They seem to be impatient with Matolino 
and Kwindingwi’s insistence that ubuntu has attained grater prominence than other rival 
theories. They argue that there is no theory, system or ideology that is ever perfect from 
inception. Instead, they think that strong theories and systems of today have evolved through 
debates, suggestions, contributions, and criticisms and not by ceasing to discuss or challenge 
them (2017: 265). If this is what these thinkers are committed to, then what does this tell us 
about their stand on ubuntu, its inception and perfection for our own times? If thinkers must 




or perfection for modern Africa? Can one continue to theorize about ubuntu’s relevance if it 
has been proven to be relevant for our own times? Or does this mean that ubuntu has not yet 
registered its relevance for our own times? Are they rest assured about its competitiveness as 
an ethical theory for contemporary Africa, if they argue that ubuntu has not been shown to be 
a strong theory or contemporary system that has evolved through debates? What about Metz 
who thinks that his version of ubuntu is promising for a contemporary African moral theory? 
What about Chimakonam who thinks that Metz’s moral theory is at the higher level of 
understanding since it breeds ubuntu’s current state: theoretical sophistication or proper mode 
of philosophizing? Predominantly, Koenane and Olatunji insist that nothing implies that ubuntu 
has been adopted merely because of its past, precolonial existence without measuring its post-
colonial suitability. For these thinkers, ubuntu has been adopted for post-colonial Africa 
without being cluttered with its primitivism since its suitability and potential or relevance is 
made manifest even in this era. They are of the view that ubuntu is relevant for contemporary 
Africa. From this point of view, they contend that Matolino and Kwindingwi have missed the 
point that ubuntu means different things to different people even though Matolino and 
Kwindingwi (2013: 197 and 201) posit ubuntu as ‘variously conceived’ or enjoying a ‘popular 
appeal’. They also argue that Matolino and Kwindingwi’s ‘The end of ubuntu’ is akin to 
Fukuyama’s ‘The end of History’ (Koenane and Olatunji, 2017: 266). They conceive of 
themselves as the first ones to concede that the task Kwindingwi and Matolino have embarked 
on is not an easy one. They suggest that the most significant functions of culture in every 
society is to shape, determine and direct thought. For this reason, there is something 
fundamental about ubuntu as a way of life for Koenane and Olatunji. They think of ubuntu as 
seeking to shape, determine and direct the thought of insiders. In other words, they understand 
ubuntu in the light of significant functions of a culture that shapes, determines and directs 
thought of insiders and not outsiders. Furthermore, they think that Matolino and Kwindingwi’s 
critique of ubuntu and the judiciary is tantamount to superficiality chiefly because they referred 
to Geraldine Freser – Moleketsi’s statement on the White paper for the department while she 
was Minister of welfare and social development. They argue that it does Matolino and 
Kwindingwi no good to proceed with their critique without “telling us what it is that was wrong 
with her utterances or reference to the ubuntu ethic” (2017: 266). They seem to be concerned 
with the reasons as to why Matolino and Kwindingwi did not dismiss theories such as 
deontology and utilitarianism. Again, a careful reader would notice that this is another instance 




thinkers who apply a comparative method [ubuntu and Christianity; the Aristocratic virtue 
ethic, and African socialism] when approaching ubuntu to challenge Matolino and 
Kwindingwi. Had Matolino and Kwindingwi appealed to a comparative method or construed 
ubuntu in the light of Western ethical systems, they would have succeeded in providing an 
alternative to ubuntu, write Koenane and Olatunji (2017). It reads as if ubuntu’s alternative is 
necessitated by how we measure its suitability with Western ethical systems, according to these 
philosophers. It reads as if they are prime candidates for suggesting that Western ethical 
systems ought to ground the possibilities of talking about ubuntu’s alternative. To be more 
precise, things would have been interesting had Matolino and Kwindingwi interrogated the 
Christian ethos as they did for the ethos of ubuntu, write Koenane and Olatunji (2017: 266). 
What strike them as problematic is what they consider to be Matolino and Kwindingwi’s failure 
to present a preferable alternative to ubuntu. They submit that this failure leaves a vacuum. It 
is this failure to give a preference to ubuntu that makes Matolino and Kwindingwi to take “the 
easy way out” (Ibid.). To my parity of reasoning, I think Koenane and Olatunji’s submission 
might be wrongheaded especially if one considers Matolino and Kwindingwi’s (2013: 204) 
preference of a “slightly different direction where [they] seek to make a case for a more 
inclusive ethic, particularly on the political front”.  
The second section points readers to what Koenane and Olatunji adumbrate as a gross mistake 
on ubuntu: ubuntu as entrenched in blackness. They insist that it is inconsistent for Matolino 
and Kwindingwi to theorize as though the situation in South Africa alone is sufficient to 
validate or invalidate ubuntu. They contend that ubuntu has no business in accounting for 
pigmentation. They suggest that one can become a person if his or her actions are accepted as 
good by the community that establishes the moral outlook of society (2017: 267). In other 
words, a person with moral dispositions of becoming is regarded as umuntu and the emphasis 
here is not on the colour of one’s skin. Thus, ubuntu must not be understood through the prism 
of race, write Koenane and Olatunji (2017: 267 – 268). It is this manner of categorizing ubuntu 
through the prism of race that strike Koenane and Olatunji (2017: 267) as philosophically 
untenable. Again, this might be viewed as a wrongheaded submission since it is not true that 
Matolino and Kwindingwi understand ubuntu through the prism of race.  
Moreover, Koenane and Olatunji (2017) further go on to argue that ubuntu is not a narrative of 
return. They think that Matolino and Kwindingwi are influenced by Leonhard Praeg when they 
qualify ubuntu as a narrative of return. But this is not to suggest that these scholars use the term 




interrogate the question and validity of Matolino and Kwindingwi’s insistence that ubuntu can 
be viewed as a narrative of return. Had Matolino and Kwindingwi qualified “their concept of 
‘narrative of return’” they would have made an argument that is supported by strong grounds 
according to these philosophers (Ibid.). Koenane and Olatunji (2017: 272) contend that Metz 
is mistaken in agreeing with Matolino and Kwindingwi that ubuntu is a narrative of return. 
They suggest that there is a more plausible description of ubuntu. They posit ubuntu as a 
‘narrative of becoming human’; ‘a narrative of seeking the truth’ (Ibid.). They think that ubuntu 
is about being. They suggest that becoming has nothing to do with the narrative of return 
project. They neither understand it as an ideology. Instead, they understand it as a worldview, 
and a way of life since it defines what it means to be human. They understand an ubuntu ethic 
as socially and psychologically justifiable. On the other side, they argue that ubuntu as a moral 
theory is more than what people do. They conceive of ubuntu as addressing one’s failure to act 
appropriately especially when one is obligated to do so. For these thinkers, this idea for ubuntu 
takes morality seriously as a vehicle through which we can promote the well-being of our 
fellow human beings. They argue that it is expected of human conduct, even under ubuntu 
moral theory, either to be deficient or excessive in terms of what people do or fail to do. This 
is what Matolino and Kwindingwi fail to understand, write Koenane and Olatunji (2017: 268). 
They contend that in the case of Matolino and Kwindingwi’s case study, the taxi driver lacked 
humanness in terms of the ethos of ubuntu: his actions were barbaric and cruel. Actions such 
as these (barbaric and cruel) occur almost every day around the world. They think that the taxi 
driver’s actions do not imply that ubuntu must be abandoned as a way of behaving since the 
same conclusions can be drawn if one considers utilitarianism, or deontology and virtue ethics 
(Ibid.). They think that Matolino and Kwindingwi have appealed to an incident that conjures 
up a negative picture about Black South Africa whilst ignoring other countless reports which 
lament these incidents as unusual and horrific. This has led them to argue that Matolino and 
Kwindingwi ‘have drawn over-generalised conclusions about South Africa from particular acts 
that occur worldwide’ (2017: 268 – 269). They construe these ‘generalizations’ as unfounded 
since they posit them as ‘a deliberate distortion of information or a pre-philosophic position 
which should be avoided in philosophy’. They accuse Matolino and Kwindingwi of giving an 
example that seeks to ‘compromise the moral outlook’ of ubuntu and choosing to be silent on 
the positive aspects of ubuntu as a moral theory (2017: 269).  
They then move to Matolino and Kwindingwi’s take on xenophobia. They reject the idea that 




understand ubuntu ‘as an all-inclusive worldview’ that ‘stands for universalized humanness 
(ubuntu) values which are shared across cultures’ (2017: 269). They contest Matolino and 
Kwindingwi’s point on disliking outsiders. As for Koenane and Olatunji, it is disappointing 
that Matolino and Kwindingwi have completely ignored academic calls against all forms of 
xenophobia: Afrophobia. They think it is absurd for Matolino and Kwindingwi to think that 
xenophobia is peculiar to black communities in South Africa. This indicates ignorance about 
the phenomenon of xenophobia, write Koenane and Olatunji (2017: 270). They argue that 
Matolino and Kwindingwi should have consulted other philosophers in their attempt to build 
an argument on ubuntu and law or public policy. They suggest that Mogobe Ramose addresses 
Matolino and Kwindingwi’s concerns.  
Further, they argue that the idea of perceiving the ubuntu worldview as a threat to other 
African’s existence is absurd and fallacious. They insist that ubuntu, just like most other 
African worldviews, expresses itself in all aspects of life, and it is therefore not strange to 
adumbrate ubuntu as a way of life. However, if ubuntu expresses itself in all aspects of life, is 
it true that it does not threaten other Africans whose lives are determined by multiple identities 
and cultures? Or if ubuntu expresses itself in all aspects of life, whose lives are they [Koenane 
and Olatunji] really talking about? Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013: 201) have already warned 
us about ‘reducing African reality to a monolithic view’. So, I urge readers to take notice of 
Koenane and Olatunji’s (2017: 272) insistence to see how they contradict themselves in their 
reaction to Matolino and Kwindingwi: “We argued earlier that ubuntu is a way of life: a 
worldview for Bantu people”. No doubt, different questions may arise if a careful reader takes 
notice of this quotation. For example: 
(a) If ubuntu is a worldview for Bantu people only, does it really account for changes that 
unfold in modern Africa?  
(b) Can Bantu people (who are committed to the values of ubuntu) succumb to the 
constitution that advocates for gay rights, or abortion rights?  
(c) What sought of justification could there be for thinking that abortion and gay rights are 
truly representative of the moral convictions and the political philosophies of the Bantu 
peoples of South Africa? (Ramose, 2004: 158).  
(d) Can one be justified in believing that ubuntu does not clash with other ideas (tolerance, 
cosmopolitanism, and even democracy) that may be seen as having equal worth for 
Bantu peoples of contemporary South Africa? (Matolino and Kwindingwi, 2013: 202). 
(e) Is it true that ubuntu worldview has conditioned most South Africans to see the world 
through the window of ubuntu even in urbanized or large-scale and technologically 




Moreover, Koenane and Olatunji (2017) argue that Matolino and Kwindingwi have an issue 
with politicians’ talk about ubuntu: the project of elitism. For Koenane and Olatunji, the project 
of elitism is inseparable from issues of governance: ubuntu is a principle through which good 
governance should be promoted, and ubuntu discourse stimulates public participation which 
would encourage accountability in politicians (2017: 271). They concede that politicians may 
be misusing ubuntu, and therefore caution needs to be exercised when engaging in the discourse 
around it. They do acknowledge that ubuntu is a promotional concept which appeals to all 
human beings and so could be abused. For this reason, they argue that calling for the end of 
ubuntu is going too far and seems to suggest that people must reject their own culture and 
replace it with whatever ‘unspecified’ culture Matolino and Kwindingwi have in mind. 
However, readers may ask: who are these ‘people’ and whose culture? Are they referring to 
black people and their culture? Koenane and Olatunji have argued that ubuntu is not limited to 
a certain group of people, but it seems like there are now talking about a certain group of people 
and their culture. The same Koenane and Olatunji insist that “for most Bantu people of Africa, 
the ubuntu worldview has conditioned us so that we see the world through the window of 
ubuntu. This being the case, Matolino and Kwindingwi suggest that those of us who perceive 
the world and make sense of it from this perspective or worldview must be deprived of our way 
of understanding our existence” (2017: 273). They further suggest that it is legitimate and 
desirable for politicians to appeal to ubuntu. They argue that Matolino and Kwindingwi’s 
understanding of ubuntu is very superficial since they have failed to consult well known 
African thinkers who have written extensively and continue to write on ubuntu. They construe 
this as a serious omission (2017: 273). As a result, they wonder what the reasons are for wanting 
ubuntu’s demise. They think this project is suspect. For them, the talk of ubuntu is likely to 
continue as suggested by Metz. Calling for the end of ubuntu is a disguised form of suggesting 
the death of the African way of life and philosophy of life, which is an old Western project, 
write Koenane and Olatunji (2017: 274). 
In their last section, Koenane and Olatunji (2017: 274) claim that Matolino and Kwindingwi 
have pointed out incidents that do not display the moral standards associated with ubuntu. They 
are of the view that these incidents are of great concern to those who believe in the principles 
of ubuntu. On this view, calling for the end of ubuntu is against Letseka’s “ought” principle 
which affirms what is morally acceptable to society, write Koenane and Olatunji (2017: 274). 
They think that through the ethical “ought”, one needs to make a case for moral conduct (Ibid.). 




ubuntu” is an irrational and exaggerated reaction since it lacks the spirit of ubuntu. They think 
that Metz’s position and objection is more plausible and justified (Ibid.). In addition, they claim 
that Matolino and Kwindingwi are reluctant to acknowledge people’s interactions at all levels 
in the new South Africa. For this reason, they insist that Matolino and Kwindingwi were correct 
in pointing out that there is an intolerance of different viewpoints. However, this intolerance 
has nothing to do with ubuntu, write Koenane and Olatunji (2017). As a result, they asked 
questions of the following sort in order to show their impatience with Matolino and 
Kwindingwi’s call for the end of ubuntu: What would we become without encouraging people 
to behave civilly towards others? What would we become if we were to support Matolino and 
Kwindingwi and do away with ubuntu? Hence, they suggest that this call for ‘The end of 
ubuntu’ is too radical, unduly harsh, and extreme (2017: 275). They then agreed with Metz’s 
insistence on the beginning for ubuntu by showing what it could offer to the global world: 
giving the world a more human face (Koenane and Olatunji, 2017: 276). 
4.3 A Close Analysis of Koenane And Olatunji’s Contribution.  
There are two basic things (in this section at least) that a careful reader would have to notice 
about Koenane and Olatunji’s contribution: (a) The perspective they have adopted; and (b) 
Their own summary and examination of Metz’s rejoinder. These are the kinds of things that I 
decided to put asunder in the preceding section so as to ease the text flow of my reading/ 
explication of Koenane and Olatunji’s contribution. In what follows, I unveil these things since 
they inform my own analysis and interrogation of Koenane and Olatunji’s contribution.  
4.3.1 Koenane And Olatunji’s Adoption of A ‘Different Perspective’.  
Readers might have noticed that these scholars mention something profound about their stand 
or position on this debate. Koenane and Olatunji have introduced their position as seeking to 
provide ‘a different perspective’ that does not tally with the manner in which Metz (2014) 
responds to Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013). At first glance, this might sound like an 
interesting proposal to have been made in order for Koenane and Olatunji to introduce a new-
fangled approach of responding to Matolino and Kwindingwi. But as time goes on, readers 
would notice that if this proposal is quite serious, strange, and unacceptable conclusions might 
logically follow.  
As a result, this section seeks to show that Koenane and Olatunji’s perspective is not as 
different as they make it sound. If there is some truth that could be drawn from this ‘different 




different from Metz’s? I urge careful readers to think about what the Matolino-Kwindingwi-
Metz debate would have to be like (for other new contributors) were Koenane and Olatunji’s 
proposal quite serious and philosophical. And if their proposal for a different perspective were 
quite serious, then what would its ‘adoption’ and ‘difference’ be like for it to count as 
philosophical. 
Let me start with Metz’s perspective. Metz’s perspective seeks to take a rather more specific 
form. It seeks to reject Matolino and Kwindingwi’s recommendation that ubuntu as an ethical 
theory and way of life must be jettisoned since it is no longer applicable to modern African 
realities (Matolino, 2015: 214). Not only did Metz (2014: 66 – 67) agree with Matolino and 
Kwindingwi that ubuntu is a narrative of return, but he also defends ubuntu using his modernist 
interpretation (Chimakonam, 2016). However, Koenane and Olatunji argue that it is not 
sufficient for Metz to demonstrate the theoretical deficiency of Matolino and Kwindingwi’s 
position. Not only do these thinkers articulate their own response to Matolino and 
Kwindingwi’s position but they do suggest a way forward. This is precisely because they seek 
to ‘examine the two earlier opposing positions (Matolino and Kwindingwi’s and Metz’s) with 
a view to synthesizing them’ (Koenane and Olatunji, 2017: 264). Their position seeks to defend 
ubuntu as an ethical theory and way of life. Hence, this is similar to Metz’s perspective.  
On this way of thinking, Koenane and Olatunji opt for ‘a different perspective’ that promises 
to have some defensible undertones right at the beginning but end up providing a conclusion 
that contradicts what they are really committed to: an adoption of a different perspective. This 
perspective fits in with the perspective they wish to abandon. Rarely did these thinkers commit 
themselves into arguing for the need to adopt this ‘different’ perspective. Not only is this so 
but there are no instances where these thinkers demonstrate its significances and differences as 
well as reliable hints and grounds for its adoption. Even though they disagree with Matolino 
and Kwindingwi that ubuntu is not a narrative of return (unlike Metz who does not), but their 
perspective is not ‘different’ and strong enough to carry us through a specific position that does 
not tally with Metz’s perspective. Metz’s perspective seeks to show that values associated with 
ubuntu are a promising ground for a contemporary ethical theory (Metz, 2014: 65 – 66). Not 
only is this so, but this perspective grounds the possibility for Metz’s defense of ubuntu’s 
relevance for our own times. The same Koenane and Olatunji (2017: 264) follow the same 
route. Their perspective seeks to ‘challenge the proposition put forward by Matolino and 
Kwindingwi that values associated with ubuntu no longer apply in contemporary South Africa’ 




South Africa (Koenane and Olatunji, 2017). So, does Koenane and Olatunji’s perspective differ 
from Metz’s if both of them seek to defend ubuntu as an ethical theory and a way of life for 
modern African realities or values associated with ubuntu at least? I hardly think so.  
However, if there are reasonable persons who might think that Koenane and Olatunji’s 
perspective differs quite clearly from Metz’s, then they would have to provide a good analysis 
that could easily discern or identify the main source of their differences. They must not point 
us to Koenane and Olatunji’s arguments about ‘capitalism and pragmatism, utilitarianism, 
deontology and virtue ethics, xenophobic and Afrophobic tensions, narratives of return, 
blackness and law and public policy’ or what they consider to be Matolino and Kwindingwi’s 
‘superficial understanding of ubuntu etc.’ to demonstrate how their perspective differs from 
Metz’s. For me, these were building blocks or justifications that serve as signifiers for Koenane 
and Olatunji’s defense of ubuntu as an ethical theory and way of life or values associated with 
ubuntu at least. Strictly speaking, Metz’s perspective seeks to defend ubuntu as an ethical 
theory and way of life. These thinkers (Metz; and Koenane and Olatunji) use different 
justifications to arrive at the same position about the relevance and competitiveness of ubuntu 
as an ethical theory and way of life for contemporary Africa. On this view, I think readers 
might fail to discern and penetrate what Koenane and Olatunji consider to be their different 
approach: the one that does not tally with Metz’s defense of ubuntu as an ethical theory and 
way of life or norms and values associated with ubuntu at least.  
As a result, did Koenane and Olatunji manage to adopt a ‘different perspective’ if they posit 
and confirm Metz’s position and objection as ‘the most plausible and justified’? (Koenane and 
Olatunji, 2017: 274). Does this perspective communicate or confirm something different from 
Metz’s rejoinder? I specifically do not want to think that this is necessarily so or likely to be 
and probably the case. The perspective adopted by these thinkers lapses into the same 
perspective that Metz cherishes. It does not even go beyond his response to Matolino and 
Kwindingwi that ubuntu is still relevant and competitive ‘as an ethical theory and way of life’ 
(Metz, 2014). So, what is the fundamental focus of the perspective - as well as its uniqueness 
- being proposed by Koenane and Olatunji? What does it do to demonstrate how it sufficiently 
differs from Metz’s? For this reason, there is no philosophical foundation that justifies the 
extent to which this proposed perspective differs from Metz’s strategy. Rarely did Koenane 
and Olatunji spend some time accounting for a transition from ‘Metz’s perspective’ to their 
preferable or newly adopted perspective. This newly adopted perspective is devoid of meaning. 




that should designate or ground its specialized context. Were this the case about Koenane and 
Olatunji’s perspective, then surely readers would struggle a little bit to understand along what 
specific lines does the said ‘perspective’ differs - from what Metz cherishes - if it only pays 
dividends to a defense of ubuntu as an ethical theory and way of life alone or values associated 
with ubuntu at least (Metz, 2014: 65 – 72; and Koenane and Olatunji, 2017: 263 – 277).  
For this reason, Koenane and Olatunji’s perspective is no different from Metz’s. It does not 
even attempt to address or sidestep Matolino’s (2015) response to Metz (2014). It is not easy 
to presume a distinction between these (Metz’s; and Koenane and Olatunji’s) perspectives 
except their different justifications for the same perspective. Surely, readers are not likely to 
confuse the two: (a) Koenane and Olatunji and Metz’s different justifications for the same 
position and (b) Koenane and Olatunji’s and Metz’s similar position: their defense of ubuntu 
as an ethical theory and way of life or values associated with ubuntu at least. On this view, if 
Koenane and Olatunji have succeeded in establishing their perspective, together with grounds 
for its adoption, then what is it that makes this ‘different’ perspective yearns for the same 
position that seems to be upkeeped by Metz’s perspective? The only difference or uniqueness 
that I have encountered is that their contribution seeks to somewhat adopt or devise new ways 
of saying ‘Yes’ to Metz’s perspective. This is simply because it does not even escape (or go 
beyond) the trap that was set by Metz (2014) in his reaction to Matolino and Kwindingwi 
(2013). Instead of providing some justifications for their ‘different perspective’, they reduce 
its uniqueness into a hopeless search that affirms Metz’s perspective as ‘most plausible and 
justified’ (Koenane and Olatunji, 2017: 274). To my parity of reasoning, Koenane and 
Olatunji’s perspective pales into insignificance precisely because it is accommodated by 
Metz’s. It is not as different as these thinkers make it sound. It is certainly not new. It only 
serves as a resuscitation of Metz’s perspective but with different justifications.  
4.3.2 Koenane And Olatunji’s Summary and Examination of Metz’s 
Rejoinder. 
When one reads Koenane and Olatunji’s joint essay, one would understand that they set out to 
“indicate engagement with” Matolino and Kwindingwi as well as Metz “respectively” (2017: 
263). By so doing, they wish to examine two opposing views that bifurcate between these 
scholars. Their engagement intends to deepen/enrich the debate on ubuntu. In carrying out this 
intention, they promise to provide readers with summaries of both scholars and follow it with 
a synthesis of their opposing views. Their engagement seeks to show why it is insufficient for 




(Koenane and Olatunji, 2017: 264). This might sound like an interesting engagement to have 
been made in order for Koenane and Olatunji to give the Matolino-Kwindingwi-Metz debate 
serious philosophical attention. However, their contribution makes no effort to provide ‘a brief 
summary of Metz’s response’ as well as an examination of his opposing view (Ibid.). Surely, I 
had some expectations that there is going to be a serious examination of these opposing fronts. 
But little did I know that no examination would come out of their contribution to literature.  
As a result, I urge careful readers to refrain from reading Koenane and Olatunji as showing any 
serious ‘engagement’ with Metz’s position (Koenane and Olatunji, 2017: 263). The summary 
of Metz that is subsumed in their contribution does not even come closer to Metz’s specific 
argument nor does it include even a good bit of paraphrasing that sets the tone for ‘why it is 
insufficient [for Metz] to demonstrate the theoretical deficiency of Matolino and Kwindingwi’s 
position’ (Ibid.). Does omitting a summary and examination of Metz’s position mean that their 
contribution only functions well outside the scope of his rejoinder? No, they are still trapped 
in espousing a particular view or perspective that falls within the ambits of Metz’s rejoinder. 
One would have noticed that instead of indicating some engagement with Metz, Koenane and 
Olatunji (2017: 275) choose to argue that the philosophy of ubuntu has shown resilience against 
forces that have tried to destroy it and will continue to do so for many more years to come. But 
I think this particular claim rests upon unsupported grounds precisely because they did not even 
point readers to these “forces” (Ibid.).  
Furthermore, let us not forget that their “Is it the end of ubuntu or just the beginning of ubuntu?” 
question was formulated to show engagement with Matolino and Kwindingwi as well as Metz. 
But their engagement of Metz is left hanging and unattended. No doubt, this is a serious 
omission. They neither examine his (Metz’s) position of protest against Matolino and 
Kwindingwi nor do they even attempt to provide a general or rough synthesis of their (Matolino 
and Kwindingwi and Metz) opposing views. Instead, what they argue is that ubuntu represents 
what has become known by the iconic phrase “the struggle continues” since they think “the 
struggle for ubuntu as a way of life continues” (Koenane and Olatunji, 2017: 275 – 276). 
However, besides this section’s close analysis, the following section seeks to provide two 
possible objections against Koenane and Olatunji’s contribution. These objections purport to 
demonstrate the kind of suspicion that a careful reader would have to foster towards 




4.4 Two Possible Objections Against Koenane and Olatunji’s Contribution. 
4.4.1 A Misreading of Matolino And Kwindingwi’s Anecdotal Story.  
The first worry that strikes me as problematic is Koenane and Olatunji’s reading of Matolino 
and Kwindingwi’s anecdote. An anecdote can be defined as a short account of an interesting 
(or general if not specific) incident or event, and it aims to lend color and generate 
understanding to a particular discussion (Seech, 1992: 16 – 17). However, Matolino and 
Kwindingwi’s anecdote takes a rather more specific form. Its narrative form is not just aimed 
at outlining an incident that appeared in the Bloemfontein CBD CCTV footage in the year 
2012, but it seeks to reveal the manner in which they question the Minister of Police who 
appeals to ubuntu when he reacts to the barbarity and criminality associated with such an 
incident. For this reason, I would like to quote their anecdotal story as it is in order to frame 
the discussion for my analysis of Koenane and Olatunji’s reading: 
“At the beginning of 2012 South Africa was stunned by television footage that showed 
an extreme act of barbarity meted out by a taxi driver to an apparently innocent 
pedestrian. Bloemfontein CBD CCTV footage that was screened on major television 
news bulletins captured the driver of the said taxi making a hasty reverse at a set of 
traffic lights. He diverted his vehicle from the road and darted onto the pavement where 
he knocked a pedestrian down. He reversed and alighted to check the impact of his 
unique driving skills. Upon realizing that his vehicle had not exerted discernible damage 
to the pedestrian, the driver unleashed a powerful kick to the abdomen of the pedestrian 
who was struggling to raise himself to his feet. The effect of the kick seemed to have the 
desired effect on the mind of the taxi driver. He shoved a female passenger, who had 
also alighted, probably to save the poor man from further punishment, back into the 
taxi and took off. Other healthy-looking males standing around this shocking scene 
appeared either unbothered or too scared to come to the aid of the hapless pedestrian. 
The Minister of police appeared on the eNews Channel Africa television station to 
bemoan the lack of ubuntu in reaction to this incident. Besides the patent criminality 
and barbarity of the taxi driver, perhaps equally surprising is the Minister of Police 
bemoaning the lack of ubuntu in such an incident. Was the Minister justified in not only 
expressing his sadness at the disappearance of ubuntu in the Bloemfontein CBD, but 




characteristics that are consistent with ubuntu in the Bloemfontein CBD and, by 
extension, all corners of South Africa?” (Matolino and Kwindingwi, 2013: 197 – 198).  
The aforementioned passage seeks to point readers into the Minister’s reactions that seem to 
have constituted Matolino and Kwindingwi’s speculative interests: The Minister’s appeal to an 
ubuntu ethic. This appeal to ubuntu interrupts the flow of other modes of reflecting on this 
incident. This is necessarily so since it has occurred in a particular place that is filled up with 
special affluences which open up for other avenues of interpreting a number of realities that 
spring form large-scale and technologically advanced societies. This appeal by the Minister of 
Police makes us more detached to other modes of interpreting the scene since he thinks that the 
only thing that preserves the monopoly of understanding it is through the prism of ubuntu. That 
is why Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013: 201) “suggest that what one finds in Bloemfontein 
are probably various competing values that are governed ordinarily by the law of the land 
without necessarily seeking to be interpreted in the light of ubuntu”. In other words, a charitable 
reading of their anecdotal story should not be necessitated by the mere act of debunking or 
overlooking how they question the Minister’s justification for invoking (or bemoaning the lack 
of) ubuntu in the Bloemfontein CBD. It is clear that this incident just occurred in a large city. 
A city that is filled up with ethnic, religious, class, cultural, and racial differences. This city 
does not have substantial agreements regarding these differences. These differences do not 
occur or exist because of how ubuntu is or ought to be interpreted. These differences are in a 
city that retains multiple identities. This is not a city of similarly constituted selves. It is a city 
that does not force individuals to ‘place a high price and value on blood relations’; the virtues 
of extended familyhood; or worldviews and ethical norms that are normally upkeeped by 
‘undifferentiated, small, and tight-knit communities’ (Matolino and Kwindingwi, 2013: 202). 
Instead of appealing to what is normally associated with his duties as the Minister of Police, 
the Minister then decides to express not only his sadness about the disappearance of ubuntu in 
the Bloemfontein CBD, but he had so much expectations about a constant exhibit of behavior 
and characteristics that are consistent with ubuntu (Ibid., 198). Indeed, their speculative 
interests are based on the Minister’s ‘sadness’ and ‘expectations’. It stands to reason that the 
Minister’s appeal to ubuntu is exactly what strike Matolino and Kwindingwi as ‘surprising’ 
(Ibid.). As a result, I read Matolino and Kwindingwi as denouncing the Minister’s readiness to 
invoke or bemoan the lack of ubuntu in a city that upkeeps competing values that do not 
necessarily seek to be interpreted through the prism of a specific worldview, ethical system 




(2013: 201 – 202). They further suggest that for a worldview, ethic, or system of ubuntu to 
work effectively and attain its stated goals, it must be upkeeped by traditional communities 
whose members “foster the necessary feelings of solidarity that enable the spirit of ubuntu to 
flourish in the manner envisaged and bemoaned by the Minister of Police” (Ibid., 202).  
4.4.1.1 A Close Analysis of Koenane And Olatunji’s Misreading. 
Koenane and Olatunji’s misreading of the anecdote is much easier to detect especially when 
one considers the following passage. I use the following passage to expose Koenane and 
Olatunji’s three ways of missing the point of what the anecdote resembles:   
“In including this incident in their articles, these authors [Matolino and Kwindingwi] 
aimed at highlighting the following: (i) The appalling act of the taxi driver, which lacked 
any element of ubuntu. This was characterised by reversing into another person and 
then violently attacking the other (which Matolino and Kwindingwi rightly regard as 
“barbaric”). (ii) The reaction or lack thereof of the onlookers, who did nothing to 
intervene or prevent the taxi driver from causing more harm to the victim. The 
expectation by Matolino and Kwindingwi was for these onlookers to intervene or do 
something to limit the injury. This act of cowardice or indifference by “healthy-looking” 
men is perceived by Matolino and Kwindingwi as a failure to apply the values of ubuntu. 
(iii) The response of the Minister of Police was basically to appeal to the public to 
“exhibit” behaviour befitting ubuntu and display “characteristics” consistent with 
ubuntu values. This appeal should not have been necessary if ordinary South Africans 
were already attuned to the ethos of ubuntu” (Koenane and Olatunji, 2017: 264).  
This passage seeks to demonstrate three propositions [(i); (ii); (iii)] that attempt to devise 
Koenane and Olatunji’s awareness of what is really going on with Matolino and Kwindingwi’s 
anecdote. From my own analysis, it reflects a particular problem I identify with their  
misreading of the  anecdote. This is a telling problem that resembles three propositions/ways 
of missing the point of what is really going on with Matolino and Kwindingwi’s anecdote.  
Firstly, Koenane and Olatunji read Matolino and Kwindingwi as arguing that the actions of the 
said taxi driver lack any elements associated with ubuntu. In other words, they reduce Matolino 
and Kwindingwi into a hopeless search for ubuntu in this incident. This is simply because 
Matolino and Kwindingwi are construed as committed to viewing ‘reversing into another 




contrary, a charitable reading of Matolino and Kwindingwi’s anecdote would not drag them 
into arguing that there is indeed an absence of ubuntu in such an incident. Instead, it would 
presume a distinction or acknowledge the difference between the Minister who bemoans the 
lack of ubuntu and Matolino and Kwindingwi who question the Minister’s appeal to ubuntu. 
Strictly speaking, Matolino and Kwindingwi demonstrate that it is the Minister who infiltrates 
ubuntu-talk when he reacts to the barbarity and criminality associated with such an incident. In 
other words, their position is not in tandem with the Minister’s strategy to bemoan the lack of 
ubuntu. The Minister thinks that values or behaviour befitting ubuntu are applicable to a 
particular place like Bloemfontein. This applicability is also made manifest in Metz’s (2014) 
insistence that values and norms associated with ubuntu are applicable to a particular place like 
Johannesburg.  
Secondly, Koenane and Olatunji’s reading of Matolino and Kwindingwi involves another 
different apparatus: their (Matolino and Kwindingwi) expectations when they think about this 
incident. The expectation by Matolino and Kwindingwi was for the onlookers to do something 
or intervene in order to limit the injury, write Koenane and Olatunji (2017). This act of 
cowardice or indifference by these onlookers demonstrates ‘failure to apply values associated 
with ubuntu’ (Koenane and Olatunji, 2017: 264). From my point of view, Matolino and 
Kwindingwi did not argue that they expected the said ‘onlookers’ to intervene or do something 
to limit the injury so as to make things much easier for them to infiltrate ubuntu-talk in this 
incident. Again, this proposition seeks to reduce Matolino and Kwindingwi into a desperate 
search for values associated with ubuntu in this incident: an incident that has occurred in a 
relatively modern and highly differentiated city. To my mind, Matolino and Kwindingwi are 
not in a desperate search for values associated ubuntu in a highly differentiated city like 
Bloemfontein. Instead, they are in the business of articulating the shortcomings of ubuntu in a 
city that does not retain natural environs in which we can conceive ubuntu to have been a 
success for contemporary Africa (Matolino and Kwindingwi, 2013: 204). In fact, they are of 
the view that to be committed to the values of ubuntu in a large city that retains multiple 
identities is to be committed at the exclusion of other values (Ibid., 202).  
The final proposition seeks to impute a slightly different apparatus: the reaction by the Minister 
of Police. Koenane and Olatunji read Matolino and Kwindingwi as positing that the Minister’s 
reaction or response was basically ‘to appeal to the public to “exhibit” behaviour befitting 
ubuntu and display “characteristics” consistent with ubuntu’ (Ibid.). They read Matolino and 




necessary were South Africans already attuned to its ethos (Koenane and Olatunji, 2017). 
Moreover, Koenane and Olatunji (2017: 268) write:  
“In fairness to Matolino and Kwindingwi, in recent times in south Africa the number of 
incidents that lack the moral disposition of ubuntu have been countless: the Marikana 
massacre; the rape and murder of children; the attacks on gays and lesbians in our 
townships; xenophobic attacks; police murders etc.”  
Even this quotation seeks to reduce Matolino and Kwindingwi into a desperate search for moral 
dispositions of ubuntu. Koenane and Olatunji (2017) argue that barbaric acts are everyday 
phenomena throughout the world. They think that with all these incidents, the uncritical reader 
may agree that talk of ubuntu in South Africa must come to an end (Ibid., 268). For Koenane 
and Olatunji, talk of ubuntu must not come to an end and must not be necessitated by these 
incidents. As a result, it appears as if another misreading is at play here. It is not true that 
Matolino and Kwindingwi interpret these incidents as lacking any elements associated with 
ubuntu. It is my view that their speculative interests are directed at the Minister’s appeal to 
ubuntu. Their speculative interests are neither directed at a number of incidents that occur 
worldwide. However, Koenane and Olatunji (2017: 274) change the story. They argue that 
“Matolino and Kwindingwi rightly point to incidents which […] do not display the moral 
standards associated with ubuntu”. No doubt, this is a serious contradiction from Koenane and 
Olatunji (2017). On the one hand, they contend that they think that Matolino and Kwindingwi 
are in the business of reflecting on an incident that lack the moral disposition of ubuntu. On the 
other side, they argue that Matolino and Kwindingwi have rightly pointed to incidents that do 
not display or lack the moral disposition of ubuntu (Koenane and Olatunji, 2017).   
However, it is clear from the foregoing that Koenane and Olatunji do not understand what 
Matolino and Kwindingwi’s anecdote resembles. Even if my own reading of Matolino and 
Kwindingwi does not succeed in providing good justifications for what exactly resembles their 
anecdote, but Koenane and Olatunji’s reading of the anecdote is problematic and does not help 
readers understand this anecdote in its true light or for what it is. This is chiefly because their 
reading of the anecdote is necessitated by the mere act of debunking or overlooking how 
Matolino and Kwindingwi question the Minister’s justification for invoking (or bemoaning the 
lack of) ubuntu in the Bloemfontein CBD. But how does Matolino and Kwindingwi question 
the Minister’s appeal to an ubuntu ethic? Their main question is stated as follows: Was the 




Bloemfontein CBD, but also in his expectation that there should be a constant exhibit of 
behavior and characteristics that are consistent with ubuntu in the Bloemfontein CBD, and by 
extension, all corners of South Africa? (Matolino and Kwindingwi, 2013: 198). This question 
is especially important since it demonstrates Matolino and Kwindingwi’s grounds of 
skepticism about the applicability or relevance of ubuntu in contemporary South Africa. This 
question must not be read lightly since it might presuppose different sub-questions that are (but 
not limited to) ontological and phenomenological descriptions. Phenomenological (or what it 
is like) questions are different from ontological (or what it is) questions. However, I wish to 
frame the manner in which the following sub-questions may be asked by using a 
phenomenological approach so as to show the significance I associate with Matolino and 
Kwindingwi’s main question. And it is not my aim to address these sub-questions here. This is 
not to suggest that an ontological approach cannot be used as a starting point for understanding 
the manner in which Matolino and Kwindingwi question the Minister’s appeal to an ubuntu 
ethic. Therefore, I confine my understanding of Matolino and Kwindingwi’s worry to sub-
questions of the following sort:  
(a)  Does the Minister think that there are no modes of interpretation which resemble other 
affluences of articulating what it’s like to react to the criminality and barbarity 
associated with such an incident, if he only limits his reactions to the disappearance of 
ubuntu alone?  
(b) What if the Minister does not know what it’s like to think about other affluences of 
judging such an incident (that may equally reflect or articulate whatever we do when 
we try to make sense of an incident) without relying on a specific worldview that only 
works effectively where communities are small and undifferentiated? 
(c) What if the Minister does not know or fully understand what it’s like (or when it is the 
right time) not to think about ubuntu when he is supposed to react to an incident that 
occurs in a large city that functions without encouraging its citizens to prize 
communality and interdependence as the only blueprints for Africanness?  
(d) If the Minister thinks that ubuntu is the only prerequisite for fully reacting to such an 
incident, does he really know and understand the merits of what it’s like to exhibit 
behavior befitting this worldview in a (relatively modernized and highly differentiated) 
city whose members are not molded through communal dependence for their 
meaningful existence?  
(e) And if the Minister does not know and understand the merits of what it’s like to exhibit 
behavior and characteristics that are consistent with ubuntu in Bloemfontein, then what 
sought of justification could there be for expressing his sadness at the disappearance of 
ubuntu in this large and technologically advanced city?  
Therefore, if I succeed in providing a charitable reading of Matolino and Kwindingwi’s 




[(i); (ii); (iii)] ways of missing the point of what it (the anecdote) resembles. Were this the case 
about Koenane and Olatunji’s reaction to Matolino and Kwindingwi, then readers would be 
convinced that their arguments about the anecdote are neither compelling nor should they be 
adumbrated as standard reply.  
4.4.2 A Serious Misinterpretation of Matolino And Kwindingwi’s 
Understanding of An Ubuntu Ethic. 
The second worry that occupies the center stage in this section is one that strikes Koenane and 
Olatunji (2017: 273) as superficial. No doubt, this worry resonates with their intentions to 
“deepening/enriching the debate on ubuntu” on their own (2017: 264). They commit 
themselves to a view that Matolino and Kwindingwi’s understanding of ubuntu is guilty of 
shallowness: “the two authors’ understanding of ubuntu ethics is superficial” (2017: 273). In 
response, I will seek to argue that this argument is not convincing since it is tantamount to 
serious misinterpretation. This objection is part and parcel of my suggestion that these thinkers’ 
arguments are neither compelling nor should they be adumbrated as standard reply. The most 
important thing is that these thinkers try by all means to surmount Matolino and Kwindingwi. 
But little did they know that the manner in which they carried out this objection was prone to 
serious misinterpretation since it is not true that they have understood the gist of the debate. To 
object to an understanding that struck them as superficial, this is what Koenane and Olatunji 
(2017: 273) had to say: 
“What we find striking, and what leads us to conclude that the two authors’ 
understanding of an ubuntu ethic is superficial, are the sources on which they have 
based their conclusions. Matolino and Kwindingwi’s assertions about ubuntu are drawn 
mainly from Broodryk, Marx and Binberger, but they fail to consult well-known African 
scholars, whom we mention but a few, including Mokgoro (1998), Teffo (1998), Ramose 
(2002), Khoza (2012), Letseka (2000; 2013a; 2013b; 2014) and others.” 
This quotation serves as a rationale for Koenane and Olatunji’s attempt to register a serious 
skeptical note against Kwindingwi and Matolino’s understanding of an ubuntu ethic. The 
manner in which these philosophers mount their skeptical note shows that Matolino and 
Kwindingwi did “fail to consult well-known African scholars”. This was an important 
submission to have been made in order to deal with Matolino and Kwindingwi if one reads 
them charitably. For these philosophers, it appears as if much better reasons exist for rejecting 




omitting well-known African thinkers: Letseka (2014) is amongst thinkers they cite. It reads 
as if the sources from which Matolino and Kwindingwi base their conclusions is a gazing stock 
for Koenane and Olatunji’s impatience with their understanding of an ubuntu ethic. Had 
Matolino and Kwindingwi avoided citing “Broodryk, Marx and Van Binberger” (and not van 
Binsbergen (2001)) - according to Koenane and Olatunji - they would have succeeded in 
providing an understanding of ubuntu that is non-superficial. Or had Matolino and Kwindingwi 
consulted the said well-known African thinkers, their understanding of ubuntu would not be 
superficial.  
These African thinkers {Ramose (2002); Teffo (1998); Khoza (2012) etc.} are probably 
construed as providing insightful viewpoints that are superficially-free. It is only after taking a 
cure of non-superficiality from these thinkers including Mokgoro (1998) and Letseka (2000; 
2013a; 2013b; 2014) that Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013) would have sufficiently understood 
an ubuntu ethic. Matolino and Kwindingwi would have sufficiently understood ubuntu based 
on certain conditions: one of these conditions is to take heed of Letseka (2014) whose paper 
was published after these philosophers had written their paper in the year 2013. Of course, 
readers must not be shocked, when they encounter Koenane and Olatunji, that Letseka’s (2014) 
paper was supposed to appear in Matolino and Kwindingwi were they to succeed in providing 
a non-superficial understanding of ubuntu. In fact, they must read them as committed to this 
view. For this reason, I read Letseka (2014) as one of the thinkers whom Koenane and Olatunji 
have appealed to in order to maximize the soundness of their skeptical note. This is a serious 
conviction for Koenane and Olatunji: Matolino and Kwindingwi were supposed to consult 
Letseka (2014) even though their paper appeared in 2013. And I am tempted to think that this 
is in parenthesis with what these philosophers had promised: “deepening/enriching the debate 
on ubuntu” on their own (Koenane and Olatunji, 2017: 264). 
On this view, appealing to Letseka (2014) or expecting Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013) to 
consult him as if his piece were already accessible to literature, is not only flawed but it raises 
more question than answers. For a start, what sort of justification could there be for expecting 
Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013) to predict an “essay”44- [Letseka (2014)] – that serves as a 
 
44 Koenane and Olatunji (2017) were not supposed to invoke Letseka (2014) because he is not the prime candidate 
for Matolino and Kwindingwi’s (2013) essay: his paper appeared in 2014 and not in 2013 or before 2013. If 
ubuntu is variously conceived, as Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013: 197) tell us, then there would be no need for 
Koenane and Olatunji to be very selective since everyone has something to say about ubuntu. Koenane and 




legitimate candidate for any form of consultation if the year in which their paper was published 
does not exist alongside the year 2014 in which Letseka’s was? What is it like and what 
difference does it make to take heed of an article - [Letseka (2014)] - that does not exist 
alongside or prior to Matolino and Kwindingwi’s year of publication? How is it that Letseka 
(2014) was a well-known African scholar even before the year 2014 or during the year in which 
Matolino and Kwindingwi’s paper was published online: 06 September 2013? How does his 
2014 article deserve to be qualified and morphed into the same status with thinkers who were 
omitted - [e.g., Khoza (2012); Ramose (2002) or Letseka (2013a and 2013b)] and who happen 
to write their articles alongside or prior to the year in which Matolino and Kwindingwi 
appeared on the South African Journal of Philosophy? For these thinkers, it reads as if, failing 
to consult or foresee what was coming in the year 2014 somehow serves as a raison de’tre for 
certainly reducing Matolino and Kwindingwi’s understanding of ubuntu to complete 
superficiality. It is for these reasons that I think I have succeeded in picking up a set of 
sentences that suit their impatience with Matolino and Kwindingwi’s understanding of ubuntu. 
To provide reasons that best reveal the most obvious cases of serious misinterpretation, I think 
it is crucial for one to come into terms with what Matolino and Kwindingwi had to say wherever 
they invoke “Broodryk; Van Binberger; and Marx”. But before coming into terms with what 
these thinkers had to say wherever they invoked Broodryk one must understand that Broodryk 
has written extensively on ubuntu. For this reason, it is unfair to invoke Broodryk’s name as if 
everyone will understand the most obvious instances where Kwindingwi and Matolino relied 
on him to draw their conclusion. In their joint paper Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013: 199 – 
200) invoke Broodryk (2006) and (2005). What Koenane and Olatunji have failed to tease out 
is a specific year or years in Broodryk’s account that constitutes the most obvious instances of 
an understanding of ubuntu that is tantamount to superficiality. In Koenane and Olatunji’s 
(2017: 273) reaction, it is not entirely clear whether they have proffered a specific objection 
that necessarily qualifies Broodryk’s (2005) or (2006) works as denoting the most maximal 
superficiality of ubuntu that everyone would not doubt. It is one thing to invoke Broodryk 
without the years [2005; and 2006] in which Matolino and Kwindingwi cited his works and 
quite another to invoke his works without being explicit about publications in which Matolino 
and Kwindingwi gleaned their understanding of ubuntu.  
This is one of the things that reasonable persons of the opposing view are not likely to confuse. 
If one were to look at Matolino and Kwindingwi carefully, then they would have to understand 




Broodryk is divorced from (or discussed without invoking) his (2005) and (2006) works. 
Koenane and Olatunji provide no justification for separating Broodryk from his (2005) and 
(2006) works. If it is probably the case that there seems to be no Broodryk (2005) and (2006) 
in their main text and list of references or their footnotes at least, then there are strong grounds 
for doubting their reading of Matolino and Kwindingwi. Koenane and Olatunji have 
championed a view that lacks reasonable grounds for registering their impatience with 
Matolino and Kwindingwi by invoking Broodryk alone and not Broodryk (2005) and (2006). 
They did not specify Broodryk’s work(s) that could be qualified as the ones that Matolino and 
Kwindingwi must be accused of as asserting, in order to reach their conclusion about ubuntu. 
Were this the case about Koenane and Olatunji, then in no way would their line of criticism 
count as ‘standard reply’ or at least undoubtedly so.45  
Besides this misreading of Matolino and Kwindingwi, a reasonable person of the opposing 
view might even reveal that there are no instances where they [Matolino and Kwindingwi] did 
cite “Van Binberger”. Rather, what we must attest to is that there are those instances where 
Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013: 199 - 201) invoke a certain thinker who goes by the surname: 
“van Binsbergen” and not “Van Binberger”. Even when one picks up the last scholar [“Marx”] 
that Koenane and Olatunji read as articulating an understanding of ubuntu that is amenable to 
a particular form of superficiality, he or she is not likely to confuse the senses in which 
Matolino and Kwindingwi appeal to the surname “Marx”. It does seem clear that Koenane and 
Olatunji have invoked “Marx” and “Broodryk” in a manner that certainly leaves readers 
shocked and confused. Readers are forced to guess or pin down for themselves the senses in 
which Koenane and Olatunji have appealed to a certain thinker that goes by the surname 
“Marx”. Thus, they left readers scratching their heads on this crucial distinction. This is a 
 
45 There is something that could be of interest to other scholars who may seem to be curious about how Koenane 
and Olatunji (2017) deepen and enrich the debate on ubuntu. That is, Koenane and Olatunji (2017: 268) adopt 
Broodryk when his understanding of ubuntu is working for their own good, and immediately abandon or denounce 
the same Broodryk when he is cited by Matolino and Kwindingwi. The only passage where Koenane and Olatunji 
(2017: 268) spoke approvingly of Broodryk is when they do not accuse him of any form of superficiality. Rather, 
these philosophers mention Broodryk (no date) as one of the thinkers who understand that ubuntu does not fall 
within the prism of race discourses. They cite Broodryk alongside philosophers like Metz; Prozesky; Nussbaum; 
Shutte; Stubbs; Praeg; and others not only to show their sympathies for him but also to articulate an argument that 
best responds to Matolino and Kwindingwi. This is where Broodryk’s understanding of ubuntu is not attached to 
any form of superficiality. In fact, this is where they demonstrate that he must be cited as an authority or as a 
thinker who can sidestep Matolino and Kwindingwi. But I think it is also interesting to note that when Broodryk 
is used by Matolino and Kwindingwi, his understanding of an ubuntu ethic just pales into insignificance. And it 





distinction between Christoph Marx and Karl Marx. Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013: 201; 
and 204) have invoked Christoph Marx (2002) (who had criticized ubuntu for fostering 
conformity) and Karl Marx (to pose a question about the economic commitments of ubuntu). 
What Koenane and Olatunji (2017: 273) have failed to tease out is to show the reader that that 
there are two senses or specialized contexts in which Matolino and Kwindingwi have invoked 
that which goes by the surname: “Marx”: a distinction between Christoph “Marx” and Karl 
“Marx” in Matolino and Kwindingwi’s essay. In other words, Koenane and Olatunji have failed 
to presume a distinction between Karl “Marx” and Christoph “Marx” in their attempt to qualify 
a certain thinker who makes Kwindingwi and Matolino to articulate a superficial understanding 
of an ubuntu ethic. If this crucial distinction is not always presumed, readers may ask the most 
basic questions: Who else is responsible for shaping Matolino and Kwindingwi’s assertions 
besides ‘Broodryk and Van Binberger? Is it Karl Marx or Christoph Marx? For this reason, it 
does seem clear that Koenane and Olatunji (2017: 273) were not explicit about the “Marx” they 
appeal to. What cannot be doubted is that they did reserve their understanding of what should 
count as superficial not only for “Broodryk and Van Binberger” but also for a certain thinker 
who goes by the surname “Marx”.  
No doubt, Koenane and Olatunji (2017) or their sympathizers at least, would register some 
grounds of skepticism about the manner in which they are criticized in this section. Now let us 
think of the strongest possible objection against my (attempted) line of criticism. It is only after 
considering the strongest and revised version of Koenane and Olatunji’s impatience with 
Matolino and Kwindingwi that one will see why I accuse them of serious misinterpretation. 
Let us suppose for argument’s sake that Koenane and Olatunji would modify their argument 
since it seems to be flawed in a manner that can be easily fixed. Let it be supposed that they 
could abandon or withdraw Letseka (2014) as one of the thinkers who were necessarily omitted 
by Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013) since his - Letseka (2014) - paper was surely not at their 
disposal. For some reason, let us pretend they could admit that since the South African Journal 
of Philosophy published Matolino and Kwindingwi’s paper in 2013, it certainly would be a 
grave mistake to expect them to foresee or take heed of Letseka’s paper that was published by 
the Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences in the subsequent year - 2014. Koenane and 
Olatunji could remove Letseka (2014) in the above quote since Letseka (2013a, and 2013b) 
himself did not cite or acknowledge his (2014) essay as the one that was “forthcoming”. Or an 
essay that must be invoked to authenticate an understanding of ubuntu that is not superficially 




“forthcoming” (or 2014) paper when he articulates an understanding of an ubuntu ethic that is 
superficially-free. That is to say, in his (2013a) work Letseka only made reference to his (2012; 
and 2000) and not (2014) works. In his (2013b) paper he did not make reference to Letseka 
(2014), but he only appealed to his (2013a; 2012 and 2000) works. This is exactly what could 
justify them in removing Letseka (2014) in the above quote since there is nothing which 
demonstrates the necessity to cite this (2014) work in matters associated with providing an 
understanding of ubuntu that is non-superficial. On the other side, they could show that they 
meant Wim van Binsbergen (2001) instead of “Van Binberger”, and that by “Marx” they meant 
Christoph Marx (2002) instead of Karl Marx.  
In what follows, I seek to present my argument about serious misinterpretation based on the 
hitherto revised objection. I do this to articulate an argument that best responds to Koenane and 
Olatunji’s revised objection. The sort of misinterpretation that I accuse Koenane and Olatunji 
of has nothing to do with other thinkers they deem as “well-known African thinkers”. Instead, 
this accusation is surely in concord with how they conceive of Wim van Binsbergen (2001); 
Christoph Marx (2002); and Broodryk (2005, and 2006) as thinkers who make it possible for 
Matolino and Kwindingwi to provide an understanding of ubuntu that struck them as 
superficial. It is my view that even this revised objection does not provide substantive reasons 
for thinking that Matolino and Kwindingwi have articulated an understanding of ubuntu that is 
prone to any form of superficiality. It is through this revised objection that I accuse them of 
misinterpreting Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013). To provide the most obvious instances of 
serious misinterpretation, I think it is crucial that I appeal to certain passages that are pretty 
much easy to identify in Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013: 199, 200, and 201). These are the 
main passages that guide me and motivate the sort of interrogation to be forwarded to Koenane 
and Olatunji, or readers in general, so that they will encounter this misinterpretation. The 
strategy to be provided below is a double-edged sword.  
Firstly, let us identify Broodryk’s (2005; and 2006) works as interpreted in Matolino and 
Kwindingwi to investigate the truthfulness of Koenane and Olatunji’s position: the position 
that Matolino and Kwindingwi provide an understanding of ubuntu that strike them as 
superficial. This is what Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013: 199 – 200) had to say in their 
“general overview”46 of ubuntu and their section about “ubuntu in policy making”:  
 
46 If it is true that they aimed to provide a general overview of ubuntu there was no need for Koenane and Olatunji 




(a) General overview of ubuntu - “The Gauteng Department of Education has introduced 
in its schools ubuntu as part of the subject for guidance for pupils. Children are taught 
the values of ubuntu in the hope that positive social values would be restored where 
they have disappeared and to popularise ubuntu amongst children of all cultures. It is 
hoped that ubuntu will create a value-driven society (Broodryk 2006: p. 25).” 
(b) General overview of ubuntu - “At the core of ubuntu is the idea that umuntu ngumuntu 
ngabantu, that is, a person depends on others to be a person. This claim is seen as the 
unique product that ubuntu offers to the world”. Shutte (2001) and Broodryk (2005) 
hold that it is time that ubuntu is exported to the international arena and be applied as 
an ethic in management for better productivity and service delivery.” 
(c) Ubuntu in policy making - “The government of South Africa and its organs and indeed 
the adherents of the above-mentioned view (at different levels of society) hold that the 
use of ubuntu as an ethic will establish some code of conduct that will transform society. 
In the civil service, government implemented the motto Batho Pele (people first) and 
expect civil servants to deliver in this spirit (Broodryk (2006: p. 25).”  
As a matter of fact, it is crucial to note that in (a) Matolino and Kwindingwi aim to provide a 
general overview of ubuntu, and that they happen to invoke Broodryk (2006) to demonstrate 
ubuntu and its relationship with objectives of the Department of Education. For this reason, the 
government wanted to implement the type of educating children that is in concord with the 
dictates of ubuntu. Educating children about its values was part and parcel of restoring positive 
social values. I construe Matolino and Kwindingwi as writing from a position of protest against 
an outdated mode of being that is used to coerce society into the same ideology in modern 
Africa. I think the burden lies on Koenane and Olatunji to account for the sort of superficiality 
that one could draw from the above (a) assertion. I read (a) as asserting that there is a 
relationship between education and ubuntu that seems to be the gazing stock for the department 
of education in the Gauteng province. There is nothing about (a) that must be read as close to 
any form of superficiality. The relationships between ubuntu and education is itself not new. 
And thus, Koenane and Olatunji did not provide any justification for thinking that 
 
limited to some extent: theirs was a general one. The fact that they did not consult other well-known African 
scholars does not mean that they have failed to pursue their critique of ubuntu up to the end. They state their 
abstract as “we seek to advance arguments that question” ubuntu. They provided their overview before they made 
their critique of ubuntu. And their critique was not based on the manner in which they did present their overview 




understanding ubuntu as embedded in educational discourses is superficial or at least likely to 
be necessarily so. 
Broodryk (2005) was not the first one to make assertions about ubuntu and education. This 
relationship dates back to 1978 were the Inkatha Freedom Party proposed that children must 
be taught the values of ubuntu in schools (Griffin, 1995). There is a bulk of other scholars who 
write on ‘ubuntu and education’: Higgs (2004; 2012); Venter (2004); Waghid (2004; 2014); 
Bondai and Kaputa (2016); Shanyanana and Waghid (2016); Piper (2016); Oviawe (2016); 
Etieyibo (2017) etc. But there is a certain scholar that I want to mention here. This scholar is 
he who was and still convinced that education should therefore be the promotion of botho or 
ubuntu. Surely, this scholar predates Koenane and Olatunji’s contribution to the Matolino-
Kwindingwi-Metz debate. This individual scholar is he who does not seem to fall from the 
good graces of these two philosophers. In fact, he seems to be one of those thinkers which they 
deem as well-known African scholars of ubuntu. This is none other than Letseka (2000: 191). 
If Koenane and Olatunji were ready to dismiss Broodryk’s assertion about ubuntu and 
education - as superficially so - then they must also recognize that Letseka (2000) does 
something of this sort in his “African Philosophy and Educational Discourse”. It is my view 
that Matolino and Kwindingwi invoke Broodryk not to insist on his definition of ubuntu but to 
insist on the relationship that exists between ubuntu and education in South Africa. This is 
where Koenane and Olatunji’s misinterpretation of things lie. It is wrong to construe Matolino 
and Kwindingwi as insisting that Broodryk is one of the “sources on which they have based 
their conclusion” (Koenane and Olatunji, 2017: 273). 
Secondly, if Koenane and Olatunji were interpreted in light of (b), then one would probably 
understand that Broodryk (2005) was cited by Matolino and Kwindingwi to reveal his 
understanding and application of the well-known aphorism of ubuntu: umuntu ngumuntu 
ngabantu. They cited Broodryk (2005) alongside Shutte (2001) to show that ubuntu is now 
deemed as exportable to the global community for some thinkers. This reading of ubuntu as 
exportable to the international arena is not peculiar to Matolino and Kwindingwi’s general 
overview of ubuntu. And it is a serious misinterpretation to argue that Broodryk (2005) is one 
of the sources in which one could identify any form of superficiality attributed to an ubuntu 
ethic.47 It is germane to note that Koenane and Olatunji (2017: 263 and 269) account for 
 





something of this sort but they immediately denounce someone who is convinced by this 
manner of going about things. That is, they insist that one does not have to be African and black 
to embrace ubuntu but reject Broodryk (2005) who does something of this sort or is at least 
committed to it.  
No doubt, ubuntu is not applicable to Africans, and blacks in particular, but its values are 
applicable to the global community or other Western philosophical approaches of the world, 
write Koenane and Olatunji (2017). This is exactly what Shutte (2001) and Broodryk (2005) 
had in mind. For instance, Koenane and Olatunji (2017: 263 and 269) understand ubuntu as an 
all-inclusive world view and admit that it stands for universalized humanness (ubuntu/botho) 
values, ones that are shared across cultures: respect; care; honesty; tolerance; compassion; 
empathy and hospitality. They admit quite strongly that the philosophy of ubuntu is no different 
from other philosophies of the world. Matolino and Kwindingwi as well as Koenane and 
Olatunji seem to recognize that some thinkers entertain the possibility that ubuntu shares some 
features with other ethical or Western philosophical approaches of the world. But in that 
recognition Koenane and Olatunji still think that Broodryk’s understanding of ubuntu is 
superficial.  
At this juncture, I am still wondering about what the point of Koenane and Olatunji’s argument 
really was. Matolino and Kwindingwi understand that ubuntu’s values are construed as 
applicable to other places: this is what Koenane and Olatunji are ready to admit. If Koenane 
and Olatunji were to accept that their understanding of ubuntu compliments (b) then it certainly 
would be interesting to see the form of superficiality that one could glean from Matolino and 
Kwindingwi’s (b). The manner in which their [Koenane and Olatunji] understanding of ubuntu 
compliments (b) lies in the idea that ubuntu is deemed by Shutte (2001) and Broodryk (2005) 
as exportable to the international arena (Matolino and Kwindingwi, 2013: 200). Hence, (b) has 
no business in accounting as one of the sources in which Matolino and Kwindingwi drew their 
conclusion about ubuntu. Thus, all of these assertions come down to my argument that 
whatever Koenane and Olatunji have carried out against Matolino and Kwindingwi’s view 
about an understanding of ubuntu pales into serious misinterpretation.  
When one looks at (c) she or he will understand that Matolino and Kwindingwi were trying to 
show that there is something going on about ubuntu and public policy in South Africa. This 
must not be construed as something that sets the tone for their support of Broodryk. They 




motto Batho Pele (people first) and expect civil servants to deliver services in this spirit. There 
is nothing superficial about how Broodryk (2005) has invoked ubuntu here. It is no hidden fact 
that the government has implemented the motto “Batho Pele” ‘to animate, or perhaps pay 
obeisance to ubuntu’ (Matolino and Kwindingwi, 2013: 197). It appears as if Koenane and 
Olatunji do not understand that the government has chosen ‘its service delivery mantra and its 
public slogan’ deliberately (Ibid.). This shows that another misinterpretation is at play here. 
However, not only did Koenane and Olatunji argue that Matolino and Kwindingwi’s assertions 
are drawn mainly from Broodryk, but on the other hand, their impatience with them was 
extended to other thinkers that are discussed below: Wim van Binsbergen (2001) and Christoph 
Marx (2002). This is the second point that I want to make about my view that Koenane and 
Olatunji’s impatience with Matolino and Kwindingwi rests on a serious misinterpretation. As 
a result, Wim van Binsbergen and Christoph Marx are some of the thinkers who are construed 
as making it possible for Matolino and Kwindingwi to provide a superficial understanding of 
an ubuntu ethic. It is said that Matolino and Kwindingwi’s understanding about the end of 
ubuntu emanates from these sources: van Binsbergen (2001) and Marx (2002) (Koenane and 
Olatunji, 2017: 273). 
Most importantly, I propose to give substantive reasons for thinking that Koenane and Olatunji 
did misinterpret whatever it is that Kwindingwi and Matolino were laboring to achieve by 
citing these scholars. The most important thing to note is that van Binsbergen (2001) is invoked 
twice whilst Christoph Marx (2002) was invoked once in Matolino and Kwindingwi. Matolino 
and Kwindingwi (2013: 199 and 201) appeal to van Binsbergen (2001) in their “general 
overview of ubuntu” and van Binsbergen (2001) and Marx (2002) in their “critique of ubuntu”. 
There is nothing in both passages that shows that Marx and van Binsbergen are the sources 
from which Matolino and Kwindingwi have based their understanding about ubuntu. Even if 
Koenane and Olatunji read Marx and van Binsbergen as making it possible for Matolino and 
Kwindingwi to provide an understanding of ubuntu that is superficial, I propose to read them 
[Matolino and Kwindingwi] as succeeding in escaping what Koenane and Olatunji’s line of 
criticism aimed at achieving. Their line of criticism serves to confuse readers and misinterprets 
Matolino and Kwindingwi’s take on Marx and van Binsbergen. This is what Matolino and 





(a) General overview of ubuntu - “Win van Binsbergen (2001) holds that ubuntu has been 
explored as a viable philosophical concept in the context of majority rule South Africa 
and that for the academic philosophers it has become a key concept to evoke 
unadulterated forms of African social life before the European conquest.”  
(b) Critique of ubuntu - “The critique we seek to make is somewhat different from other 
criticisms that have been made against ubuntu. van Binsbergen, for instance argues 
that ubuntu denies humanity to non-autochthonous individuals (2001: pp. 53 – 89). On 
the other hand, Christoph Marx has criticized ubuntu for fostering conformity and has 
been noted that of nation-building suffers the tension of inclusion at the same time 
(2002: pp. 49-69). [..] Although we endorse these criticisms and others similar to them, 
immediately below we seek to pursue a different line of criticism.” 
The most important thing to notice from (a) is that Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013: 199) 
appeal to van Binsbergen (2001) in their “general” overview of ubuntu. This overview was a 
template for a general overview of ubuntu. If (a) were to count as a passage that does influence 
them to provide a superficial understanding of ubuntu, then surely it would be unfair, for 
Koenane and Olatunji, not to mention Dandala (1996); Mthembu (1996); Richardson (2008); 
Khanyile (1995); Shutte (2001); and Mkhize (2003; 2008) who are constitutive of this general 
overview of ubuntu. For this reason, it is true that their general overview of ubuntu also relied 
but not “mainly relied” on van Binsbergen. If that were to be the case, then it certainly would 
still not be easy to see how could van Binsbergen and Broodryk alone had a strong influence 
in their understanding of ubuntu. What about the other scholars just mentioned above? Is it not 
the case that Matolino and Kwindingwi did accept for themselves in their critique that what 
they seek to pursue is somewhat different form van Binsbergen’s? But this form of 
misinterpretation becomes easily visible in (b). In (b) Matolino and Kwindingwi were very 
clear about their move. They started off by recognizing other authorities who have critiqued 
ubuntu before them. They made it quite clear that theirs is somewhat different form others. In 
other words, van Binsbergen’s critique must not be read as a blueprint for Matolino and 
Kwindingwi’s understanding of ubuntu if (b) makes it clear that they “seek to pursue a different 
line of criticism” (Matolino and Kwindingwi, 2013: 201).  
The same goes for Christoph Marx. Matolino and Kwindingwi recognize these thinkers: Marx 
and van Binsbergen, and their different lines of criticism and “others similar to them”. If 




would be the significance of a distinction that is presumed in (b). In other words, when one 
reads (b), it is easy to see that a distinction is presumed between criticisms by Marx and van 
Binsbergen as well as others similar to them, and Matolino and Kwindingwi’s “different line 
of criticism”. If Koenane and Olatunji did not make this distinction, then is it because Matolino 
and Kwindingwi’s line of criticism is not different from others registered by Marx and van 
Binsbergen or others similar to them? It seems like the distinction between Marx’s critique and 
Matolino and Kwindingwi’s line of criticism is not carefully presumed by Koenane and 
Olatunji. Thus, Koenane and Olatunji’s failure to presume this distinction is as follows.  
“Their [Matolino and Kwindingwi] criticism of ubuntu seem to run as follows: first; 
ubuntu fosters conformity.” (Koenane and Olatunji, 2017: 264).  
When one looks at (b), one would see that this criticism is reminiscent of Marx’s. But if one 
were to read this quote carefully and the context it proceeds from, then she or he would have 
noticed that Koenane and Olatunji (2016: 264) interpret “ubuntu as fostering conformity” as 
the first line of criticism that flows from Matolino and Kwindingwi. It is not even read in the 
light of Marx’s line of critique. In other words, is this not a serious misinterpretation? I think 
it really is. This is chiefly because Koenane and Olatunji do not distinguish Marx from 
Matolino and Kwindingwi. They conceive of Marx’s critique as having the first intrinsic 
quality in their (Matolino and Kwindingwi’s) line of criticism. In addition, I do not want to 
reduce the manner in which these philosophers exchange their ideas with Matolino and 
Kwindingwi into a quarrel about words. But one must notice that the word “conformity” is 
neither used more than once nor twice in Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013: 201). There are no 
instances, other than this, especially where the phrase “ubuntu fosters conformity” seem to 
appear in other parts of their essay. They argue “ubuntu fosters conformity” especially in (b) 
and not throughout their essay. The point I am getting at is that this phrase could be read as 
leading Koenane and Olatunji into a category mistake precisely because instead of it being 
understood as reminiscent of Marx’s critique, it is construed as flowing from Matolino and 
Kwindingwi’s line of criticism. If they are of the view that Matolino and Kwindingwi are 
committed to this phrase, then they must distinguish it from how Marx use it and designate its 
specialized context so that it could be re-interpreted as having the first intrinsic quality in 
Matolino and Kwindingwi’s line of criticism. Thus, one would have noticed that these thinkers 




true that Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013: 201) were mainly influenced by Marx (2002), and 
van Binsbergen (2001). In fact, in (b), I read them as pursuing a different line of criticism. 
Therefore, if it is true that these philosophers were influenced by Marx, Broodryk, and van 
Binsbergen, then one would expect Koenane and Olatunji to pursue a different argument that 
designate a specialized interpretation or context that could suit and qualify their impatience 
with Matolino and Kwindingwi. For instance, they must point readers to other passages in 
Matolino and Kwindingwi’s essay that could be interpreted as being inspired by Marx and van 
Binsbergen. Surely, this was not central to their line of criticism. But this is one of the instances 
which could strengthen the force of their argument. So, if my argument against Koenane and 
Olatunji succeeds, then readers must come to an understanding that their objection to Matolino 
and Kwindingwi is vulnerable to significant flaws. And readers would also be convinced that 
this specific objection that Koenane and Olatunji had against Matolino and Kwindingwi is 
neither compelling nor should one adumbrate it as standard reply.  
4.5 Concluding Remarks. 
This chapter sought to present three specific problems for a philosophical interrogation in 
Koenane and Olatunji’s contribution. It sought to argue that their arguments are neither 
compelling nor should they be adumbrated as standard reply to Matolino and Kwindingwi. It 
was comprised of four sections. Firstly, it sought to provide: an explication of Koenane and 
Olatunji’s contribution to the debate. Secondly, a close analysis of their contribution. Thirdly, 
a rejection of their reading of Matolino and Kwindingwi’s anecdote. Finally, a rejection of their 












Ubuntu And Modernity: A Plea for Taking Modern Realities Seriously. 
5.1 Preliminary Remarks. 
The debate introduces ‘ubuntu and modernity’ as an area of a philosophical interrogation that 
serves as a plea for taking modern realities seriously. This debate champions different 
postulations that either “jettison” (Matolino and Kwindingwi) or “endorse” (Metz) ubuntu and 
its relationships with the facets of modernity. The reason why ubuntu and the facets of 
modernity serve as their template for taking modern realities seriously, is because Matolino 
and Kwindingwi reject its relevance whilst Metz adopts it for modern societies. It appears, at 
least when one reads the debate carefully, that ubuntu and its facets with the dictates of 
modernity can do or cannot do a much better job of formulating proper theorisations that 
account for what it means for modern African realities to be taken seriously. This chapter chats 
a direction that grapples with the question of ubuntu’s relevance that has been lingering in the 
previous chapters: is ubuntu still relevant for modern African realities/societies? By so doing, 
it interrogates this question using the debate since it has received scant examination in this 
project. This chapter conceives of the debate as de-centralizing and centralizing ubuntu’s place 
in modern realities. This kind of reading renders initiators of the debate as anchors for the “de-
centralization” (Matolino and Kwindingwi) and “centralization” (Metz) of ubuntu’s place.48 
Surely, this may not be a good path to follow, especially for those who neither concentrate on 
the question of ubuntu’s relevance by appealing to the debate. However, just like those who 
may want to think that its question could fall within the ambits of the debate, this chapter argues 
that a “pro-centralizing camp” fails to account for ubuntu’s relevance in modern Africa.  
5.1.1 Outline. 
I wish to achieve three outcomes in this chapter. Firstly, I provide a preview of modern African 
realities. Secondly, I provide the architecture of the debate as resting upon two competing 
camps. Namely, “de-/and pro-centralizing” camps. Finally, I argue that the “pro-centralizing” 
(or Metz’s) camp fails to account for what it would mean for ubuntu to be relevant for modern 
African Societies.  
 
48 The purpose and role of these concepts [de-centralization and centralization] will be explained in sections 




5.2 A Preview of Modern African Realities. 
This section gives a preview of modern realities that Africa is conditioned under. Before 
considering these realities, it is important to note that on the African continent individualistic 
behaviours are excoriated and those who embrace it stand condemned for abandoning a 
superior mode of living: Communalism (Taiwo, 2016: 83). This is what Taiwo (2016: 83) 
proposes: 
  “It matters little what that individual “feels” or “thinks”, respecting how and where “he 
can develop his potential, his originality” – simply put, he has not been given the choice; 
the decision has been made for him. He has not, we might say, been taken seriously. He 
has been rendered less than a person.” 
The most important submission to make here is that much larger African societies in today’s 
world are characterised by increasing urbanization, significant religious, ethnic cleavages, and 
class differences (Ciaffa, 2008: 36). Some thinkers like Taiwo (2016: 95 – 96) for instance, 
might suggest that the spatial arrangement of many buildings in large scale communities makes 
it difficult for the architecture of communalism and its associated values to thrive. He concedes 
that our cities and towns, large and small, are devoid [..] of common spaces for the unfolding 
of communal living. He seems to question the praise of communal living. He accuses African 
scholars of forever singing the praise of communal living; the virtues of the extended family; 
how Africans often and easily assume the burdens of being another’s brother’s keeper (Taiwo, 
2016: 83). It is hardly an exaggeration to argue that each and every decision on matters close 
to their hearts and lives, most individuals in large-scale communities make them without 
calculating the interests of their kin or lineage groups (Abraham, 1992: 18).  
Communities of this sort are neither characterised by substantial agreements regarding 
religious beliefs, customs and morals nor do they seem to have been characterised by a sense 
of solidarity and shared destiny among the people (Bodunrin, 1991: 69 – 70 in Ciaffa, 2008: 
36). Life in traditional societies is not the same as that of the modern, individual and, large-
scale societies. This is not to suggest that there is no co-operation in traditional, small, and 
undifferentiated societies. But the communitarian outlook one may glean from this society is 
hardly true for modern African societies. Matolino (2018b: 168), in his book entitled 
“Consensus as Democracy in Africa” contends that human beings, all over the world, have 
basic needs which must be satisfied, not undermined, or overlooked, in order to secure a 




remoteness of Africa’s past represents in modern Africa. It is this remoteness that he deems as 
indicative of Africa’s potential ineffectiveness when it comes to providing a prescription for 
today’s ailments (Matolino, 2018b: 173). He suggests that there is a serious disconnect that 
exists between traditional social structures and modern structures (Matolino, 2018b: 174). 
Elsewhere, he argues that some communities in Africa are constituted by individuals who no 
longer share a common communal good. He thinks that the essentialists view that the African 
notion of community as constituted by individuals who share a deep connection and 
commitment to the same good is unwarranted in modern societies. He doubts that all or most 
African communities are constituted in this manner. He suggests that most parts of Africa are 
fairly modernised and governed by rules and structures that do not retain the structures of 
classical communitarianism (Matolino, 2011a). 
It is beyond any shadow of doubt that most if not all countries on the African continent have 
experienced urbanization and technological expansion. In fact, William Abraham (1992: 14) 
makes this pronouncement when he argues that this experience with urbanization has brought 
influxes of populations from the country into the cities. He thinks that the protective 
connections and certitudes that were said to generate the fellowships and bonds of rural life 
have been disrupted throughout the continent. It is this population movement that has registered 
daunting challenges on the value; material; and institutional facets of rural life. Abraham 
(1992:15) construes this daunting challenge as the great population drain. He thinks that this is 
the great population drain from rural areas. These areas have transferred thousands of national 
populations to urban communities which have transferred to urban areas. Not only did this 
movement become a signifier of detrimental effects but it has caused frustrations on traditional 
cultures and norms. Key to these frustrations and detrimental effects is the very idea of family 
that has changed completely. The functions and prerogatives of the old lineage group has 
become a big question for citizens who reside in urban and industrialized communities. Not 
only is this so but it is not entirely clear whether lineage groups continue to have discernible 
impacts on the education and the shaping or upbringing of children in large cities. This is 
simply because, in their upbringing, urban children tend not to be well acquainted with the 
dictates of the traditions for any lineage group (Abraham, 1992).  
When it comes to children and their peer groups Abraham (1992: 17) argues that the rural 
settings in the past and today especially in small tight knit communities would supply a 
framework for their initiation as adults and their training in social institutions. However, in the 




traditional cultures are thwarted without equivalent substitutes (Ibid., 17). Just like Africans 
residing in large-scale communities, their way of life is neither in tandem with social nor ethical 
norms of their original cultures. It is said that these cities are filled with those who hold on to 
aspirations of individual success as opposed to or distinct from family success.  As Abraham 
(1992: 18) argues, this is primarily because they are little inclined to sacrifice children’s 
opportunities and their own in favour of their siblings, nephews, and nieces. For this reason, 
this is not a community whose members are “bound together by common blood and feelings 
of extended familyhood” (Bodunrin, 1991: 69 – 70 in Ciaffa, 2008: 36).   
5.3 The Architecture of the Matolino-Kwindingwi-Metz Debate.  
The architecture of the debate and contributions glued from it spark a certain kind of 
philosophical exploration that centres on ubuntu and its relationship with modern African 
realities. The present section delves on the architecture of the debate that hinges upon two 
camps: de-centralizing and pro-centralizing camps. It conceives of the debate as de-centralizing 
and centralizing ubuntu’s place in modern societies. It renders initiators of the debate as 
anchors for the de-centralization and centralization of ubuntu’s place in modern Africa. The 
first camp is composed of Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013); Matolino (2015), whereas the 
second one is composed of Metz (2014) and a number of his publications he deems relevant to 
the debate. 
These camps do not take modern African realities for granted. In fact, I read them as taking 
modern realities seriously. I read these opposing camps as following Taiwo’s (2009) insistence 
that the continent must overcome its numerous present difficulties and evaluate its relationship 
with the project of modernity. Whilst the first camp decentralizes the relevance [if not place] 
of ubuntu in modern Africa, the other camp centralises its relevance and place for modern 
Africa. I wish to argue that the reading proposed here will illuminate and inspire a philosophical 
interrogation that renders ubuntu’s relevance as its underlying motif. The reason why this 
reading renders the relevance of ubuntu as its underlying motif is simple because it attempts to 
spark a certain kind of investigation about ubuntu in modern Africa.  
These camps orient the reader to a scant examination of ubuntu’s relevance that must be 
attended to in the debate.  This chapter chats a different direction I deem suitable for reading 
the debate and how its initiators secure ubuntu’s place. From the point of view of this current 
research on ubuntu and its project with the facets of modernity, the impression I get, when I 




searches for new ways of saying yes to Metz’s claim to fame. Metz’s claim to fame here refers 
to his invitation to other scholars that might see the need to respond to Kwindingwi and 
Matolino on their own (Metz, 2014: 65 – 66).  
5.3.1 The De-Centralizing Camp.  
This camp cuts across two features in its attempt to take modern realities seriously. Firstly, it 
seeks to decentralize the place of ubuntu by separating it from the menu of realities the camp 
deems as characteristic of modern Africa. Secondly, it argues that ubuntu’s relevance is placed 
and served by a small fraction: remote and most traditional communities. In no way does this 
suggest that other features that one could glean from Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013) and 
Matolino (2015) are non-existent. However, I appeal to these two-pronged features for the 
purposes of what I characterise as a decentralizing camp. These features are mentioned to tease 
out distinctions between ubuntu’s “hereness”, and the “no-where-ness” of an ubuntu ethic. By 
doing so, this section proceeds by way of providing answers to the following question: What 
sort of communication does each feature make in its venture to decentralize or pinpoint the 
place and relevance of ubuntu both in traditional and modern Africa?  
5.3.1.1 The First Feature: A Decentralization of ubuntu’s place. 
No doubt, ubuntu, at least for this camp, is separated from the menu of realities that modern 
Africa is conditioned under. For instance, modernity; industrialization; globalisation; 
individual creativity and capacities; individual and dissenting thought; the capacity for 
intellectual activity; varying shifts that retain multiple identities and other dynamics that could 
possibly direct and shape current African life (Matolino and Kwindingwi, 2013). Scholars of 
ubuntu might insist that it does place a high premium on modern realities. But it could be 
argued that such a premium would not be wide open for other realities and needs that modern 
Africa is conditioned under. This menu of realities is wired up by a number of interests that are 
human, natural, and equally important for a modern society.  
Indeed, I read Matolino and Kwindingwi as questioning the tenability of ubuntu in modern 
Africa since the visibility for the present state of its nowhere-ness is made manifest in this 
camp. It is this camp that decentralizes ubuntu and drags it into the status of nowhere-ness. 
They push for its nowhere-ness in the sense that the present state of its place and relevance is 
fragmented by calls for taking African reality together with its relationships with the facets of 
modernity not lightly. The reason why ubuntu is nowhere in large scale and industrialised 




of modernity, individual capacities, and potentialities.  In as far as this camp decentralises the 
place (if not relevance) of ubuntu, one must note that it does so to shift ones focus to taking 
modern realities very seriously. What this shows is that Matolino and Kwindingwi’s essay 
attempts to bring readers one step closer to taking modern African realities not lightly. Not 
only does it take them very seriously by recognizing other experiences that are characteristic 
of modern African societies, but it does so by also insisting on them not being taken for granted. 
What one will acknowledge is that when other experiences are taken seriously and not for 
granted, he or she will somehow concede that ubuntu is not fit and therefore cannot fully 
account for modern African realities.  
It is my view that the constitutive features of a critique by Kwindingwi and Matolino leaves no 
doubt that ubuntu is subjected to vigorous scrutiny since they show that it is unwarranted in 
modern societies. I read them as committed to views that seek to canvass the downfall of ubuntu 
and the rise of modernity discourses. Their understanding of what they take a modern society 
to be, together with its present state and realities, cause them to reveal the challenges that 
bedevil ubuntu, and therefore expose its limitations. Insisting on other dynamics and multiple 
identities that shape modern Africa is all there is to their recommendation that ubuntu has 
reached its end. This end of ubuntu is warranted or inaugurated by its limits to be in concord 
with the dictates of modernity or other dynamics that have characterised what a modern society 
is likely to be. However, it must be borne in mind that this camp does not deny that there are 
academics and elites who push for its place or where-ness in modern Africa. Matolino (2015) 
makes it quite clear that those who are involved in this enterprise bend ubuntu to their own 
proclivities. Since the present state of its where-ness is occasioned by elites, Matolino and 
Kwindingwi suggest that they are advocating for ubuntu’s relevance without being explicit 
about their political moves. 
5.3.1.2 The Second Feature: The Only Hope/Right Place for Ubuntu’s 
Relevance. 
The second feature demonstrates that the question of ubuntu’s relevance ought to take place in 
rural communities and ought not to take place in modern communities. It is this camp which 
construes ubuntu’s relevance as placed and served by a small fraction: remote and most 
traditional communities. For this reason, Matolino and Kwindingwi focus on small 
communities as the right place to locate ubuntu’s relevance. These philosophers do not deny 
that ubuntu stands somewhere. The sort of evidence they point readers to especially about its 




is evinced by the first feature. Central to their advocacy for the end of ubuntu is the recognition 
of its “here-ness” in modern Africa especially the “here-ness” of ubuntu that is maintained by 
elites and academics etc. But Matolino (2015) argues that those who are engaged in affirming 
its relevance and “hereness” for modern Africa twist ubuntu to their own purposes and 
proclivities. Since the present state of ubuntu’s “where-ness” is dragged into small-scale 
communities, Matolino and Kwindingwi think that this is the only place where ubuntu can 
register its howling success.  It is for these reasons that they deem ubuntu as only endowed to 
be relevant to this community. This is precisely because the status of ubuntu’s relevance is only 
upkeeped by communities of this sort. This is simply because they insist that if one recognises 
the irreversible effects of industrialization and modernity one would see that the values of 
ubuntu are now extinct especially in large-scale societies where multiple identities and 
divergent ideas flourish.  
As a result, for one to see the values of ubuntu as a reality for everyone, he or she must 
understand that ubuntu is possible once it is “embedded in the strictures of communalism”, 
because without communalism there is no possibility for ubuntu to register its success. This 
idea arises form Matolino and Kwindingwi’s view that “the mutability of African societies 
(away from their traditional antecedents) has rendered ubuntu dissonant with the naturalness 
of the opportunities for its realisation” (2013: 203). However, the present state for its relevance 
and here-ness is occasioned by Metz’s insistence on its beginning especially in matters 
associated with scholarly inquiry and political application. This is exactly what occupies the 
scope of the following section.  
5.3.2 The Pro-Centralizing Camp. 
In this camp, Metz can be read as creating a zeal for resisting Kwindingwi and Matolino’s 
position on the end of ubuntu. For Metz, ubuntu is in better shape as he has managed to develop 
it to suit the demands of modern African realities. This is what he seeks to affirm by also 
appealing to his numerous publications. The most important question at this stage is: what 
sought of justification could there be for ubuntu’s relevance, as construed through the prism of 
Metz’s rejoinder? The discussion that follows attempts to provide answers to this question.  
Metz focuses on urban communities as the right place to locate ubuntu’s relevance in southern 
Africa. For Metz (2014), ubuntu could not afford to be left behind; or at least be “left 
completely out of discussion” (Eze, 2006: 63) about changes that unfold in modern Africa. For 




this view, he conceives of ubuntu as being open to the dictates and facets of modernity. His 
rejoinder maybe construed as signalling the quest for coming into terms with the place [if not 
relevance] of ubuntu and its present state as an ethical theory for modern Africa. Metz concurs 
that it fits well and does account for these realities: in view of his ethical theory. He seeks to 
show that the centrality of ubuntu and its relationships with the facets of modernity and 
industrialized African societies deserve a better hearing. This hearing appeals to “the several 
norms and values associated with ubuntu”. These norms and values are the ones that Metz 
(2014: 65 – 66) qualifies as “a promising ground for a contemporary ethical theory”. These 
norms and values ground the possibility and place of ubuntu as an ethical theory for our own 
times.  
For this reason, I read Metz as rejecting an attempt to decentralise the relevance of ubuntu in 
modern African societies. Supporters of Chimakonam’s contribution might insist that Metz’s 
moral theory presents ubuntu into its better shape because it represents ubuntu’s present state: 
theoretical sophistication and proper mode of philosophising. This version of ubuntu is one that 
compliments modern demands since it breeds theoretical sophistication and proper mode of 
philosophising for our own times, or as Chimakonam (2016) would have us believe. Even 
Koenane and Olatunji (2017: 263) uphold that ubuntu is not only a competitive moral theory, 
but it is a theory that ultimately proves to be a desirable ethic. An ethic which could make a 
positive contribution in developing “moral character” in modern Africa. Metz gives us one of 
the major cities in South Africa to show that there are those instances where several norms and 
values of ubuntu compliment modern day African realities. Johannesburg is Metz’s actual case 
in point since he thinks that those currently residing there would surely live up to these values 
(caring; sharing; humanness; compassion and respect etc) of ubuntu. He then reasons – using 
a set of sentences – to attain correctness about the current state of ubuntu’s place in modern 
Africa: 
“Surely, those in large-scale, technologically developed societies can be humane, 
respectful, and compassionate and share what they have with others. [...] There is, so 
far, no reason to think that it is unique to a pre-industrial, small-scale setting.”  
(Metz, 2014: 68). 
Metz thinks that this major city is populated by people who are in consonant with the values of 
ubuntu. In other words, he is against Matolino and Kwindingwi’s insistence that the uniqueness 




This is the positive direction that will guarantee the place for ubuntu in modern societies for 
Metz. He thinks that being humane is not unique or limited to but rise above small-scale and 
pre-industrial settings. He is rest assured about the centeredness of ubuntu’s values even in 
technologically developed and large-scale societies. It is this centeredness that could be 
interpreted as assuring the relevance of ubuntu and its current state as an ethical theory for 
modern Africa. He insists that that being humane, compassionate, respectful, and sharing what 
one has is guaranteed in modern African societies. It is for these reasons that Metz might view 
his account as centralizing and complimenting ubuntu’s relevance with the facets and dictates 
of modernity. He contends that “being hospitable to strangers”49 is not applicable only to 
members of small and tight-knit communities but equally applicable to modern Africa. In his 
own words Metz (2014: 69) thus concurs: 
  “These facets of ubuntu are clearly not applicable only to members of ‘small and tight-
knit communities that are relatively developed. [..] I maintain that ubuntu provides all-
things-considered justification for certain relationships in contemporary (South) Africa 
that admittedly lack ubuntu to some (pro tanto) degree”. […] much more sharing, and 
caring is in fact possible in it.”  
He uses ubuntu to reappropriate it as a viable alternative for the dictates of modernity. He 
appeals to his works to show the viability and relevance of ubuntu for contemporary South[ern] 
Africa. He conceives of his works as a helping nudge that orients the reader to ubuntu’s defence 
that he deems relevant for modern Africa.   
No doubt, I read him as deploying ubuntu’s ethical theory as a template for modern African 
Societies. Metz deems ubuntu as an ethical theory that is in tandem with “how contemporary 
society could be organised so as to manifest more ubuntu”. It is quite clear for Metz that ubuntu 
is in concord with the facets of modernity (Metz, 2014: 71). He appeals to ubuntu as a moral 
theory to account for its centredness in modern African realities. The direction that he is 
heading in demonstrates that “ubuntu as a moral theory has a lot going for it”. The sort of 
positivity that one may glue from a lot that goes for ubuntu as a moral theory is “how 
individuals and institutions should be moral”. Metz then appeals to examples which show that 
ubuntu is relevant for modern Africa. Namely: Being hospitable to strangers; state bureaucracy; 
and Letsema (Metz, 2014: 69 – 70). He insists that agreeing with these example means agreeing 
 
49 welcoming visitors to a village; sharing one’s best food with strangers at least for a time; viewing everyone as 




that ubuntu is far from the end. He thinks that ubuntu is rather getting started in the sense of 
now being in a terrific position to steer away from undesirable ways of life with which it has 
been associated, such as sexism, and conservatism, and to incorporate the insights of science, 
the benefits of technology and more generally, the desirable facets of modernity (2014: 71). He 
understands ubuntu to be open up for modern demands (Metz, 2011; and 2014: 65 – 72). 
5.4 Is Ubuntu Still Relevant for Modern African Societies/Realities?  
This section proceeds from my reading of both camps. It seeks to argue that Metz’s camp fails 
to provide a strong justification for thinking that ubuntu can be deemed relevant for large-scale 
societies in Africa. This section draws on a preview of modern African realities, discussed in 
the first section of this chapter, and applies other relevant sources (e.g., Abraham (1992); 
Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013); and Taiwo (2016)), to sidestep Metz’s insistence that 
ubuntu’s relevance is not limited to small and tight-knit communities but is also served by 
another fraction: large-scale, and technologically advanced societies. The reason why his 
attempts do not succeed in placing a high premium on ubuntu’s relevance in large-scale 
communities is simply because there are spatial arrangements of many buildings in these large-
scale communities that make it difficult for ubuntu to be a success and reality for everyone. It 
is my view that cities like Johannesburg and Bloemfontein are devoid of common spaces for 
the unfolding of traditional communal living and ubuntu to thrive. The praise of communal 
living that is said to be witnessed in large-scale cities is exactly what Taiwo (2016: 95 – 96) 
subjects to scrutiny. He then accuses African scholars of forever singing the praise of 
communal living; the virtues of the extended family in these cities (Taiwo, 2016: 83). For this 
reason, I think the tenets of ubuntu are vulnerable to these cities because most individuals are 
not exclusively in tuned to its moral standards. I endorse the Matolino and Kwindingwi’s camp 
that denies its relevance for communities of this sort. These are not communities of similarly 
constituted selves. Instead, communities of this sort are neither characterised by substantial 
agreement regarding religious beliefs, customs and morals nor do they seem to have been 
characterised by a sense of solidarity, [interdependence] and a shared destiny (Bodunrin, 1991: 
69 – 70 in Ciaffa, 2008: 36).  
For this reason, modern and technologically advanced societies are far from what traditional 
and tight-knit communities were. And it is true that the old milieu is now gone on the African 
continent (Wiredu, 1980). There needs to be a distinction between traditional and modern 
societies. In other words, life in traditional societies is not the same as that of the modern, 




ubuntu in traditional, small, and undifferentiated societies. But the communitarian outlook that 
makes the successes of ubuntu to flourish is hardly true for a city like Johannesburg. This city 
does not warrant talk of interdependence as the business or reality for everyone who really 
searches for his or her meaningful existence. It can thus be understood as exhibiting different 
cultural systems which are not necessarily complementary fragments of one whole. Rather, 
they are divergent in their inspiration, orientation, structure and in their aims and methods of 
inculcation (Abraham, 1992: 18).   
However, a reasonable person of the opposing view might object that my argument is not 
convincing at this stage. She might agree with Metz that ubuntu is open for modern demands. 
She might argue, just like Metz, that being humane, compassionate, respectful, and sharing 
what one has is guaranteed in modern African societies. She could extend his objection to 
claiming that Metz might still have a coming back. Let us say this person believes in the 
relevance of ubuntu both in urban and rural communities. Let it be supposed that this individual 
person recognises that a “de-centralizing” camp aims to question the specific relevance of 
ubuntu: the one that she might glean from its first feature. Let us imagine that she understands 
that, for the first camp (but its second feature in particular) ubuntu’s relevance continues to 
thrive in small-scale and tight-knit communities. Now the most important question she might 
pose is: does the first camp succeed to constructing any theoretical sophistications and 
complexities that morph modern conditions into the status of destroying the tenets of ubuntu? 
By this question she might argue that there are other instances where ubuntu could flourish 
very easily in modern societies.  
For this reason, she might identify an individual person, let us call him “Mehluko”, an adherent 
of ubuntu who succumb to both “the lure of the city” and his ancestral home (Abraham, 1992: 
15). Let us say Mehluko not only resides in a small-scale and tight-knit community but also 
works permanently and stays in a large city during working days. Mehluko returns home every 
Friday and travels back to his apartment in this or that large-scale city on a Sunday. However, 
she might say: if it is true that there are such people in urban areas who still hold on to values 
such as compassion; caring; honesty; kindness; and friendliness just like Mehluko, is it possible 
to reject Metz’s claim that people like Mehluko can be attuned to the dictates of ubuntu in the 
midst of all the realities modern societies are conditioned under?  
By posing this question she could aim to show that Matolino and Kwindingwi’s camp lacks 




experience seriously one would surmount Matolino and Kwindingwi’s insistence that the 
successes of ubuntu are limited only to communalistic societies. Not only is this so but human 
experiences such as these should count as important ones to have been voiced by the first camp. 
She might argue that if Matolino and Kwindingwi do not take note of this human experience 
they might be faced with the danger of being accused of articulating the end of ubuntu that 
lacks comprehensiveness. If indeed Matolino and Kwindingwi accept that ubuntu is relevant 
only in rural communities, is it not possible for it to thrive in urban areas if those who live in 
these (rural) communities also work permanently in large-scale and technologically advanced 
ones? She might suggest that Metz must be read as demonstrating this sort of human experience 
to those individuals who stay in large-scale cities like Johannesburg. If the human living 
conditions of Mehluko do not clash with other values that are characteristic of modern realities, 
then would Matolino and Kwindingwi still be convinced that ubuntu is only served by a small 
fraction? Should the living and human conditions of Mehluko be treated with much less 
seriousness just because he comes from a community that is said to be ‘intolerant towards 
divergent ideas’ (Matolino and Kwindingwi, 2013)?  She might conclude that even large-scale 
communities could serve as the right place to locate ubuntu’s relevance. Therefore, she might 
argue that this potential objection is plausible and can contribute to defending Metz’s “pro-
centralizing” camp. 
As a result, I conceive of this potential objection as a crucial one that could have been raised 
not only to sidestep a “de-centralizing” camp but also to support Metz’s “pro-centralizing” 
camp on ubuntu’s relevance for a modern African society. In other words, this is an objection 
that could have been voiced to provide answers to a specific question that serves as this 
section’s heading. However, a response to this objection would require one to understand that 
there are no theoretical sophistications and complexities that Matolino and Kwindingwi could 
tap into in order to demonstrate the problems faced by ubuntu in this instance. Rather, readers 
might understand that this camp seeks to report certain changes that unfold in modern African 
societies. 
It is my view that the protective connections and certitudes that could generate the fellowships, 
[ubuntu], and bonds of rural life have been disrupted by the very nature of technologically 
advanced societies (Abraham, 1992). The institutional facets of rural life and values that existed 
prior to colonialism and slavery have become vulnerable to the structures of individualistic 
societies, since these societies are a great signifier of detrimental effects that have caused 




detrimental effects are the very ideals of interdependence; familyhood or brotherhood that have 
changed completely. The functions and prerogatives of the old lineage group have become a 
big question for citizens who reside in urban and industrialized communities. Not only is this 
so but lineage groups no longer have discernible impacts on the cultivation of traditional moral 
standards. It is no hidden fact that rural settings and norms can easily flourish in tight knit-
communities but once one gets into modernised societies, he or she realises that that one could 
be said to be African without being an ubuntu adherent because they contain multiple identities 
that are not even aligned with the spirit of communalism. These cities do destroy or weaken 
the manifestation of one’s sense of lineage group greatly. Once this individual gets to 
understand urban settings, he could see that social controls that prevailed in traditional societies 
are weakened since the sanctions and instruments of traditional cultures are thwarted in modern 
societies (Abraham, 1992).  
For this reason, it is not true that all individuals in large-scale cities are moral agents of an 
ubuntu ethic since not everyone would want to validate his or her humanness in terms of life 
with certain values that a small-scale community cherishes. So conceived, a muntu can be an 
agent that is not necessarily a doer of ubuntu or an agent that participates in the perennial doing 
of ubuntu as the human quality, conduct or character and the essence of being human or African 
in modern African societies. Prizing communal relations is not the order or business of the day 
in these societies since a true human potential is no longer moulded by the tenets of ubuntu as 
a communal way of life alone.  Africans residing in large-scale communities would notice that 
their way of life is neither in tandem with social nor ethical norms of their original cultures. It 
is said that these cities are filled with those who hold on to aspirations of individual success as 
opposed to or distinct from family success. As Abraham (1992: 18) argues, this is primarily 
because they are little inclined to sacrifice children’s opportunities and their own in favour of 
their siblings, nephews, and nieces. From this point of view, it is clear that modern African 
societies are more about the self than ubuntu which is more about the community. Societies of 
this sort do not necessarily have passion for community or unselfishness: something that is so 
central to the survival of traditional communal relationships. Individuals in these cities are no 
longer inherently relational in the sense of being natural members of a traditional community 
that believes in social relations as a panacea for Africanness or meaningful existence.   
For this reason, ubuntu is not relevant for these societies because they are not the types of 
societies whose members are “bound together by common blood and feelings of extended 




premium in nurturing persons with reference to their traditional moral standards that prioritise 
talk of interdependence as the only epitome of Africanness. The African today is highly 
complex since he or she has a variety of cultural fragments. Her education has a strong capacity 
of inculcating her with a different conception of the individual and the individual’s 
responsibility to others. She is schooled by an education system that dominates her growing 
life and has a strong capacity to determine her future. Her hopes, aspirations fall within a new 
belief system which comes with its own axioms and postulates, its own norms, and its own 
ethic (Abraham, 1992: 14 – 18). In other words, there are those instances where individuals 
could be said to ignore the sense of community or interdependence as something that renders 
him or her to be mutually responsive to the needs of others. Not everyone in large scale 
communities owes his or her existence to the existence of others: something that is at the nerve 
of an “umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu” aphorism for an ubuntu ethic.  
For instance, it is not an exaggeration to claim that being sensitive to the needs of others or 
prioritising and fostering the spirit of communality that Africans are noted for, is a reality that 
is somehow overlooked in modern Africa. If ubuntu has registered its howling successes in 
modern Africa selfishness would be non-existent. Even if its values are there but it is still 
possible for persons to die of hunger because “selfish tendencies” - something that “hazvina 
hunhu” or lacks ubuntu - is natural in human beings. Human beings in general, desire what is 
beneficial to them and anything they do is for gain and glory. On this view, if a human being 
saves a little child from drowning, this is not necessarily done with clean hands or altruistically. 
But it is done to serve specific purposes. It is done for recognition as a heroic figure or to save 
a child to avoid the guilt of knowing they watched someone die (Zimunya; Gwara; and 
Mlambo, 2015: 11). 
As a matter of fact, if it is true that the spatial arrangements of many buildings in large scale 
communities make it difficult for the architecture of ubuntu and its spirit of communalism to 
flourish, then one would see that ubuntu is no longer relevant for complex and multicultural 
societies. These societies are devoid [..] of common spaces for the unfolding of communal 
living and ubuntu (Taiwo, 2016). Were this the case about ubuntu, then it certainly would be 
necessary to argue that a “pro-centralizing” camp does fail to prove its justifications for 
locating ubuntu’s relevance to modern and large-scale societies. If that were to be necessarily 
the case, then it certainly would be true and quite reasonable to claim that ubuntu is clattered 
with prizing communality, interdependence; a high price in recognising the other; the spirit of 




and Africa’s lost pristine mode of being – in recognizing or realizing dignified/meaningful 
existence or the only epitome and panacea of Africanness (Abraham, 1992; Matolino and 
Kwindingwi, 2013; and Taiwo, 2016). These are the realities that clatters ubuntu’s relevance. 
Therefore, it is my view that ubuntu is not relevant for modern African societies if it is clattered 
with these realities that are at the nerve of narratives of return or projects that seek to revive a 
specific modus operandi of being truly African.  
5.5 Concluding Remarks. 
In this chapter, I have sought to argue that the Matolino-Kwindingwi-Metz debate champions 
different postulations that either “jettison” or “endorse” ubuntu and its relationships with the 
facets of modernity. For this reason, ubuntu and modernity serve as its template for taking 
modern realities seriously. The chapter has chatted a direction that grapples with the question 
of ubuntu’s relevance that was outstanding throughout this project: is ubuntu still relevant for 
modern African societies/realities? By so doing, it has interrogated this question using the 
debate which I sought to read as de-centralizing and centralizing ubuntu’s place in modern 
Africa. In other words, the entire chapter conceived of the debaters as constituting “de-
centralizing”, as well as “pro-centralizing” camps. Its philosophical point of departure was that 
a “pro-centralizing camp” fails to account for ubuntu’s relevance for our own times. In the 
process of defending this position, this chapter appealed to a preview of modern African 
realities; the architecture of the debate as resting upon two competing camps in order to argue 
that ubuntu is clattered with realities that makes it (ubuntu) difficult and fail to account for its 














To conclude and give this project’s final epilogue, the previous chapters sought to provide a 
critical examination of ubuntu and its challenges in modern philosophical discourses. In doing 
so, this project subjected the Matolino-Kwindingwi-Metz debate and its two earlier 
commentaries (Chimakonam (2016); and Koenane and Olatunji (2017)) to philosophical 
scrutiny. The question of the relevance for ubuntu served as its key research question: What is 
the relevance of ubuntu in modern southern African societies? This research question served 
as this project’s recurring motif. This project’s original contribution rested upon two basic 
tenets since it is a starting point for giving the Matolino-Kwindingwi-Metz debate and its two 
contributors serious philosophical attention:  
(a) Its aim was to show that Metz’s, Chimakonam’s and Koenane and Olatunji’s 
arguments are neither compelling nor should they be adumbrated as standard replies 
to Matolino and Kwindingwi. 
(b) It was aimed at showing that ubuntu is not relevant for modern southern African 
societies. This was based on my reading of Matolino and Kwindingwi and Metz so as 
to search for ubuntu and its relationships with the facets of modernity with the attempt 
to deal with its relevance for our own times.  
This original contribution [(a) ; and (b)] was aimed at making sure that the debate and its two 
commentaries receive considerable attention or this was one of the gaps to be identified and 
filled up in this project. This project’s identification of both (a); and (b) with reference to the 
question of ubuntu’s relevance was surely to open new ground since these were underexplored. 
This was a starting point. However, this project only recognized two thinkers who mounted 
their skeptical notes against Metz’s attempt to defend ubuntu as an ethical theory and way of 
life for contemporary Africa. These thinkers were Bernard Matolino (2015) and Leonhard 
Praeg (2017). And it was not my aim in this project to subject them to critical scrutiny. Instead, 
I sought to introduce readers to my own interrogation of Metz which somehow draws 
inspiration from these thinkers. As a matter of fact, it is up to those scholars who are keen about 
(or fascinated by) this debate to deal with their (Matolino and Praeg) responses to Metz’s 
current defense of ubuntu for contemporary Africa. Readers might have noticed that this 
dissertation does not dwell on the philosophical significance of the Matolino-Kwindingwi 
conundrum as adumbrated by Chimakonam (2016) as well as his ‘Toward a conversational 




are not worth thinking through seriously. In fact, they are worth thinking through seriously. 
But this specific research is a ‘starting point’ for what may be conceived as giving this debate 
and its two contributors serious philosophical attention. So, it must be understood and carefully 
examined along these specific lines. This philosophical attention is served by the question of 
ubuntu’s relevance as this project’s recurring motif. Therefore, this project’s reading of 
ubuntu’s relevance with reference to this debate and its contributors is open to further 
fruitful/philosophical interrogations, critical scrutiny as well as informed and honest 
disagreements since it must be construed as a ‘starting point’. For the purposes of this project, 
I argued against two contributors and ubuntu’s relevance for contemporary Africa. 
Most importantly, this project started off by providing a critical exposition of ubuntu. This 
exposition aimed to demonstrate the broadness of ubuntu’s pertinent views. It sought to 
provide: a brief description of ubuntu; a brief construal of what ubuntu is as articulated by 
different thinkers and an account for the African community in understanding ubuntu. This 
account was limited to the role of the community in understanding ubuntu-: Chapters one. 
However, in order to bring readers one step closer to the vast recesses of the debate and its two 
contributors chapters two sought to provide a critique of scholarly inquiry into ubuntu. This 
critique attempted to challenge the logic behind affirming the possibilities of ubuntu’s 
relevance for contemporary Africa. It sought to rely on some of the affirmative assertions for 
ubuntu’s relevance/talk to lay a foundation for a critique I wanted to make about scholarly 
inquiry into ubuntu. These affirmations span from different interpretations: ubuntu and 
metaphysics; ubuntu as African education; ubuntu as African law/jurisprudence; ubuntu as 
humanism; ubuntu as cosmopolitanism; ubuntu as African ethics; and ubuntu as environmental 
ethics. It was at the level of detail that drew from a metaphysical grounding for these  
affirmations which manifested reactionary frameworks for an ubuntu ethic. This was done with 
the intention to foreground different ways in which the possibilities of ubuntu’s relevance have 
been affirmed in Southern Africa. My critique sought to penetrate the recesses of ubuntu’s 
affirmative postures, a little bit. In other words, it was at the level of detail that sufficed to build 
a foundation for thinking harder about ubuntu and its relevance throughout this project. As a 
matter of fact, I did not make a case for it being the best critique that one could offer in reaction 
to the logic for or behind ubuntu’s affirmative postures-: Chapters two.  
As a corollary to this line of critique, this project then tapped into the Matolino-Kwindingwi-




intended to bring readers a step closer to accepting the cogency of my arguments about Metz 
(2014); Chimakonam (2016); Koenane and Olatunji (2017), as well as my take on ubuntu’s 
relevance and how it fails to register its relevance for modern African societies. As a result, 
chapters three pointed readers to a logical inconsistency that haunts Metz’s rejoinder. This 
inconsistency bifurcates between his justifications for: (a) The beginning for ubuntu; and (b) 
The beginning for its projects that he deems as properly getting started. I then developed two 
objections against Chimakonam’s contribution. Firstly, I provided a response to his stand with 
Metz and Matolino on Metz’s systematization of ubuntu. I made a case for why it is not clear 
where he stands in his: (a) Approval of Matolino’s impatience with Metz’s systematization; 
and (b) His rejection of Metz’s systematisation. Secondly, I then subjected his “one way of 
credibly assessing” the debate to scrutiny. In other words, I pursued a specific line of critique 
which shows that Chimakonam’s ‘one way of credibly assessing’ the debate is not as credible 
as he makes it sound. In chapters four, I sought to argue that Koenane and Olatunji’s 
contribution is vulnerable to significant flaws: (a) Through a specific analysis of their 
contribution, I sought to demonstrate that the perspective they have adopted - in their reaction 
to Matolino and Kwindingwi - is not as different as they make it sound. Not only is this so but 
their perspective serves as a resuscitation of Metz’s perspective with different justifications. I 
also provided another analysis which shows that they have failed to provide a summary and an 
examination of Metz’s rejoinder. (b) I then pointed readers to their misreading of Matolino and 
Kwindingwi’s anecdote; (c) As well as their misinterpretation of Matolino and Kwindingwi’s 
understanding of  ubuntu.  
Chapters five was based on my reading of the debate so as to search for ubuntu and its 
relationships with the facets of modernity in its (ubuntu’s) attempt to demonstrate its relevance 
for modern African societies. This reading shows that this debate seeks to take modern realities 
very seriously: either by arguing that ubuntu is not in concord with the desirable facets of 
modernity, or by insisting that ubuntu is not vulnerable to the changes that unfold in modern 
African societies. However, for various reasons which were demonstrated in this final chapter, 
I sought to argue that Metz’s account fails to account for ubuntu’s relevance for our own times. 
My understanding is that ubuntu is clattered with realities that makes it fail to account for 
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